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Abstract 
Scaling big data infrastructure using multi-cloud environment has led to the demand 
for highly secure, resilient and reliable data sharing method. Several variants of secret 
sharing scheme have been proposed but there remains a gap in knowledge on the 
evaluation of these methods in relation to scalability, resilience and key management 
as volume of files generated increase and cloud outages persist. In line with these, this 
thesis presents an evaluation of a method that combines data fragmentation with 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme known as Fragmented Secret Share System (FSSS). It 
applies data fragmentation using a calculated optimum fragment size and encrypts 
each fragment using a 256-bit AES key length before dispersal to cloudlets, the 
encryption key is managed using secret sharing methods as used in cryptography.  
Four experiments were performed to measure the scalability, resilience and reliability 
in key management. The first and second experiments evaluated scalability using 
defined fragment blocks and an optimum fragment size. These fragment types were 
used to break file of varied sizes into fragments, and then encrypted and dispersed to 
the cloud, and recovered when required. Both were used in combination of different 
secret sharing policies for key management. The third experiment tested file recovery 
during cloud failures, while the fourth experiment focused on efficient key 
management.  
The contributions of this thesis are of two ways: development of evaluation 
frameworks to measure scalability and resilience of data sharing methods; and the 
provision of information on relationships between file sizes and share policies 
combinations. While the first aimed at providing platform to measure scalability from 
the point of continuous production as file size and volume increase, and resilience as 
the potential to continue operation despite cloud outages; the second provides 
experimental frameworks on the effects of file sizes and share policies on overall 
system performance. 
The results of evaluation of FSSS with similar methods showed that the fragmentation 
method has less overhead costs irrespective of file sizes and the share policy 
combination. That the inherent challenges in secret sharing scheme can only be solved 
through alternative means such as combining secret sharing with other data 
fragmentation method. In all, the system is less of any erasure coding technique, 
making it difficult to detect corrupt or lost fragment during file recovery.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Information Technology (IT) resources available in the cloud have made the adoption 
attractive in service sectors [1] as a result of growth in knowledge economy placing an 
emphasis on the provision of consistent data availability for quick decision making. 
However, with the growth of data regarding types and sizes, concerns have been 
raised on how best to transmit data securely as well as share and make them readily 
available uninterruptedly irrespective of the size and type.  
Adi Shamir [2] and George Blakely [3] did classic publications in 1979 on how to 
share data securely without using encryption key known as keyless encryption by 
defining a method that breaks data (secret) into a number of shares and a certain 
number of these that can come together to recover the secret of which any number less 
than these cannot, later to be known as Secret Sharing Scheme. The number of shares 
created is equivalent to the number of participants, and the number that is required to 
recover the secret is known as the threshold, this is known as share policy. This 
scheme uses two main protocols (algorithms) of secret share creation and recovery. 
The application has proved to be secure, resilient, reliable and efficient in sharing and 
recovering data in a distributed system. The use of secret sharing scheme has some 
inherent limitations, of which are the inability to provide data operations at large-scale 
data size and the effects of changing share policies on system overheads.  
Keyless encryption implies breaking data into shares in such a manner that each share 
of the data exists in a meaningless manner and only a certain defined number known 
as threshold or more can come together to recover the original data. 
A share policy implies a defined threshold (m) and maximum number of shares (n) to 
be made from a data. Where data recovery is only possible when the threshold shares 
(m) or number of shares equal to the total number of shares (n) are put together using 
an algorithm. 
The word cloudlets, Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) and clouds are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
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1.1.1 Cloud systems 
In the face of these current realities, we present an evaluation of a method for sharing 
large-scale data infrastructure in multi-clouds using a combination of data 
fragmentation and secret share scheme. A system that can provide consistent data 
availability, high-level scalability and security, as well as maintaining data integrity 
within cloud-based architecture know as Fragmented Secret Share System (FSSS). It 
creates fragments from a file, encrypts each fragment and applies secret sharing 
methods as used in cryptography to create robust and secure keyless key management 
system in a multi-clouds data distribution system.  
The process involves the user providing the file(s) as well as choosing desired share 
policy for each operation, while the system provides appropriate optimum fragment 
size and number of cloudlets that will participate in the operation. It goes forward by 
breaking the file into chunks using the chosen fragment size, encrypting each chunk 
with different AES-256-bit key generated by a random key generator and then creates 
shares out of the encryption key based on user’s chosen share policy. The shares, as 
well as the encrypted fragments are stored with selected CSPs, and when the file is 
required, the key shares are recovered using the same key share policy in relations to 
the defined threshold and as well as the encrypted fragments. Each recovered key is 
therefore used to decrypt corresponding encrypted fragment, and with the fragments 
decrypted serially, the original file is recombined and file checksum performed using 
SHA512 to ensure file integrity before delivery to the file owner. 
1.1.2 Secret shares 
Shor et al. [4] suggests that the optimal way of sharing big data in multi-cloud 
environments is in the combination of data encryption and use of efficient secret 
sharing scheme in managing encryption key in the light of this, four experiments were 
performed to measure scalability, resilience and key management of FSSS and 
evaluate same with the evaluation frameworks developed by this thesis on the areas of 
scalability and resilience. The first experiments used defined fragment blocks to break 
file of varied block sizes - 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB and 1GB into 
fragments. The second experiments used an optimum fragment size defined as 15% of 
file size (this was derived from the observation of result trends in our previous work 
[5]) and used in breaking the above file sizes into fragments. Both were used in a 
combination of different secret sharing policies and our results showed that defining 
an optimum fragment size of 15% of file size produced less overhead than the first 
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experiment. The second experiment also provided high-level scalability at different 
secret sharing policies than the first. In the third experiments, file recovery during 
cloud failures were tested and showed that recovery were faster in as much as the 
outage does not exceed the defined threshold of the secret sharing policy in use. While 
the fourth experiment showed that improving on the concept of socialisation in secret 
sharing scheme as earlier proposed by Nojoumian et al. in 2010 could provide good 
key management system in multi-cloud architecture that can mitigate losses 
occasioned by cloud outages. 
The results of evaluation of FSSS with respect to similar methods using the  
frameworks designed by this thesis suggest that the method of using calculated 
optimum fragments size in breaking data into fragments and managing encryption 
keys with an efficient secret sharing scheme provides much more optimal means of 
sharing large-scale data infrastructure than suggested by Shor et al. [4]. In addition, it 
also provided a 4-in-1 level of security to data through fragmentation, encryption, 
redundancies and robust key management through secret share system. With the 
resilient nature of the system even in the face of 60% cloud failures as well as the 
robust key management system, the method showed promises in redefining cloud-
based disaster management from that of system recovery to mitigation of losses 
occasioned by cloud-based disasters. In all, the system is weak in the area of detecting 
malicious, corrupt or lost fragment during file recovery and does not implement a 
threshold scheme nor applied an erasure coding technique in data storage 
management. 
1.2 Disaster Recovery and Fail-Over System 
An estimate that one in every four businesses will not be able to survive a disaster 
according to US government makes information technology disaster recovery plan an 
invaluable investment for business owners [6]. Disaster, as an unexpected event in a 
system lifetime, can be natural or man-made and its recovery could be traditional or 
cloud-based [7]. In all, the essence of disaster recovery system is for business 
continuity, and this needs to be pursued within the least possible cost to business 
owners during failover or failback phase.  
OnlineTech [8], in their disaster recovery white paper listed in order of priorities, 
increased reliance on technology, increased business complexity, increasing frequency 
and intensity of natural disasters, increased reliance on third-parties and others as 
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reasons why business owners should consider disaster recovery plan as a way of 
ensuring business continuity. In all, this thesis tends to change the status quo from 
disaster recovery to disaster mitigation through robustness and resilience using data 
fragmentation technology, secret sharing scheme as well as multi-cloud architecture. 
Figures 1 and 2 show an example of an existing model as designed by Gu et al. in [9]. 
In Figure 2, Cloud Provider 1 (CP1) is the major data disaster recovery provider to 
customers of different levels, while in Figure 1, CP2, CP3 to CPM are collaborative 
cloud service providers that provide other cloud resources to support CP1 in Figure 2. 
CP1
Cloud Interface
CP2 Cloud Interface
CPM
Cloud Interface
CP3 ...
Cloud Interface
Request Buffer
Replica Scheduler Resource Manager
Metadata
 
Figure 1: Data Backup Model [9] 
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Cloud Interface
CPY Cloud Interface
CPZ
Cloud Interface
CPX ...
Recovery Proxy
Cloud Interface
Recovery Manager
Metadata
Replica 1 Replica 2 Replica 3...
CP1
Figure 2: Data Recovery Model [9] 
1.3 Secret Sharing Scheme 
The deviation from key-based to keyless encryption was introduced by Adi Shamir 
and George Blakely in 1979 [2, 3] in two different seminal papers, each presented to 
the world a different means of securing cryptographic keys. Their works focused on 
splitting the key into meaningless shares in such a way that it will take only a certain 
number of the broken keys (shares) known as a threshold to come together and 
reconstruct the key and any number less than the threshold cannot. This concept was 
later known to be Secret Sharing Scheme. 
This scheme focuses on the techniques used in striping and distribution of data among 
many participants in such a way that a certain number of the participants, known as 
the threshold, can come together and recover the original data while a certain number 
less than the threshold cannot [10]. The Shamir Secret sharing scheme is an ideal 
scheme and known as a perfect scheme [2], while many provide computational 
security such as [11]. Krawczyk [11] is of the opinion that an (𝑛, 𝑚) −secret sharing 
scheme is a randomised protocol that stripes a secret S and disseminate same as shares 
to an n participants in such a way that only an m participants shares are capable of 
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recovering the original secret for m, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛, while 𝑚 − 1 shares cannot give any 
information on the secret as presented by [2, 3].  
Using real-life scenario with diagrammatic representations in figures 3 and 4, we take 
for instance a beverage company, the owner wants to make their recipe a top secret. 
Their intention is to prevent their managers from learning the recipe and in so doing 
decided to use an algorithm to break their recipe into shares (Si) in such a way that a 
certain number of the shares (M) will be enough to recover the recipe out of the total 
number distributed to managers (N). After breaking the recipe into shares, the shares 
were distributed to say four of their top managers knowing that at least two from the 
four are needed to get the recipe back. This total number of shares made of the recipe 
is equivalent to the number of players (Managers) and the minimum number required 
to get the recipe back is known as a threshold.  
 
Recipe
Chairman
Sharing Algorithm
Manager 1 Manager 2
Manager 3 Manager 4
Shares
431 2
Figure 3: Diagram of a Secret Sharing System 
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Recipe
Beverage
Manager 1 Manager 2
Manager 3 Manager 4
Shares
32
Recovery Algorithm
 
Figure 4: Diagram of a Secret Recovering System 
1.4 Research Questions 
The core research questions which this thesis aims to address are: 
• Several methods of data fragmentation in conjunction with secret sharing scheme 
have been proposed as fit for use in multi-cloud architecture, but with the advent 
of big data infrastructure, which of these methods can continue operation at 
different changes of file size and share policy making it suitable for use in large-
scale data infrastructure? 
• The use of multi-cloud architecture is to improve on redundancy technique and 
make data readily available. As cloud failures persist, is there a storage method 
that can ensure consistent data availability irrespective of cloud failures, and how 
does one understand different rates of cloud failure based on chosen share policy? 
• Data fragmentation technique that combines secret sharing scheme for key 
management has been adjudged better in performance in multi-cloud environment. 
How does this method tend to overcome the complexity of key retrievals during 
adverse situations as key retrievals are impossible when outage exceeds defined 
threshold? 
1.5 Aim and Objectives 
This thesis is focused on the evaluation of fragmented secret share system, a method 
for sharing large-scale data infrastructure in multi-clouds using a combination of data 
fragmentation and secret share system with respect to scalability, resilience and key 
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management in relation to current available practices. To be able to meet the above 
stated aim, these objectives are therefore defined:  
Objective 1: To build an evaluation framework that defines scalability using the 
metric of continuous operation at different changes of file size and share policy.  
Different methods of data fragmentation exist in data sharing and retrieval in multi-
cloud environment but there is a gap in knowledge on what constitutes scalability of 
these methods and how to evaluate them. The interest of this thesis is on such methods 
that incorporate secret sharing scheme in its data fragmentation technique. In view of 
this, an evaluation framework that defines scalability in such a manner that when file 
size and share policy change, there is no significant effect on data sharing and 
retrieval is developed. This thesis also uses same to evaluate different data 
fragmentation methods in multi-cloud systems in order to assess their suitability for 
use in large-scale data infrastructure. 
Objective 2: To further develop an evaluation framework that defines resilience 
of a method as the ability to avoid downtime and data losses during acceptable 
level of cloud failures.  
Use of secret sharing scheme in data sharing in multi-cloud architecture are of two 
options, data sharing and key management. These explore the resilient nature of secret 
sharing scheme in their implementations, measuring this resilient nature using an 
evaluation framework has therefore become very important. This thesis using the 
existing knowledge in literature that the acceptable level of cloud outage in these 
methods lies only when the number of shares to recover original secret is greater than 
or equal to the threshold (𝑛 ≥ 𝑚). In view of the above, this thesis therefore evaluates 
different methods’ ability to validate this fact, the relevant information about the 
behaviours of CSPs at each rate of cloud outage and what is being done to mitigate the 
above bottleneck. 
Objective 3: To evaluate how different methods used in data sharing in multi-
cloud architecture handle the perceived complexity in key management.  
It is believed that this complexity is more on retrieval process as the more complex the 
retrieval interface is, the greater the challenge of deploying key retrieval in 
applications such as decrypting encrypted file. The evaluation of how different 
methods of key management fits into the above definition of resilience in Objective 2, 
and the implication of its application in order to provide a hitch-free key retrieval 
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process at different rates of cloud outage in addition to information on what is being 
done through this thesis to propose a mitigating factor using self-organisation forms 
part of our objective. Furthermore, providing information on the potential of 
fragmented secret sharing scheme in mitigating losses occasioned by cloud-based 
disaster rather than minimising the recovery time objective of cloud-based disaster 
remains one of this focus.  
1.6 Contributions  
• Cloud storage resources provide quick access to data as computing is usually 
on the go. Using multi-cloud architecture for storage therefore increases access 
level as the system can rely on more than one cloud storage resources [9], [12], 
[13], [14], [15], and [16]. Secret sharing scheme as a method of data sharing in 
multi-cloud has remain a focus of research in this direction as many variants 
exist but the argument of its suitability for sharing large-scale data 
infrastructure persists. Alsolami and Boult in [17] are of the opinion that the 
use of Secret Sharing is an ideal solution and this position is supported by the 
works of Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Fabian et al. [12] but in all failed to 
scale data size above 500MB. FSSS by using a defined optimum fragment size 
(within the scope of this thesis experiments) and secret sharing in key 
management was able to continue production as file size increased 
exponentially making it suitable for use in large-scale data infrastructre. 
 
• Shor et al. [4] by their results suggests that the optimal way of sharing big data 
in multi-cloud environments is in the combination of data encryption and use 
of efficient secret sharing scheme in managing encryption key. But in the 
contrary, FSSS found out that using its defined optimum fragment size in 
breaking the data into fragments before encryption and managing encryption 
keys using efficient secret sharing scheme provide an optimal and highly 
scalable scheme that is best fit for use in large-scale data infrastructure. 
 
• This thesis evaluation shows two main methods for data sharing in cloud-
based systems. While one method combines data fragmentation with secret 
sharing scheme for key management of encryption keys such as Kapusta et al. 
[18], Abdallah and Salleh [19], Koikara et al. [20], and Pal et al. [21]. Another 
method relies only on secret sharing scheme for data fragmentation, like the 
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works of Alsolami and Boult [17], Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Fabian et al. 
[12] but none provided information on the relationship between file sizes and 
share policies at different applications scenario and this FSSS provides using 
extensive experimental frameworks.  
 
• There are many methods of data sharing in multi-cloud architecture, but the 
interest of this thesis is limited to data sharing methods that utilises secret 
sharing scheme in its design methodology. In order to provide a secure content 
sharing of data in public cloud, Xiong et al. [22] through CloudSeal provided a 
system of data sharing that integrates multi-cryptographic system such as 
symmetric encryption, proxy-based re-encryption, and threshold, m-out-of-n 
secret sharing scheme in conjunction with broadcast revocation mechanisms 
and by so doing provide an end-to-end security and privacy of distributed data 
in pubic cloud. Fabian et al. [12] in other hand developed a method of 
collaboratively and inter-organisational sharing of big data in healthcare sector 
using attributed-based encryption for access control and secret sharing scheme 
for data sharing in multi-clouds. DEPSKY [23], a system that improves the 
availability, integrity and confidentiality of information stored in the cloud 
through the encryption, encoding and replication of the data on diverse clouds 
that form a cloud-of-clouds is a good example of real life application of Secret 
Sharing scheme in multi-cloud-based storage system. Other works like 
CloudStash [24] utilises secret-sharing, low cost cloud storages and multi-
threading to improve confidentiality, availability, performance and fault 
tolerance. Works like ARCHISTAR [25] by Loruenser et al., Li et al. in 
CDStore [26], and so on are some of the examples of data sharing methods 
that utilise secret sharing in multi-cloud architecture. From the above, there is 
no known work that contributed on the evaluation of these methods of data 
sharing with the view of finding their strengths and weaknesses to establish 
their suitability of applications in sharing large-scale data infrastructure using 
multi-cloud storage facilities. Providing this critical information forms part of 
the contribution of this thesis.  
 
• Some of the works above extensively utilised secret sharing scheme in data 
sharing, thereby providing keyless encryption in securing data such as that of 
Fabian et al. [12], Loruenser et al. [25] in ARCHISTAR, Ermakova and 
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Fabian [13] in defining a method that used secret sharing for health data in 
multi-provider clouds and Alsolami and Boult [24] in CloudStash: Using 
Secret-Sharing Scheme to Secure Data, Not Keys, in Multi-Clouds. In all, 
none of these works established relationships between file size and share 
policy combinations at both normal and adverse application scenarios such as 
cloud outages. 
 
• Use of secret sharing scheme has some inherent limitations, of which are the 
inability to provide data operations at large-scale data size and the effects of 
changing share policies on system overheads. The works of Abdallah and 
Salleh in [19] and [27] provided extensive information on all these without any 
known solutions and these are what FSSS provided using fragmented secret 
share system through defined optimum fragment size. By developing two 
evaluation frameworks on scalability and resilience, this thesis defined 
scalability as the ability to continue production even when file size increases 
exponentially and resilience of secret sharing as the ability to continue 
production in multi-cloud environments during adverse cloud failures. These 
FSSS’s results and future works suggest are the better approach than existing 
methods.  
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as: 
• Chapter 1. Introduction – Introduces some basic concepts of the work that will 
help capture the essence and knowledge gap being investigated as well as the 
proposed solutions. It has in details the research question, aim and objectives, 
comprehensive research overview and expected results from the research. 
• Chapter 2. Background – This chapter introduces the fundamentals of computer 
security alongside the uses and application of data striping technique, which forms 
the background technology for data dispersal in this report and FSSS architecture. 
• Chapter 3. Literature Reviews – Secret Sharing Schemes and their basic 
classification are discussed alongside its security limitations as there is no perfect 
security in cryptography. Because cloud storage forms major components of this 
work, a thorough and concise review of relevant literature relating to security of 
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the stored data in the cloud is also presented alongside that of disaster recovery as 
well. 
• Chapter 4. Experimental Design – This chapter is concerned with the steps used 
in the experimental setup through coding, execution of codes, result collections 
and computations to determine cloud behaviours during process executions.  
• Chapter 5. Data Fragmentation Evaluation in a Multi-Cloud Environment –
This thesis used this chapter to evaluate a method of fragmentation known as 
Fragmented Secret Share System (FSSS) alongside similar schemes that are built 
on Secret Sharing scheme so as to measure their levels of scalability in a multi-
cloud environment.  
• Chapter 6. Key Management Evaluation in a Multi-Cloud Environment – In 
this chapter, FSSS key management is presented with a view of evaluating same 
with similar methods that use secret sharing scheme in key management in the 
cloud as FSSS combines data fragmentation with encryption and manages the keys 
using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.  
• Chapter 7. Disaster Management Evaluation in a Multi-Cloud Environment –
This chapter aims to present some features of FSSS in comparison with similar 
methods that make it reliable, readily available and resilient, and how it tends to 
use these qualities to redefine disaster management using cloud-based resources 
from that of recovery from losses to mitigation against losses. 
• Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Works – This chapter presents the thesis 
summary, major findings, limitations and Future Works. 
1.8 Publications 
The publications that are core to this thesis are: 
 
• Buchanan, W. J., Lanc, D., Ukwandu, E., Fan, L., Russell, G., & Lo, O. (2015). 
The future internet: A world of secret shares. Future Internet, 7(4), 445-464. 
• Ukwandu, E., Buchanan, W. J., Fan, L., Russell, G., & Lo, O. (2015, August). 
RESCUE: Resilient Secret Sharing Cloud-Based Architecture. In 
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, 2015 IEEE (Vol. 1, pp. 872-879). IEEE. 
• Ukwandu, E., Buchanan, W. J., & Russell, G. (2017, June). Performance 
evaluation of a fragmented secret share system. In Cyber Situational Awareness, 
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Data Analytics And Assessment (Cyber SA), 2017 International Conference On 
(pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
• Buchanan, W. J., Ukwandu, E., van Deursen, N., Fan, L., Russell, G., Lo, O. & 
Thuemmler, C. (2016). Secret shares to protect health records in cloud-based 
Infrastructures. In 2015 17th International Conference on E-health Networking, 
Application & Services (HealthCom). Doi:10.1109/HealthCom.2015.7454589. 
ISBN 978-1-4673-8325-7. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the fundamental mathematical backgrounds and theory that the 
thesis will be based on. Two major concepts that feature prominently in this study – 
Data sharing and Cloud-based storage, as well as the supporting information theory 
has been brought to fore. Moreso, providing insight into some inter-disciplinary units 
that make up our research has become necessary here to a foster better understanding 
of this thesis.  
2.2 Fundamentals of Computer Security 
The human information need and the quest to meet with the demand has brought with 
it a new stage of the revolution known as a knowledge economy. In the face of these 
realities lie the fear of how secured the information being transmitted from one 
computer to another; the authenticity of the message signature and the assurance that 
the information being transmitted still retains its original contents. In dealing with the 
above subject matters, computer scientists through the years have been working on the 
science of disguising a message in such a way to hide its substance. This entails 
disguising a message (plaintext) into scrambled text (ciphertext), in a process called 
encryption. The process of turning the ciphertext back to its original format is called 
decryption.  
The art and science of keeping message secure is known as cryptography [24]. 
Encryption and decryption involve the use of keys to be able to encrypt and decrypt 
messages without fail, and these keys are usually exchanged between the parties 
involved in the process. This can be private key (Symmetric), private and public key 
(Asymmetric) or one-way hash method (Hash function). In transmitting these keys 
from one computer to another computer scientist use different mathematical 
algorithms. In symmetric key algorithms, we have DES, 3DES, AES, RC4, Twofish 
and so on, while Asymmetric Key we also have RSA, DSA, ElGamal and so on. In 
one-way hashing, we have examples like MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-
512.  
                         15   
 
2.3 Data Striping: Uses and Applications 
In a bid to bring solution to key management problems associated with key-based 
encryption as discussed above, a keyless encryption system was introduced with great 
impact in storage technology and one method to achieve this is data striping. This 
method is successfully applied in a distributed storage system. In storage technology, 
data striping is used to break data into chunks and subsequently dispersed to multiple 
storage disks. Striping technique as applied to several disks comes to bear when a data 
processing device requests data more frequently than a single storage device can 
handle. Its application is spread across the accessing of concurrent multiple devices as 
it increases total data throughput.  
One of its usefulness factors is in balancing input/output load across an array of disks 
such as in Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID). In FSSS as shown in 
Figure 5, we used data fragmentation, encryption and secret sharing scheme. The three 
as above are used in securing and dispersing data to different cloudlets as well as the 
encryption keys. A Splitter first breaks a file into fragments using a predefined 
optimum fragment size, calculated basically in relation to a percentage of the file for 
which most often lies from 15% of file size as derived from observations and 
measurements from previous results in [5]. The fragments each are encrypted with an 
AES-256 encryption key randomly generated by a key generator. Each of these keys is 
stored using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, where shares generated are dispersed to 
multiple cloudlets for which a predefined threshold is used to recover the key when 
needed. To recreate the file, the shares are recovered from the cloudlets for each key 
using recovery algorithm and uses so to decrypt each fragment and thereafter recreate 
the file by bringing the decrypted fragments together using a Combiner. 
2.4 Mathematical Background 
2.4.1 Information Theory 
This work centres on data distribution and its security within a cloud infrastructure 
and therefore will look into the mathematical background of information security and 
hence Information Theory. Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver [29] published in 
1948 a classic seminal paper that introduced the modern and meaningful way of 
thinking about communication of information. Information theory studies the 
transmission, processing, utilisation, and extraction of information. It defines the 
amount of information contained in a message as the minimum number of bits needed 
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to encode all possible meanings of the message, in as much as they are equally likely. 
In simple terms, information can be thought of as the resolution of uncertainty.  
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Figure 5: Data Fragmentation and File Reconstruction 
2.4.2 Definition and History 
Schneier [30] defines entropy measures as the amount of information or uncertainty 
contained in a message M given as H(M). Shannon defined the actual rate of a 
language mathematically as [30]:  
 𝑟 =
𝐻(𝑀)
𝑁
        Equation 1 
Where H(M) is the entropy, N is the length of the message and r is the rate of the 
language. The absolute rate, which is the maximum bits size that can be coded in a 
character, assuming all characters are equally probable, is given as [30]: 
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 𝑅 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝐿        Equation 2 
L is the number of characters in a language; the equation defines the maximum 
entropy of the individual characters. The redundancy of a language D is therefore 
given as [30]: 
 𝐷 = 𝑅 − 𝑟        Equation 3 
The information content of a symbol or event is defined by its probability. In relating 
this work to the security of a cryptosystem, Shannon theorised that there is nothing 
like perfect secrecy as ciphertext to the barest minimum reveals information about the 
plaintext, this it does by not being able to have a key as long as the plaintext 
(message) without possibly reusing any symbol, or character so as to be able to 
achieve perfect secrecy. Perfect secrecy is only possible in a One-Time-Pad. The 
entropy of a cryptosystem is therefore a measure of the key size K, given as [30]: 
 𝐻(𝐾) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝐾       Equation 4 
It is therefore worthy to note that the larger the entropy of a cryptosystem, the more 
difficult it is to crack. As information refers to the degree of uncertainty contained in a 
situation, it therefore correlates that the larger the uncertainty removed by a message, 
the stronger the correlation between the input and output of a communication channel.  
2.4.3 Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme 
Shamir (1979) work provides a good example of perfect secrecy. The scheme, which 
is a keyless scheme is known as perfect secret sharing [2]. It involves two protocols, 
secret sharing and recovering. Shamir’s Perfect Secret Sharing (PSS) relies on the idea 
that on the principle that you can define a straight line with two points, three points for 
a quadratic equation, and so on, to give t points to define a polynomial of degree t−1. 
Hence, a method for t-out-of-n secret sharing can thus use a polynomial with a t−1 
degree using a secret for the first coefficient, and then random values for the 
remaining coefficients. Next, find n points on the curve and give one to each of the 
players. As a result, when at least t out of the n players reveal their points, there is 
sufficient information to fit a (t−1)th degree polynomial to them, in which the first 
coefficient is the secret. There are two conditions required for it to be perfect: if, and 
only if, t−1 shares provide absolutely no information regarding the hidden secret, and 
when the ratio of the length of the secret to the length of each of the shares (known as 
the information rate) is equivalent to unity. 
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To illustrate this construction technique, consider a concrete example. Assume that a 
secret value is split into five parts, three of which are needed to reconstruct the 
original data (i.e., n = 5, t = 3). The first step is to create a second-order polynomial 
[31]: 
 
y = a0 × x
0 + a1 × x
1 + a2 × x
2      Equation 5 
The second step is to assign the secret value to the first coefficient (i.e., a0) and choose 
random values for the remaining coefficients (i.e., a1 and a2). Suppose that the secret 
value is: 42, a1 = 1 and a2 = 2, then the polynomial becomes [31]: 
 
y = 42 + x + 2 × x2       Equation 6 
The third step is to calculate any five (x, y) pairs, for instance: 
x     ______y 
1  42 + 1 + 2 × 1  45 
2  42 + 2 + 2 × 4  52 
3  42 + 3 + 2 × 9  63 
4  42 + 4 + 2 × 16  78 
5  42 + 5 + 2 × 25  97 
Finally, distribute one pair to each player, e.g., Player1 receives (1, 45), Player2 
receives (2, 52), and so on. No player can thus tell anything about the original secret, 
unless at least three players exchange their information and yield equations like: 
45 = a0 + a1 × 1 + a2 × 1
2 
52 = a0 + a1 × 2 + a2 × 2
2 
63 = a0 + a1 × 3 + a2 × 3
2 
Hence, the three players together can work out that the secret value a0 is 42. This 
method works fine, but from a security point of view, a player can still obtain more 
information about the secret with every pair on the polynomial that they find. For 
example, player Eve finds two pairs (2, 52) and (4, 78). Although these are not enough 
to reveal the secret value, Eve could combine them together and get: 
76 = a0 + a1 × 4 + a2 × 4
2 
52 = a0 + a1 × 2 + a2 × 2
2 
Therefore, Eve can work out that: 
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a0 = 26 + 8 × a2 
So, Eve starts to replace a2 with 0, 1, 2, 3… to find all the possible values of a0. This 
problem can be fixed by using finite field arithmetic in a field of size r where: 
r > ai, r > N, r = p
k, p ∈ P where P is the set of primes and k is a positive integer. 
Then, calculate the pairs as [31]: 
  
y = f(x) (mod p)        Equation 7 
Where f(x) = a0 × x
0 + a1 × x
1 + a2 × x
2, as in equation 5 above. For example, consider 
the example of p = 61: 
x              p       y 
1  61  (42 + 1 + 2 × 1) % 61  45 
2  61  (42 + 2 + 2 × 4) % 61  52 
3  61  (42 + 3 + 2 × 9) % 61  2 
4  61  (42 + 4 + 2 × 16) % 61  17 
5  61  (42 + 5 + 2 × 25) % 61  36 
 
Shamir’s PSS is a promising approach to secret sharing for cloud storage, and 
provides many advantages, including: 
1. Secure—Anyone with fewer than t shares has no extra information about the 
secret than someone with zero shares. 
2. Extensible—When n is fixed; new shares can be dynamically added or deleted 
without affecting the existing shares. 
3. Dynamic—With this it is possible to modify the polynomial and construct new 
shares without changing the secret. 
4. Flexible—In organisations where hierarchy is important, it is possible to supply 
each of the participants a different number of shares according to their 
importance. 
 
2.4.4 The Social Concept in Secret Sharing 
The social concept in secret sharing as proposed by Nojoumian et al. [4, 5, 6] suggests 
that the resilient nature of secret sharing scheme can be strengthened by using it to 
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develop a self-organising system as it concerns the use of cloud storage resources. The 
concept mimics human social interactions where participants during social tuning 
phase are allocated more shares or disenrolled based on their reputation using 
calculated trust function that is based on response time and rate of availability during 
sharing and recovering phases. This implies that more cooperative players get more 
shares without exceeding the established threshold, while the non-cooperative ones 
get disenrolled from subsequent operations. 
This concept can be likened to a situation such as in Kit Kat Beverage Company 
where the Chief Executive Officer wants to make the recipe for their products secured 
in such a way that none of the top management staff can have it. In doing so, he/she 
decided to break the recipe into shares. Let us assume the Company has five top 
management staff named Alice, Bob, Charlie, David, and Grace. He will break the 
recipe into five shares in such a way that it will take only three out of the five staff to 
collaborate their shares to have the recipe and any number less than that cannot. Let us 
represent this mathematically (Recipe = S, participants (n) = Alice, Bob, Charlie, David, 
and Grace, Weight of each participants (W)): 
 𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=0,i≠j        Equation 8 
Where i is the index number of participants,  0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1,  0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 − 1, m is the 
threshold. At first, the weight (W) of all participants are initialised to 1.  
For a recovery process, each participant’s weight is determined by the Throughput and 
Availability Rate. To recover the secret, only the participants with better reputation 
(faster Throughput and Availability) but not more than the required threshold will be 
selected: 
 𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑖
𝑚−1
𝑖=0,i≠j        Equation 9 
2.4.5 Non-Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme  
In a situation where partial information about the secret has been gained by the  𝑡 − 1 
subsets of participants that cannot recover the secret value, a scheme known as non-
perfect secret sharing scheme has been established [35]. In this scheme, the size of 
shares (Si) most often is less than that of the secret (K) and therefore produces an 
information rate less than 1, as mathematically expressed in  [35]. 
f(0) = K                 Equation 10 
and: 
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 Information rate =
𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝐾
𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑆𝑖
≠ 1                Equation 11 
Where f(0) implies that the secret (K) lies at the position where X=0, which is the 
intercept, log2K is the size of the secret and log2Si is that of share, and 0≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. 
In Asmuth et al. [36] a method to safeguard key was proposed in which the shares are 
congruent classes of a number associated with the original key. It is an (m, n)-
threshold secret sharing scheme that applies the use of Chinese remainder theorem as 
well as prime numbers. As an example, in an (𝑚, 𝑛) −threshold scheme, consider a 
large prime, p, greater than M. Then choose n numbers less than 𝑝, 𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑n, 
such that: 
1. The d values are in increasing order; 𝑑𝑖 < 𝑑𝑖+1 
2. Each di is relatively prime to every other di 
3. 𝑑1 × 𝑑2 × … × 𝑑𝑚 > 𝑝 × 𝑑𝑛−𝑚+2 × 𝑑𝑛−𝑚+3 × … × 𝑑𝑛 
 
The strengths of this scheme is on its efficiency in the sharing and recovery of secret; 
its sensitivity to random errors; and the relation between the threshold (m), the m-1 
that cannot recover the secret (s), and the total number of participants (n). 
Brickell [37] worked on an ideal situation but for more general access structures, 
dealing with assigning each participant a level, which is a positive integer thereby 
forming a multilevel access structure consisting of the subsets. 
Implying that, at a level of 2, 1 or 2 participants are empowered to determine the 
secret, whereas, in a level of 3, 2 or 3 participants can. Simmons [38], proposed a 
compartmented access structure differing from that of a threshold access structure 
with a more general view. The access structure is arranged in different compartments, 
which are a disjoint set of participants, say C1..,Cu, containing positive integers tl, …tu, 
and t. This consists of all subsets containing at least ti participants from 𝐶𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑢, and a total of at least t participants.  
Some non-perfect secret sharing schemes like Information Dispersal Algorithm is 
discussed in detail in Section 3.22 as their contributions are necessary in 
understanding the scheme under review. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
Information theory as propounded by Shannon and Weaver [29] play an important 
role in understanding the concept of this thesis as it is centred on data at every stage – 
rest, motion and in use. So, the understanding of its core principle, background and 
practical application is important for clarity and better comprehension of this work. 
Knowing this will foster a better understanding of the mathematics involved in Secret 
Sharing Scheme as done by Shamir [2] and Blakely [3] in 1979.  
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an examination carried out to provide insights into the areas 
FSSS is premised. Relevant literatures are reviewed around the Secret Sharing 
scheme, such as that of Shamir, Rabin IDA, Krawczyk and Social Secret sharing 
scheme. The essence is to understand their potentials, weaknesses and applications in 
data security with reference to cloud data storage security. This thesis pays much 
attention to the limitations that make such scheme more suitable in key management 
than data sharing and dispersal in a multi-cloud architecture.  
The work of Shor et al. [4] is reviewed so as to elicit the reason behind our claim that 
using optimum fragment size in fragmenting data before encrypting and dispersal 
rather than encrypting the whole data is more optimal, scalable and suitable for use in 
large-scale data infrastructure. A review on cloud-based data storage system will help 
provide knowledge on the characteristics that encourage adoption, some major 
concerns and steps through research to address these challenges. One major area is the 
migration from single to multi-cloud storage as a measure to improve on availability 
and resilience of cloud data storages through redundancy technique. Furthermore, this 
thesis explored more works that ensure data availability autonomously or otherwise 
regardless of hardware failures, corrupted physical disks or downtime as well as their 
several key management methods.  
3.2 Secret Sharing Scheme 
In storage technology, data sharing is used to break data into shares and subsequently 
dispersed to multiple storage locations and original data is recovered when needed 
sometimes with fewer numbers of dispersed data known as a threshold. There are 
many types of data sharing techniques, the foremost being the works of Adi Shamir 
[2] and George Blakeley [3] later to be known as a Secret Sharing Scheme. While the 
scheme provides the method of securing data without encryption keys in a dispersed 
storage, it has proved to be insufficient for use with big data as they are not very 
scalable according to Buchanan [39], hence the use in securing encryption keys 
mainly as it will be too processor intense to use in securing data [39]. Shamir and 
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Blakely’s works came to be known as a perfect secret sharing scheme. Other variants 
of data sharing of interest to us are Information Dispersal Algorithm by Michael 
Rabin [40], which tends to reduce the storage complexity experienced in Adi Shamir’s 
Perfect secret sharing scheme. Our interest is in its broader application for data 
dispersals since it has high-performance throughput when used to disperse data 
whether in-memory or in the cloud as it does not encourage redundancy with a trade-
off on the perfect security of data. On a last note on secret sharing scheme is Social 
Secret sharing scheme (SSSS), which combines the features of Weighted Threshold 
Secret Sharing Scheme (WTSSS) [2], [41], [42], [43], [44] and that of Proactive 
Secret Sharing Scheme (PSSS) [45] in its design and concepts. We will be exploring 
its design principle of Sharing-Tuning-Recovery method in our future works while 
leveraging on this design to provide a self-organising system as proposed with a high 
level of data scalability in a multi-cloud architecture.  
3.2.1 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) 
Adi Shamir’s classic paper of “How to Share a Secret” is an example of a perfect 
secret sharing scheme. Thus implying that its information ratio is always unity for 
every process of secret sharing, as the size of the file is equivalent to each of the share 
created out of it. This implies providing perfect secrecy as shares less than the 
threshold cannot recover or learn of the secret, but a trade-off with performance. The 
larger the file size, the larger each share is and an increase in the number of 
participants in the sharing algorithm leads to higher storage overhead of the shares. 
With this, Shamir’s scheme is unsuitable for sharing large-scale data infrastructure 
according to [39], [31], [46], [5], [19], [13], [12], [18], [47] and [17].   
SSS has been classified as a threshold scheme known as (t, n) scheme and it requires 
two conditions to be perfect: if, and only if, t−1 shares provide absolutely no 
information regarding the hidden secret. Also when the ratio of the length of the secret 
to the length of each of the shares (known as the information rate) is equivalent to 1, 
these views are shared collectively by [48] and [31]. Shamir’s PSS relies on the idea 
that on the principle that you can define a straight line with two points, three points for 
a quadratic equation, and so on, to give t points to define a polynomial of degree t−1. 
Hence, a method for t-out-of-n secret sharing can thus use a polynomial with a t−1 
degree using a secret for the first coefficient, and then random values for the 
remaining coefficients. Next, find n points on the curve and give one to each of the 
players. As a result, when at least t out of the n players reveal their points, there is 
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sufficient information to fit a (t−1)th degree polynomial to them, in which the first 
coefficient is the secret. 
The work of Shamir [2] and that of Blakely [3] which as ideal schemes are the 
foundation of Secret Sharing Schemes. Shamir’s PSS is the foundation to a social 
secret sharing scheme as proposed by Nojoumian et al. [32] has applications and 
expansions  in [34], [33] and [49]. This thesis tends to adapt its core principle of its 3-
in-1 scheme of Share, Social Tuning and Recovery known as Sha, Tun and Rec with 
some modification in the Social Tuning protocol so as to be able to fit into our futurre 
research design in providing a redefined self-organisation different from their earlier 
proposal in [34] having found that their idea of social function has no place in disaster 
mitigation as  some factors of disaster are not human rather than natural. 
3.2.2 Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) 
Rabin’s [40] work is an example of non-perfect secret sharing scheme focused on 
dividing a secret S into n pieces in such a way that anybody possessing shares less 
than the threshold k can obtain the secret. Here, each secret Si, i ≤ n, is of size |S|/k, 
where |S| is the size of the secret. The total sizes of all the secrets are [31]:  
 (
𝑛
𝑘
) × |𝑆|                          Equation 12 
Thus, with the Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm, the storage complexity of a 
secret sharing system can be significantly reduced in comparison to Shamir’s [2] 
perfect secret sharing scheme. But the security flaw in this method is that, if the data 
exhibits some pattern frequently, and that the attacker gets hold of m < k slices, then 
there are great possibilities for him to get the secret S. 
Both the split and combine algorithms operate by performing matrix multiplication 
over the input. In the case of the split operation, the transform matrix has n rows 
(n=number of shares) and k columns (k=quorum), while in the case of a combine 
operation, the transform matrix has k rows and n columns. Either operation is 
described simply as the matrix multiplication [31]: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 × 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥                    Equation 13 
The transform matrix must have the property that any subset of n rows represents 
linearly independent basis vectors. If this is not the case then the transform cannot be 
reversed. However, understanding the requirement of linear independence is important 
in case a user-supplied matrix is provided and also for understanding the key 
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parameter to the split/combine routines. A key is defined as a list of field elements 
(i.e., 8-bit, 16-bit or 32-bit values) [31]: 
𝑥1,𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛,𝑦1,𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑘                              Equation 14 
whose values must all be distinct. If a key is supplied to the split routine, these values 
are used to create a Cauchy-form transform matrix [31]: 
𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 
    
|
|
1
𝑥1+𝑦1
1
𝑥1+𝑦2
   …
1
𝑥1+𝑦𝑘
1
𝑥2+𝑦1
1
𝑥2+𝑦2
  …
1
𝑥2+𝑦𝑘
⋮
1
𝑥𝑛+𝑦1
⋮ ⋮
1
𝑥𝑛+𝑦2
⋯
⋮
1
𝑥𝑛+𝑦𝑘
|
|
𝑛 𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑠            Equation 15 
Rabin’s IDA has shown so far as having high-performance throughput when used to 
disperse data whether in-memory or in the cloud as it does not encourage redundancy 
with a trade-off on the perfect security of data. 
Lin and Chung [50] developed a variant of Information Dispersal Algorithm in order 
to correct their perceived security flaw in IDA in the design of a coding system. In 
order to correct this needed flaw, they designed a system called An Efficient 
Information Dispersal Algorithm using Fermat Number Transforms. In a bid to 
improve the computational performance, security and integrity of IDA, Lahkar & R 
[51] modified the scheme by combining the All-Or-Nothing Transform [52] with 
optimised Cauchy Reed-Solomon code, this they did by using a modified AONT as a 
pre-processing operation over the data. 
An application of IDA in mobile networks aside, other application areas include in 
object storage in cloud [53] as provided in [54]. An evaluation of the effectiveness of 
this system called Reliable and Efficient Forwarding (REEF) using the Information 
Dispersal Algorithm (REEF-IDA) as against Reliable and Efficient Forwarding 
(REEF) [55] showed that the system REEF-IDA performed better than REEF by 
increasing the network throughput while decreasing both end-to-end delays and packet 
loss ratio. 
3.2.3 Krawczyk’s Computational Secret Sharing 
Hugo Krawczyk [11] proposed the Computational Secret Sharing (CSS) technique 
(a.k.a. secret sharing made short), which combines Rabin’s IDA [40] with Shamir’s 
PSS [2]. Data is first encrypted with a randomly generated key, using a symmetric 
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encryption algorithm. Next, this data is split into n fragments using Rabin’s IDA with 
a threshold t configured. In this case, the scheme is t times more efficient than 
Shamir’s PSS. The final step is to use Shamir’s PSS to produce shares of the randomly 
generated symmetric key (which is typically of the order of 64 to 256 bits) and then 
give one share and one fragment to each shareholder. 
A related approach, known as AONT-RS [52] as supported by [18], applies an All-Or-
Nothing Transform (AONT) to the data as a pre-processing step to the IDA. AONT 
guarantees that any number of shares less than the threshold is insufficient to decrypt 
the data. It combines AONT with Reed Solomon (RS) in order to achieve high 
security in a reduced computational and storage overheads. AONT-RS is the backbone 
used in Cleversafe, which has since been bought over by IBM in October 2015.  
3.2.4 Social Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) 
Social Secret Sharing Scheme as proposed by Nojoumian et al. [33], [32], [34] 
involves three-fold constructions denoted by (Sha, Tun, Rec) implying Secret 
Sharing, Social Tuning and Secret Recovery. Its major difference to other threshold 
schemes is the social tuning, in which the weight of each participant is either 
increased or decreased with reference to participant’s reputation.  
There are three basic assumptions in SSSS, which states that to recover the secret, the 
total weight of authorised participants must be equal to or greater than the threshold, 
∑ 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑝𝑖∈∆ ,  ∆ is the set of participants and wi is the weights of the participants and t 
the threshold; secondly, the weights of the unreliable participants must be less than the 
threshold, ∑ 𝑤𝑖 < 𝑡,𝑃𝑖∈∇  and finally, the weight of each participant is bounded by a 
parameter much less than the threshold, 𝑤𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 ≪ 𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
3.2.4.1 Share distribution 
In SSSS each participant receives a constant number of shares; the adjustments are 
made in accordance to each participant’s behaviours during each process and therefore 
it follows that the dealer generates a polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑞[𝑥] of degree 𝑡 − 1, where 
𝑓(0) = 𝑘, the secret, which is the constant term as stated earlier following [2] 
construction. Each participant Pi thereafter receives a share; 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 with respect to 
his weight wi before the dealer leaves the scene [33], [32], [34]. 
𝜑𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝜗𝑖𝑗 ) for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑖               Equation 16        
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Where 𝜗𝑖𝑗 = 𝑖𝑚 − 𝑚 + 𝑗 and m is the maximum weight of any participant, which is 
zero for all at the initial stage. 
3.2.4.2 Social Tuning 
Social tuning is the protocol used in SSSS to adjust the weights of participants as the 
process goes on as ab initio all participants receive an equal number of shares. The 
adjustments are made based on the participant’s activities during each process of share 
creation and recreation measured in terms of active collaboration and response time 
during share request for reconstruction. Simply, put it involves three stages namely: 
adjustment, enrolment and disenrollment stages assuming that the weights are 
increased or decreased one by one. In adjustment stage, participant’s availability and 
response time during the processes determine his reputation and thus result in the 
adjustment of their weight progressively or retrogressively. This is done using the 
following formulae [33], [32], [34]: 
 𝑃𝑖(𝐷): 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⇒ 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = ⌊𝑤𝑖(𝑝 − 1). (1 −
𝜏
2
)⌋              Equation 17 
Where 𝜏 = 𝑇𝑖(𝑝 − 1) − 𝑇𝑖(𝑝) ≥ 0 is the coefficient of weight reduction for non-
collaborative participants and whenever the weight of any participant is 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 0, 
the participant Pi is removed from the scheme. In the same vein, enrolment stage is 
activated whenever the weight of any active participant is to be increased by any 
value, at this point all the participants collaborate to generate a new share on the initial 
secret sharing polynomial for the participant, [33] has an elaborate details on 
enrolment protocol. Lastly, at the disenrollment stage, inactive participants are 
dropped when all the active participants gather to update their shares without the 
participation of the inactive ones. When this is done all shares are updated to be on a 
new secret sharing polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) but because the inactive ones do not participate, 
their shares remain on the old secret sharing polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) making them invalid 
and therefore can no longer participate in the secret reconstruction. The active or 
inactive status or reputation of each participant is known by using the trust calculation 
method proposed by [49] to calculate the average of the trust values in order to 
compute a participant’s reputation after each secret sharing process [33], [32], [34]. 
𝑇𝑖(𝑝) =
1
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑗
𝑗≠1 (𝑝)            Equation 18         
where −1 ≤ 𝑇𝑖(𝑝) ≤ +1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖(0) = 0. A new Trust Function has also been 
proposed for Social Secret Sharing in Cloud Computing by [34]. 
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3.2.4.3 Secret Recovery 
Just as in Shamir [2] authorised participants following earlier stated rules are able to 
recover the secret using Lagrangian interpolation once the condition ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑝𝑖∈∆  as 
stated earlier is met. The participants 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ∆ contribute their shares 𝜗𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 
to recover the secret 𝑓(0) = 𝑘.  
Eslami et al. [56] in their work, proposed a variant of social secret sharing scheme that 
proved to be more efficient in terms of share size, communication and computational 
complexities by using Birkhoff interpolation scheme as opposed to Lagrangian 
Interpolation used in Social Secret sharing scheme but admits that social secret 
sharing scheme is better in terms of social tuning and recovering of secret compared to 
theirs. While Traverso et al. in [57] provided a framework called Adaptive Social 
Secret sharing (AS3). The framework is a variant of social secret sharing that uses a 
dynamic approach in secret sharing and recovering. One major difference is in the 
dynamism of allocation of shares thus provides an efficient and optimal storage 
system than Social secret sharing scheme. The scheme also demonstrated through a 
proof of concept a different way of computing trust value as well as initialising such 
for newcomers. 
Social secret sharing scheme as proposed has its social tuning function based on the 
calculation of trust function as well as used perfect secret sharing in breaking data into 
shares and recovering it. Using such scheme for large-scale data infrastructure is 
unsuitable and determining cloud ‘behaviour’ based on results of two capacities such 
as response time and rate of availability will be relying on incomplete information in 
making a critical decision such as adjustment, enrolment and disenrolment of a 
participant. This is because cloud ‘behaviours’ can be affected by its multi-tenancy 
nature and hence the reason throughput fluctuates. So, it will be better to rely on more 
than two capacities such as throughput, reliability, transaction speed and Integrity. 
Moreso, using current statistics without looking at future ones may not be a correct 
approach as behaviours that are subjective can change. 
3.2.5 Secret Sharing and Multi-Cloud Architecture 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) define Cloud computing as a 
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
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effort or service provider interaction [58], others in contrast define cloud as an elastic 
execution environment of resources involving multiple stakeholders and providing a 
metered service and multiple granularities for specified level of quality  [59], [60], and 
[61].  
The major concerns of moving towards cloud-based storage have been security and 
availability of data when accessed. Several researchers defined that a multi-cloud 
storage platform might improve security and resilience [62], [63], and [64]. Based on 
these and to ensure effective data splitting and security of stored data, a secret sharing 
algorithm such as Shamir secret sharing has been proposed as an efficient scheme for 
multi-cloud storage [4], [65], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69] and [70]. Several other 
methods use Backup and Restore while some other ones replicate data at different 
storage areas using encryption to safeguard them. This type of methodology can be 
costly (in terms of network bandwidth and storage facilities), and not safe in the case 
of poor key management.  
3.2.6 Security Limitations of Secret Sharing Schemes 
Recent developments in information and communication technologies infrastructure 
stipulate a rapid growth of electronic data exchange. All the same, it is common for 
the public and private institutions as well as the industries to outsource massive 
electronic databases to storage centres. The cloud computing technology allows the 
users to work with such centres without even knowing their internal structure. 
However, storing all the data in one centre creates a single point of failure and raises 
privacy and availability concerns, especially in the sense of disaster preparedness and 
recovery. Secret sharing is a cryptographic technology, which allows us to address 
both privacy and availability issues simultaneously [71].  
However, in Dautrich & Ravishankar’s work [72], titled: Security Limitations of 
Using Secret Sharing for Data Outsourcing demonstrated that the claims made by 
three different works, [73], [74], [75] that when k shares that are required to recover a 
secret or more collude, adequate security of the scheme remains intact as long as a 
prime p and a vector X used by the secret sharing algorithm are kept private by 
describing and implementing an attack that reconstructs all secret data when only k +2 
secrets are known initially. With this experiment, they were able to recover a hidden 
256-bit prime for k ≤ 13 servers, or an 8192-bit prime for k ≤ 8 in less than 500 
seconds. 
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Moreso, Tompa & Woll [76] in their work: How to Share a Secret with Cheaters 
identified a flaw in Shamir threshold scheme that makes it susceptible to attack by 
Cheaters by assessing the impact of an active adversary who takes the form of a 
participant but maliciously submits a false share during a reconstruction phase. Take 
for example; some participant Pi submits a false share λi instead of a correct share f(xi). 
This without mincing words will result to the prevention of an honest participant from 
learning the correct secret thus failing to alert the other participants that they have not 
reconstructed the correct secret and this, in turn, allows the adversary to learn the 
correct secret (by exploiting knowledge of f(xi)−λi) [38]. 
3.3 Secret Sharing/Data Striping: 
Applications 
In storage technology, data striping is used to break data into slices and subsequently 
dispersed to multiple storage disks. Striping technique as applied to several disks 
comes to bear when a data processing device requests data more frequently than a 
single storage device can handle. Its application is spread across the accessing of 
multiple concurrent devices as it increases total data throughput. One of its usefulness 
is in balancing Input/Output load across an array of disks such as in Redundant Array 
of Independent Disks (RAID).  
Beyond this, secret sharing as a method of creating shares of data, disperse to multiple 
storage devices and recover when needed has been found better in security and 
availability of data. It has two major areas of application – data sharing and key 
management as has been applied successfully in the collaborative and secure sharing 
of healthcare data in multi-clouds in [12] where secret sharing scheme is used 
alongside attribute-based encryption in providing selective access authorisation in 
order to disperse data across multiple clouds. In [13], Tatiana and Benjamin 
demonstrated how they combined Shamir secret sharing scheme [2] and Rabin’s 
Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [40] for use in distributing health data to 
multiple cloud providers as fragments, which also have the ability to provide higher 
redundancy, security and privacy needed for safekeeping of the data in cloud system, 
while Shor et al. [4]  used same in managing encryption key successfully.  
Loruenser et al. [25] presented an architecture for secure cloud-based data sharing 
known as ARCHISTAR based on secret sharing scheme. The focus of the system is 
on providing adequate confidentiality to data; make it available against any active 
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attacks as well as robust even in the face of failures. There are other research solutions 
based on different variants of secret sharing schemes and multi-cloud architecture that 
give credence to its resilience in the face of failures, data security in a keyless manner, 
such as:  
Ukwandu et al. [46] worked on a research article titled - RESCUE: Resilient Secret 
Sharing Cloud-based Architecture, which presents an architecture of a system that is 
capable of implementing: a keyless encryption method with in-built failover 
protection. It aims to overcome many of the current problems within Cloud-based 
infrastructures, such as the loss of private keys, and inherent failover protection. 
While RESCUE provides an architecture for a resilient cloud-based storage with 
keyless data security capabilities using a secret sharing scheme for data splitting, 
storage and recovery; Alsolani & Boult in CloudStash [17] also relied on the above 
strengths to prove security of data using secret sharing schemes in a multi-cloud 
environment; Fabian et al. [12] provided empirical evidence of resilience and 
robustness in data sharing using secret sharing scheme in a multi-cloud environment 
and Buchanan et al. [31] predicted that future internet will be a world of secret shares. 
In all these, secret sharing was seen as limited in scope and therefore is unfit for use in 
sharing large data infrastructure, supporting the initial evidence provided by Buchanan 
[39] on limitations of secret sharing scheme applications. 
Lastly, of major interest to us is the use of data striping by International Business 
Machine (IBM) for Cloud Object Storage [53]. The system uses data striping as an 
innovative approach for storing a large volume of data while ensuring security, 
availability and reliability. It uses a modified Rabin’s IDA by introducing symmetric 
Reed Solomon to stripe data and distribute same across multiple data centres securely. 
No single node contains a complete copy of the data and only a subset of nodes needs 
to be available in order to fully retrieve the data on the network. This work previously 
known as Cleversafe before being bought over by IBM in October 2015 provides 
better alternative to the idea of data replication and remain a pioneering work in our 
area of interest in combining data striping with multi-cloud architecture in achieving 
reliance, availability, security, resilience and scalability for big data but failed to 
interpret robustness in the area of self-organisation, rather use canary for corruption 
checks and encode data with encryption key while dispersing and this according to 
Schneier [30] is more tedious than encryption itself.  
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3.4 Performance Evaluation of Secret 
Sharing Schemes 
Secret sharing scheme has two main application areas: data sharing and recovery and 
key management. While proponents of use for data sharing are of the view that using 
such is scalable; secure, resilient, improves data confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. In the other hands, the other proponents argue that secret sharing scheme 
has inherent bottlenecks that make it unsuitable for use in sharing and recovering 
large-scale data infrastructure as it was originally proposed for use in managing 
encryption keys. The performance evaluation of these positions will be reviewed here 
to ascertain the necessary bottlenecks, knowledge gaps and suitability of both 
positions for use in sharing large-scale data infrastructure in multi-cloud architecture. 
3.4.1 Scalability 
This thesis defines scalability of data sharing methods as the ability of a method to 
continue production even when file size increases exponentially, this will form the 
basis of our review on the concept of scalability of secret sharing scheme in data 
sharing and recovery. The essence is to ascertain the available knowledge gaps in this 
area of application of secret sharing scheme. 
Alsolami and Boult in [17] built a system called CloudStash, which posits that secret 
sharing is more suitable in securing data not encryption keys and by performing some 
experiments, showed that CloudStash is faster when used in small sized file. But with 
large file sizes such as 10MB, admitted that the overheads grew exponentially and 
suggests that the perfect secrecy of using secret sharing should be a good trade-off in 
this regards. In all CloudStash did not show enough evidence of scalability and fit for 
use in large-scale data infrastructure, as results proved otherwise even when 
performed in a multi-threaded system. 
Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Fabian et al. [12] in their work used combination of 
secret sharing scheme with other cryptographic primitives in securing healthcare data 
through shares creation, dispersal and recovery in multi-clouds. In all, Abdallah and 
Salleh [19] and [27] showed that secret sharing has inherent bottlenecks that make it 
not suitable for use in big data as increase in the number of participants increases data 
sharing overheads, while increasing the threshold increase data recovery overheads 
and hence not scalable. 
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3.4.2 Resilience 
The works of Abdallah and Salleh [19] and [27] provided information supporting the 
evidence that when the number of shares available for recovery is less than the defined 
threshold, implying that 𝑛 < 𝑚, for n as the number of participants and m as the 
defined threshold, secret recovery is impossible and hence a proof that the use of 
secret sharing has limited level of resilience. In view of this, a review of the concept 
of resilience in secret sharing needs to be considered as an ability to continue 
production at different rates of cloud outages within a reasonable extent. 
3.4.3 Key management 
Works of Shor et al. [4], and [18], [17], [25], [78] used secret sharing scheme in their 
key management and attest that using secret sharing scheme in key management is 
robust, resilient, and secure. It has shown as the ideal method for use in multi-cloud 
environments but did not extend their research on the impacts of cloud outages on key 
management. This has been notified as a knowledge gap they failed to address. 
3.5 Sharing a big data 
Shor et al. [4] believe that the only way to secure sensitive data before storing it in the 
cloud is to encrypt before storage. With an evaluation of the inherent trade-offs of 
securing data in remote storage as well as an end-to-end analysis of the current 
methods of securing data using secret sharing scheme, encryption-based schemes on a 
local cluster storage device and multi-cloud environments. Their results suggest that 
the bottlenecks in securing data has moved from that of computational overheads of 
encoding and random data generation to network, storage and availability as a result 
of hardware accelerated encryption methods and hence concluded that data encryption 
and management of keys with an efficient secret sharing scheme is optimal for multi-
cloud environments. These claims run contrary to the works of Resch and Plank, 
known as AONT-RS [52] as supported by [18], it applies an All-Or-Nothing 
Transform (AONT) to the data as a pre-processing step to the IDA. AONT guarantees 
that any number of shares less than the threshold is insufficient to decrypt the data. It 
combines AONT with Reed Solomon (RS) in order to achieve high security in a 
reduced computational and storage overheads.  
While Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Fabian et al. [12] used combination of secret 
sharing scheme with other cryptographic primitives in securing healthcare data 
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through shares creation, dispersal and recovery in multi-clouds,  Alsolami and Boult 
in [17] built a system called CloudStash, which posits that secret sharing is more 
suitable in securing data not keys. Through experimental results showed that 
CloudStash is faster when used in small file significantly but in large file sizes such as 
10MB, admitted that the overheads grew exponentially but suggests that the perfect 
secrecy of using secret sharing should be a good trade-off in this regards. Shor et al. 
[4] concerned themselves with the protection of big data and of encryption key using 
multi-cloud environments forgetting that using a single point storage for data is 
susceptible to single point of failure. It is only an available data that can be decrypted, 
therefore using data fragmentation seems more promising in safeguarding sensitive 
data as well as sharing big secret than their approach in cloud-based system. 
3.6 Cloud-based data storage 
Cloud data storage system is not new in computing as it is one of the widely deployed 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) in cloud computing. The evolving technology has 
been the use of multi-cloud rather than single cloud for cloud storage in order to 
improve on data availability, confidentiality and integrity [9], [12], [13], [25], [17] and 
[46]. A lot of characteristics of the cloud storage make it attractive from being 
scalable for a big data infrastructure, to cheaper service of the pay-as-you-use model, 
availability, flexibility [79], and disaster management [80], [81], [82], [9], and [25]. 
But there are some concerns in areas of data security, privacy and confidentiality due 
to multi-tenancy storage approach used in the cloud. Khoshkholghi et al. [79] 
classified cloud data storage into four layers: physical storage, infrastructure 
management, application interface and access layer. Some practical solution proffered 
to some issues with cloud storages raised earlier show that progress have been made to 
ensure data protection as well as redundancy in cloud storage.  
As threats to data integrity consist of malicious third party occurrences and hosting 
infrastructure weaknesses, issues like Proof-of-Readability (POR) and Proof-of-Data 
Protection (PDP) protocols are well studied in the literature by [83], [84]. There is also 
a compact improved version by [85] and for high-availability (HAIL) by [85]. Wang, 
et al. [86] and [87], [88] worked on auditing the security of cloud storage, which 
suggests that an interface layer can help user assess risks. Tang, et al., [89], and [90] 
worried that users’ data when deleted can still be restored through a backup version by 
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CSPs and therefore presents a work called FADE, which is a Secure Overlay with 
File; Access Control and Assured Deletion.   
To ensure data availability, [91] applauded the combination of strong consistency, 
global partitioned namespace and disaster recovery approach of Windows Azure 
Storage in ensuring availability of multi-tenancy environment.  Figure 6 shows how data 
stored in the cloud are accessed commonly through the web service APIs and that remains a 
point of dissimilarities between traditional and cloud storages, while Figure 7 shows the cloud 
storage reference model as designed in [92]. 
 
 
Figure 6: Cloud Storage Access Method [93] 
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Figure 7: Cloud Storage Reference Model [92] 
3.6.1 Cloud-based Key Management System 
The security of stored data in cloud is crucial in cloud computing as Wang et al. [94] 
posit that such necessitates the need for the design of a key management scheme that 
is reliable for safe computing in the cloud. Rao [95] agrees that key management is 
not standardised optimally in the cloud. Rao and Selvamani [96] are of the view that 
having only authorised users to have access to the decryption key is the best 
management. While Zissis and Lekkas [97] suggest that having a trusted third party is 
the way to go. In order to achieve this objective as opined, two major methods suffice 
– keyless and In-house-key-storage management system. In keyless system [4], [18], 
[17], [25] and [78] used secret sharing scheme, but Resch and Plank [52] dispersed 
encryption key with the encrypted data in cloudlets, while [87], [98] proposed key 
aggregate key management system in managing In-house-key-storage. In all, it shows 
how important key management is in cloud-based data storage. From the methods 
presented, the keyless type provides a system that prevents key loss, theft and 
leakages and as such is resilient, reliable and as well provide confidentiality and 
availability needed in a key management system for a robust cloud-based storage.  
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3.6.2 Cloud-based Disaster Recovery (DR) System 
The cloud disaster recovery system is entirely different in approach to traditional 
disaster recovery system. A cloud-based system takes an integrated approach in which 
the virtual server gets bundled with the operating system, applications, software 
patches and data. Furthermore, the backing up and copying of the entire server to an 
off-site data centres through virtualisation take as little as minutes [6].  
The virtual server does not depend on a particular hardware, which makes it easier to 
transfer safely and accurately from one data centre to another, the operating system, 
applications, patches and data without reloading each component of the server. The 
advantages of Cloud-based DR over the traditional type range from reduced recovery 
time and complete data accuracy during data restoration and recovery. These are made 
possible because of its ability to implement full network replication, the 
synchronisation or mirroring of Virtual Machines (VM) at a remote site to ensure 
failover in the event of failure of the original site. 
Cloud-based DR as in all cloud-based systems provides low-cost DR solutions 
because of the “pay-as-you-use” model. Cloud-based DR provides its subscribers both 
shared and dedicated DR services. Based on customers’ choice, the benefits can 
accrue but in all, cloud-based DR offers low-cost services compared to traditional 
systems. It is this “resource-on-demand” and a high degree of automation that made 
cloud-based DR very attractive. Despite attractive economics, Wood et al. [99] argue 
that increased latency is a major barrier in using cloud data centres for DR, as other 
servers could have a large geographical separation from the primary site, which in no 
small measure could affect communication between them adversely. The limitation of 
data owners from having control over their data placement worsens this scenario, they 
argued. 
In the same vein, Ji et al. [100] and [79] opined that the use of synchronous replication 
by Cloud-based DR does not in any way help every data write as the wide-area 
latency has negative impacts on its performance, forcing system administrators to 
consider asynchronous replication. This often trades-off loss of data for performance 
by replicating a consistent “snapshot” to the backup site. Asynchronous replication 
positively impacts performance as the primary site can come up even before the 
replication completes. However, this can lead to loss of disk writes at the primary site 
subsequent to the last replicated snapshot in case of a disaster. 
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3.6.3 Benefits, Challenges and Solutions 
As DR is aimed at business continuity, its benefits are: assets and inventory 
management, network management, task redundancy, cost saving and ability to test 
your plan in various scenarios ahead of time. But with the introduction of cloud-based 
DR, the dimension of its benefits could take a different turn as cloud systems 
deliveries are much faster and can provide multi-site availability at a fraction of the 
cost of traditional disaster recovery. 
Figure 8 provides insight into the graphical explanation of the benefits of cloud DR 
systems. The red arrow represents cloud-based DR systems, it shows the cost-
effectiveness of cloud DR with significantly faster recovery times [8]. Cloud resources 
have made disaster recovery cost-effective and attractive as it provides quick data 
recovery by providing rapid failover and failback capabilities to the primary site in the 
face of a disaster [8]. 
Despite these benefits, there are some common challenges accustomed with cloud-
based DR mechanisms, ranging from dependency according to [79] and [101]. This 
arises as customers depend on cloud service providers for DR services for lack of 
direct control over their data thereby creating a serious challenge of selecting a trusted 
service provider. Cost, though cheaper in cloud-based DR but appears in three phases 
as initial cost, ongoing cost and cost of the potential disaster. Others are failure 
detection, data security in the face of disaster, replication latency; centralised data 
storage and lack of redundancy during failover as the primary site remains down until 
brought back during failback phase. 
But these are not without some proposed fine-grained solutions based on Redundancy 
and Backup strategies as proposed by [101] on using Local Backup; [102] and [103] 
on the application of Geographical Redundancy and Backup; [104], proposed the use 
of Inter-Private Cloud Storage; [105], opted for Resource Management (use of 
enhanced technology) for data recovery in storage clouds, while [106] talked of 
Secure-Distributed Data Backup as measure to protect data in the event of disaster. 
Pipelined Replication has been proposed by [107] as a way to team up the 
performance of asynchronous replication with the consistency of synchronous 
replication in the face of disaster. Nakajima et al. [108] discussed the use of Scale 
Up/Down technique while Aghdaie et al [109], proposed Dual-Role Operation. 
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Figure 8: Disaster Recovery Trade-Offs in Cloud DR [8] 
3.6.4 Fine-Grained Cloud-based DR solutions 
The evaluation of fragmented secret share system will also look at its potential 
application area – cloud-based disaster management and hence a review of some fine-
grained current solutions in this area. The essence is to elicit knowledge on their 
strengths and weaknesses that provide the need for FSSS. 
3.6.4.1 DR-Cloud 
Gu et al. [9] relied on data backup and restore technology to build a system proposed 
to provide high data reliability, low backup cost and short recovery time by utilising 
co-operative resources of various cloud service providers with various parameters 
using multiple optimisation scheduling as strategies in balancing the objectives of 
disaster recovery. The system is built of multi-cloud architecture using Cumulus [110] 
as cloud storage resources. Thus, providing the need for further studies on the 
elimination of system downtime during a disaster, as well as provide consistent data 
availability as there is no provision for such in this work, rather concentrated on data 
reliability, low backup cost and short recovery time. 
3.6.4.2 Cloud Standby 
The use of fully operational standby sites and having the systems periodically updated 
is an approach Lenk et al. [111] opined here as a way of being at alert against 
disasters. Thus, by describing the architecture for a novel approach in establishing 
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standby sites, known as warm sites in disaster recovery that replicates a distributed 
system in the cloud to another cloud, they argued is a missing link in current literature.  
Hence in their architecture - they argued that it provides a better warm standby 
approach for setting up and updating a standby system in the cloud. In order to reduce 
the recovery time, they developed a deployment method that allows providers an 
independent and automated distribution system in [112] known as A Model-Driven 
Deployment Method for Disaster Recovery in the cloud. 
No doubt, their system is intended to provide a backup system in case of disaster. 
Even with their deployment method, the certainties of downtime cannot be 
overemphasised and hence flawed in providing a resilient system that can mitigate 
disaster rather than recovery after the hazards must have taken place. 
3.6.4.3 Adaptive Remus 
Cully et al. [67]  described a system that provides software resilience in the face of 
hardware failure (VMs for Virtual Machines) in such a manner that an active system 
at such a time can continue execution on an alternative physical host while preserving 
the host configurations by using speculative execution in replicating either processor-
intensive applications or communication-intensive applications at a fixed time 
interval. The strength lies in the preservation of system’s software independently 
during hardware failure but lags in the area of performing Replication by adding fault 
tolerance into the VM at fixed intervals. This creates confusion between processing-
intensive applications and network-intensive applications maximisation as longer 
intervals benefits the former, while shorter intervals the latter thus creating a 
dynamically adaptive time interval for optimal utilisation of both resources becomes a 
knowledge gap Silva et al. [113]  proposed to achieved by designing Adaptive Remus, 
which dynamically adjusts the replication frequency according to the characteristics of 
running applications.   
It is obvious with Adaptive Remus that speculative execution is still involved as time 
delays and other factors can lead to miscalculation of resource replication time and 
hence downtime is inevitable but may be minimised. 
3.6.4.4 MCES 
Dong et al. [114] described an architecture known as Multi-cloud-based Evacuation 
Services for Emergency Management (MCES) that is based on instantiating multiple 
instances at different states as a way of mitigating the cloud-based disaster. Their 
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work is similar to that of Chu and Wu [115], Chu and Wu [116] and Chen et al. [117]. 
Chu and Wu provided a hybrid system that combines cloud resources with mobile 
phones. The cloud serves for routine task computing while sensor information that 
provide best evacuation routes for data are collected using mobile phones and these 
are done irrespective of an emergency situation or not. Chen et al. concentrated on 
mobile cloud computing using smart-phones. Using their proposed system mobile 
phones are used to collect sensor information for which evacuation route are found 
based on sensor information and user location information.  
Dong’s have instances status cycle scheduling framework organised in three layers 
respectively with their different status: service, sleeping, and snapshot. The multi-
cloud-based evacuation services (MCES) architecture maintains basic monitoring and 
maintenance services during times of normal activity but quickly scales up service 
capacity during an emergency; these were achieved using different sets of algorithms. 
It is obvious that MCES interest lies solely on maintaining system infrastructure by 
instantiating a new VM when one goes off and of course, the instantiation takes time 
depending on the software systems (OS and Applications) to be reinstalled. Thus, 
proving a point that MCES is designed for disaster recovery with its attendant 
downtimes depending on the time it takes to re-instantiate a new VM after the cloud 
disaster. 
3.7 Weaknesses and research challenge of 
present methods 
Several variants of data sharing techniques that incorporates secret sharing scheme 
designed for use in multi-cloud environment lay claim to scalability and resilience. 
While two research directions exist in the use of secret sharing scheme in data sharing, 
one is of the opinion that its implementation is primarily for protection of encryption 
key, while the other believes it is capable of being used to protect data in a keyless 
manner.  
According to Abdallah and Salleh [19] and [27] secret sharing has inherent 
bottlenecks that make it not suitable for use in big data as increase in the number of 
participants increases data sharing overheads, while increasing the threshold increase 
data recovery overheads and hence not scalable. Also, their works in [19] and [27] 
provided information supporting the evidence that when the number of shares 
available for recovery is less than the defined threshold, implying that 𝑛 < 𝑚, for n as 
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the number of participants and m as the defined threshold, secret recovery is 
impossible and hence a proof that the use of secret sharing resilience is limited in 
scope.  
In all, there is a gap in knowledge on what constitutes scalability and resilience of 
these methods of data sharing in multi-cloud environment. Establishing a standard 
through which these capacities can be evaluated remains a research challenge needed 
to be addressed. 
3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed current literature around areas FSSS is premised. By reviewing 
literatures in Data Sharing and Recovery schemes such as that of Shamir [2], Rabin 
IDA [40], Krawczyk [11], AONT-RS [52] and Social Secret sharing scheme [32]–
[34], [49] knowledge on their potentials, weaknesses and applications in data security 
with reference to cloud data storage security has been provided. The essence is to 
bring attention and focus on why these limitations made them more suitable in key 
management than data sharing and dispersal in a multi-cloud architecture especially 
Shamir’s Perfect Secret Sharing scheme. The knowledge gaps found in the work of 
Shor et al. [4] and the performance evaluations of secret sharing scheme with respect 
their scalabilities, resilience and key management together laid the foundation on 
which FSSS will be built. Reviews on Cloud-based Data Storage system have 
provided knowledge on the evolving technologies in the use of this cloud resources 
from single cloud to multi-clouds storage to improve on data availability, 
confidentiality and integrity [9], [12], [13], [25], [17] and [46] and some concerns 
bothering on key management, privacy, security and confidentiality due to multi-
tenancy storage approach used in the cloud.  
With further exploration on works that ensure data availability autonomously or 
otherwise regardless of hardware failures, corrupted physical disks or downtime as 
well as their several key management methods this thesis has been able to provide 
insight why cloud outages persist, the most attractive key management method in 
cloud-based storage and establish the need for a robust system that redefines disaster 
management. The literature has shown that secret sharing is unsuitable in dispersing 
large-scale data infrastructure rather better used in key management with reference to 
Shamir’s scheme. The use of multi-cloud in conjunction with secret sharing scheme 
have proved to be resilient, reliable, improves confidentiality and security. It is 
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therefore necessary to design a method that combines high data scalability in multi-
clouds with secret sharing scheme for key management with the aim of redefining 
robustness in cloud-based disaster management. 
The next chapter presents the design of FSSS, whose method aims at providing a 
scalable way of sharing any amount of data within cloud-based architecture and hopes 
to redefine robustness and resilience using the concept of self-organisation in future 
works. It combines data fragmentation and secret share system known as a fragmented 
secret share system.   
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4 Experimental Design 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis is focused on the evaluation of fragmented secret share system against 
similar methods in relation to scalability, key management and resilience. This chapter 
is therefore aimed at bringing to fore the overall system architecture, design 
principles, and methodology. The methodology comprises of the experimental setup 
and evaluation frameworks. The nature of FSSS design is on software and hardware 
systems and fully cloud-based. This thesis therefore uses this chapter to lay out the 
detailed overall architectural design, core design principles and steps used in the 
experimental setups, the aims of the experiments, justification and metrics used in 
each experiment. RESCUE developed two major evaluation frameworks in equations 
19 and 20 that will guide the overall evaluations based on scalability and resilience 
with reference to similar methods. These two, especially resilience form the 
background on the evaluation of the key management, while both are the core that 
informs the potential application areas of mitigating cloud-based disaster. 
4.2 Design Architecture 
Figure 9 shows a high-level architectural design of FSSS. It is built as a method that 
accepts user’s input and uses same to determine appropriate fragment size for which 
the file is broken into fragments.  With the user’s choice of share policy, the number 
of cloud providers (cloudlets) that will participate in the operation is determined. The 
fragments automatically created are each encrypted and shares created out of it based 
on share policy. The storage of these shares, as well as the encrypted fragments 
(chunks), is done in  the cloudlets in such a manner that when the file is required, the 
key shares are recovered and each recovered key used to decrypt corresponding 
encrypted chunk and finally recombined the original file, after which file checksum is 
performed before despatching it to the file owner. Major components are input and 
output terminals, FSSS engine is made up of file-splitter, key generator, share and 
fragments creation, storage, recovery and file-combiner alongside checksum and 
metadata, which serves as the database for storing share, fragments and file 
information. 
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Figure 9: Overall FSSS Design Architecture 
4.3 Design Principles 
FSSS is designed to meet these objectives: First, to provide a method that is fit for 
sharing large data infrastructure and yet resilient, robust, readily available and reliable. 
Previous literature in [19], [5], [39] and [17] showed the strength and limitations of 
secret sharing scheme in data sharing and recovery. Thus, showing the need to 
incorporate data fragmentation with secret sharing scheme in order to provide high 
level scalability for file of all sizes and types. Secondly, provide information on best 
practices that will ensure quick, efficient, secure and scalable operations through 
combination of fragments, file sizes, share policies, and cloudlets. Finally, use the 
above qualities in redefining cloud-based disaster management away from current 
practices of recovery after cloud outages as seen in [25], [113], [112], [107], [81] to 
disaster mitigation to forestall losses.  
4.3.1 System components 
The system is made up of four main components: 
1. User Management: Login details, file size options, share policy options, metadata 
creation. 
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2. File Fragmentation: fragments creation, key generation, encryption, share 
creation, share dispersion, storage and then followed by numbers 4 and 5 below. 
3. File Recreation: Login details, metadata retrievals, encrypted fragments recovery, 
key share recovery, key recreation, fragments decryption, file recreation, 
checksum and storage, followed by numbers 4 and 5 below. 
4. Cloud Behavioural Computations. 
5. Agent – Analyses and future behavioural predictions, clean-ups, self-organisation 
if needed (future works). 
4.4 System Design Methodology 
FSSS methodology entails steps and procedures taken in conducting experimental 
tests, metrics used, and the evaluations in order to ascertain the significance, and 
weaknesses with respect to other similar methods in areas such as scalability, 
resilience, which affects key management system. Four main experimental tests will 
be outlined, the metrics, alongside procedures taken and the relevant evaluations done. 
4.4.1 Experimental setup 
Scalability 
Experiments A: Break file of sizes 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB into 
fragments. 
Steps taken with graphical details in Figure 10:  
(a) Use 10KB as defined block fragment size to break the above file sizes each. 
Repeat same with 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB and 1GB sizes. 
(b) Encrypt each fragment with AES 256-bit key length as generated by the key 
generator for each fragment. 
(c) Using n from chosen share policy generate the equivalent number of cloud 
service providers (CSPs) and initialise for storage of key shares as shown in 
Figure 11. 
(d) Initialise three CSPs for encrypted fragments storage. 
(e) Disperse encrypted fragments to 3 default CSPs initialised for it. 
(f) Disperse key shares to the specified CSPs in accordance to n. 
(g) Return all IDs (fragments and key shares to metadata table) as in Table 1. 
(h) Generate user’s ID and file details. 
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(i) Input user’s ID, use same to retrieve the encrypted fragments, decrypt and 
recover the original file as shown in Figure 12. 
(j) Calculate cloud behaviours using metrics in Tables 2 and 3. 
Aim: To measure the time taken to break each file into block fragments, disperse and 
recover the original file in relation to share policy. 
Metrics: file size over time taken to process in relation to share policy. 
Justifications: This thesis chose minimum and maximum file sizes, alongside ranges 
of share policies to be able to have a controlled experiment within a specific time 
frame. The incremental nature is to help find appropriate results that fit into the 
metrics being evaluated. The block sized fragments are chosen to enable this thesis 
evaluates the scalability of block and chosen optimum fragment sizes at different 
share policies. All files are byte streams to provide a neutral ground for all file types. 
Encryption method is AES 256-bit key length with Electronic Code Book (ECB), the 
basic method as byte streams broken into fragments were being encrypted and hence 
did not consider using Salt and Initialisation Vector (IV). 
Tests conducted 
Test One: Tests of Share Policies, File Sizes and Fragments 
Test 1a: Fixed share policies, varied file sizes, varied number of fragments and 
system overhead 
Test 1b: Varied thresholds, varied file sizes, same fragment size and system overhead  
Test Two: Tests File Sizes, Fragments, and Share Policies 
Test 2a: Varied file sizes, fixed share policy, varied number of fragments and system 
overhead. 
Test 2b: Varied file size, varied share policy, varied fragment sizes and system 
overhead. 
 
Experiments B: Break file of sizes 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB into 
fragments. 
Steps taken with graphical details in Figure 10:  
(a) Using file size of 10KB, calculate 15% of file size and use as fragment size 
and break the above file sizes each. Repeat same with 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 
100MB and 1GB sizes. 
(b) Encrypt each fragment with AES 256-bit key length as generated by the key 
generator for each fragment. 
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(c) Using n from chosen share policy generate the equivalent number of cloud 
service providers (CSPs) and initialise for storage of key shares as shown in 
Figure 11. 
(d) Initialise 3 CSPs for encrypted fragments storage. 
(e) Disperse encrypted fragments to 3 default CSPs initialised for it. 
(f) Disperse key shares to the specified CSPs in accordance to n. 
(g) Return all IDs (fragments and key shares to metadata table). 
(h) Generate user’s ID and file details. 
(i) Input user’s ID, use same to retrieve the encrypted fragments, decrypt and 
recover the original file as shown in Figure 12. 
(j) Calculate cloud behaviours using metrics in Tables 2 and 3. 
Aim: To measure the time taken to break each file into optimum fragments fragments, 
disperse and recover the original file in relation to share policy. 
Metrics: file size over time taken to process in relation to share policy. 
Justifications: Previous research generate the number of fragments from each file 
based on the number of cloud subscriptions irrespective of file size. This does not 
consider the effect of fragment size on the overall system overheads. This thesis, 
therefore, chose minimum and maximum file sizes, alongside ranges of share policies 
to be able to have a controlled experiment within a specific time frame. The 
incremental nature is to help find appropriate results that fit into the metrics being 
evaluated – optimum fragment size. Thus, we chose optimum fragment size from 
these results to enable this thesis to evaluate the scalability of our method in relation 
to similar methods. Using block and optimum fragment sizes at different share 
policies are to justify the reason for our choice at the end of the day. All files are byte 
streams to provide a neutral ground for all file types. Encryption method is AES 256-
bit key length with Electronic Code Book (ECB), the basic method as byte streams 
broken into fragments were being encrypted and hence did not consider using Salt and 
Initialisation Vector (IV). 
Tests conducted 
Test One: Tests of share policies, file sizes and fragments 
Test 1a: Varied share policies, varied file sizes, equal number of fragments and 
system overhead 
Test 1b: Varied thresholds, varied file sizes, equal number of fragments and system 
overhead  
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Test Two: Tests file sizes, fragments, and share policies 
Test 2a: Varied file sizes, fixed share policy, equal number of fragment and system 
overhead. 
Test 2b: Varied file sizes, share policies, fixed number of fragments and system 
overhead. 
 
Resilience 
Experiment C: Recover original file in the midst of varying rates of cloud outages 
Steps taken:  
(a) Use results of experiment B as benchmarks for normal situations in file 
recovery. 
(b) Repeat the experiment using share policy 3 from 5 and keep file size constant. 
(c) Disconnect one CSP and run the experiment as in (b) above again. 
(d) Disconnect two CSPs and run the experiment as in (b) above again. 
(e) Repeat the experiment using share policy 6 from 10 and keep file size 
constant. 
(f) Disconnect three CSPs and run the experiment as in (e) above again. 
(g) Disconnect four CSPs and run the experiment as in (e) above again. 
Aim: To measure the effects of cloud outages in file recovery. 
Metrics: File size over time taken to recover in relation to share policy. 
Justifications: Different file sizes and varying policies will be able to give the 
required information on the behaviours of FSSS at different rate of cloud failures. 
Tests conducted 
Test a: File combination at various cloud outages against normal situations. 
Test b:  Key recovery at various cloud outages against normal situations. 
 
The social concept in secret sharing 
Experiment D: Plot the average results of the metrics collected to determine the 
major determinant of CSP’s level of cooperation during each operation. 
Steps taken: 
(a) Use metrics and standards as detailed in Tables 2 and 3. 
(b) Collect each of these metrics results in a file after every operation. 
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(c) Plot the graphs. 
(d) Observe the nature of curves and consider different behaviours of the graphs 
with respect to others. 
(e) Categorise them as influencing and non-influencing metrics using the pattern 
of their curves. 
Aim: To measure the sufficiency of using rate of availability and response time in 
determining every CSP’s level of cooperation during each operation. 
Metrics: As detailed in Tables 2 and 3. 
Justifications: Taking into considerations, the results of different metrics of cloudlets 
during each operation will be able to give the appropriate information on the major 
determinants of cloud behaviours. 
Tests conducted 
Test a: The sufficiency of using rate of availability and response time to determine 
cloud level of cooperation. 
Test b: The fairness of using capacities above to disenroll participant. 
 
Period of experiments: These experiments were conducted usually from early hours 
in the morning through midnight each day of the experiment, sometimes earlier and 
later than midnight depending on the time taken to conclude each round of code 
executions. The reason is to ascertain behaviours of the cloud at peak and less peak 
hours. 
4.4.2 Evaluation frameworks 
Scalability 
Jogalekar and Woodside [118] define scalability metric as the measure of the 
productivity level of a system. This thesis, therefore, defines scalability metric as the 
ability of a method to continue with data sharing and recovery at different file sizes 
and share policies. Hence, the scalability measure of FSSS will be evaluated on the 
ability to overcome three scalability bottlenecks experienced with the use of secret 
sharing scheme in data sharing and recovering in multi-cloud architectures. These are 
the inability of use when file size increases, the effects of share policy, which are 
increase in number of participants (n) and that of the threshold (m) in file creation and 
recovery [19], they will be considered with respect to computing resources made 
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available such as the processing power, which includes the number of processors, 
RAM size, single or multithreaded and network bandwidths. All the evaluations will 
be on cloud-based systems. 
Taking file size as 𝐾𝑠, time taken as 𝑡𝑠, Scalability is expressed as: 
 𝑺𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 =
𝑲𝒔+𝑺𝒑
𝒕𝒔
+  𝑪𝒑     Equation 19 
 
Share Policy Sp of each method will be measured as: 
𝑆𝑝 =
𝑛
𝑚
, and where 𝑆𝑝 ≫ 1, it shows that n has been increased, where m remains 
unchanged, 𝑆𝑝 ≥ 1, m increased, where n remains unchanged. 
Where Sp is the share policy, which is a factor of participants (n) and that of threshold 
(m) and Cp is the computing power. Whereas 𝐾𝑠 (𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒), 𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑).  Sp may be 
varied, Cp is meant to be an unchanging computing resources in use. Total time taken 
(𝑡𝑠) is the sum of time taken in data sharing, dispersal, shares retrieval and secret 
recovery. 
 
Resilience 
The ability of a system to provide an acceptable level of service despite challenges 
like failures has been defined as resilience according to Sterbenz et al. [119]. This 
thesis sees resilience as the ability of a method to continue to provide data availability 
irrespective failure rate of participants to throw in their shares for secret recovery. It is 
a measure of the ability of a method to avoid downtime and data loss during 
acceptable level of participants failures. Following these definitions, FSSS level of 
resilience will be evaluated on the ability to avoid downtime and data loss during 
cloud failures. In secret sharing scheme, Abdallah and Salleh [19] provides 
information that data recovery is only possible when 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚. But fails to provide 
further information on the accrued system overheads during each rate of failure. 
Taking file size as Kr, time taken to recover a file during cloud failures as tr, we 
express Resilience as: 
 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 = (
𝑲𝒓+𝛁𝑺𝒑
𝒕𝒔
) + 𝑪𝒑    Equation 20 
Recall that in equation 19 that 𝑆𝑝 =
𝑛
𝑚
 and here in equation 20, this thesis is dealing 
with only a measurement that concentrates on a depleting n values due to outages at 
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an unchanged m value and hence ∇𝑆𝑝 =
∇𝑛
𝑚
, 
where ∇ represents decrease in value of 𝑛. When 𝑆𝑝 ≥ 1, the system shows that is 
nearing breaking point, whereas 𝑆𝑝 = 1, the breaking point has been reached and 
𝑆𝑝 < 1, data recovery is impossible. Cp is available computing power, assuming that 
all methods being evaluated have same amidst changing file size and rate of cloud 
failure. Kr is in (byte), tr is in (second). 
For effective use of equations 19 and 20, this thesis assumes that the methods 
under evaluation have same computing resources as well as share policies and 
file sizes. 
Measuring Scalability and Resilience 
Scalability 
Available literature shows that the larger the n in data sharing, the faster the data 
dispersal to participants as data shares are in smaller pieces but data sharing method 
has four major phases – data sharing, dispersal, retrieval and recovery. This implies 
that the scalability of a method cannot be judged based only on the dispersal 
overheads but in overall overheads of its processes. From available literature, 
Abdallah and Salleh [19] and [27] showed that secret sharing has inherent bottlenecks 
as increase in the number of participants increases data sharing overheads, while 
increasing the threshold increase data recovery overheads. 
In order to provide a balance between these and give information on a possible 
combination that has less overhead, this thesis evaluation framework as shown above 
therefore becomes imperative. It provides a way of measuring the impact of file size, 
against time taken to process it given a share policy in addition to the effect of the 
computing resource available. To be able to evaluate different methods, it assumes 
that both file size, share policy and computing resources available are same. 
Therefore, evaluation of Scalability is the measure of accrued overheads with respect 
to time taken to share, disperse, retrieve and recovery secret given same file size, 
share policy and computing resources. 
 
Resilience 
Resilience measures the ability of a method to recover secret during outages. The 
works of Abdallah and Salleh [19] and [27] provided information supporting the 
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evidence that when the number of shares available for recovery is less than the defined 
threshold, implying that 𝑛 < 𝑚, for n as the number of participants and m as the 
defined threshold, secret recovery is impossible and hence a proof that the use of 
secret sharing has limited level of resilience. Based on this, the evaluation of 
resilience of different data sharing method is on the mesure of its ability to recover 
secret at different rate of outages in relation to the accrued overheads. While 
Scalability is a measure of accrued overheads in both data sharing, dispersal, shares 
retrieval and secret recovery, Resilience is concentrated on the ability to recover secret 
in relation to overheads accrued during shares retrieval and secret recovery during 
outages. So, this thesis evaluation is a measure of ability to recover secret at different 
rates of outages assuming that the files size, share policy, and computing resources in 
use remain same althrough the operations. This ability is also viewed in relation to 
time taken to do so. 
General results collection procedures: In collecting results from code executions, 
several procedures are taken to evaluate the results to make sure all tests are coherent 
with none skewed in favour or against others. After each execution, cloud behavioural 
analyses results collected through a file are calculated automatically and displayed 
graphically so as to ascertain the behaviour of different metrics such as speed, 
throughput, download and upload bandwidths and so on (see tables 2 and 3 for details) 
and when they are inconsistent for more than three runs, the results are discarded and 
are validated otherwise with average taken.  
 
Table 1: User Management Data Store 
Datetime ID UUID FileName FileSize FileRef Cloudlet0 Cloudlet1 ... Cloudletn 
Datetime1 ID1 UUID1 Filename1 Filesize1 FileRef1 FileID0 FileID1 ... FileIDn 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Datetimen IDn UUIDn Filenamen Filesizen FileRefn FileIDn0 FileIDn1 ... FileIDn 
 
Legends: 
DateTime  = specifies Date and Time user details were stored. 
ID  = contains hashed value of all user personal details    
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UUID   = Universally Unique Identifier automatically created for each user. It  
  differentiates users and used to name file fragments when created in order of 
  creation (UUID.1, UUID.2,..,UUID.n). 
FileName  = specified name of file from which fragments were created 
FileSize  = provides size of user’s file 
FileRef  = Reference number of user’s file, serves as a Primary key. 
Cloudlet0-Cloudletn = provides FileID that reveals share storage details (cloud API, token, 
   name of share and location in storage bucket of the cloud).  
File Container for 
encrypted fragments
Key Generator
File Container for 
plaintext
Plaintext
Splitter
Encryption 
Algorithm
Encryption Key
Key Sharing Algorithm
Fragments
...
Frag_Name = UUID + 
Serial No.
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UUID
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FileRef
Encrypted
Fragments
...
Encryption Key
Figure 10: File Fragmentation and Encryption 
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Figure 11: Key Share Storage 
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Figure 12: Key recoveries and file reconstruction 
 
I. Capacity Measures of clouds 
Table 2 shows the Capacities, Evaluation Metrics, Formulae, Units and Tools for 
measurement. 
Justifications 
In order to measure cloud capacities, we relied on the first attempt to benchmark this 
type of study as was conducted by Li et al. [120]. This thesis relied on this as it a 
comprehensive catalogue of metrics for evaluating commercial cloud services and this 
follows similar works in Bardsiri and S. M. Hashemi [121] on – “Qos metrics for 
cloud computing services evaluation”.  
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Table 2: Evaluation Metrics 
Capacity Metrics Formulae Unit Tool 
Availability Packet Loss 
Frequency 
Packet Loss Per Unit 
Time 
Bits per second 
(bps) 
Pingparser 
Latency IP Transfer Delays Propagation Delay + 
Serialisation delay 
Milliseconds (ms) SpeedNet 
Transaction 
Speed 
Max. No. of 
Transfer Session 
Length of File Over 
Time 
Meters per 
Second (mps) 
SpeedNet 
Throughput Volume of 
processed data 
File Size Over Time Ops/Sec (bps) SpeedNet 
 
II. Overall Performance Measures 
Overall performance extends some measures by including more metrics that shows 
comparatively cloudlets performance at a glance by considering their different 
capacities such as: Elapsed Time (s), Packet Loss, Average Round Trip Time (ms), 
Speed (s), Download and Upload Bandwidths (bps), Latency (bps) and Throughput 
(bps). 
Table 3: Overall Performance Evaluation Metrics 
Capacity Metrics Formulae Unit Tool 
Elapsed Time Time Taken for action End Time - Start Time seconds Clock Time 
Packet Loss Packet differentials Received – Transmitted 
packets 
bps SpeedNet 
Average Round 
Trip Time 
Mean Round Trip Time Total RTT/Number of Round 
Trips 
ms Pingparser 
Speed Max. No. of Transfer 
Session 
Length/Time taken mps Pingparser 
Download 
Bandwidth 
Total download traffic 
carrying capacity 
Volume of data transmitted 
between two points per second 
bps SpeedNet 
Upload 
Bandwidth 
Total upload traffic 
carrying capacity 
Volume of data transmitted 
between two points per second 
bps SpeedNet 
Latency IP Transfer Delays Propagation Delay + 
Serialisation delay 
ms SpeedNet 
Throughput Volume of Processed 
Data 
File Size Over Time bps SpeedNet 
 
 
                         59   
 
4.5 System Specifications 
System specification deals with the specifics on cloud infrastructure used. It takes into 
accounts the hardware and software components. 
4.5.1 Virtual Machine Specifications 
Standard Intel N1, 1 vCPU 2.30GHz Intel Zeon (R), 3.840GB memory, 50.00GB 
NTFS HDD (Boot disk), Windows Server 2012 R2 DataCenter edition, Stand-alone, 
Terminal Server, Ethernet, Red Hat VirtIO Ethernet Adapter on Google Cloud 
Console running on Network Internet Egress from Americas to Americas. 
Beside the VM, several cloud storage facilities were used to stored data such as 
Google Cloud, Amazon Web Services Simple Storage Service (AWS S3), Dropbox 
and Microsoft OneDrive. AWS S3 has the highest number of storage subscriptions 
differentiated by their different regions such as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Cloud Storage Locations 
S/No. Bucket Name Region/Location 
1 awsbucketuseast US East (Ohio) 
2 awsbucketuswest US West (N. California) 
3 awsbucketasia Asia Pacific (Mumbai) 
4 awsbucketcanada Canada (Central) 
5 awsbucketlondon EU (London) 
6 awsbucketsaopaulo South America (Sao Paulo) 
7 awsbucketfrankfurt EU (Frankfurt) 
8 awsbuckettokyo Asia Pacific (Tokyo) 
9 Dropbox I & II US West of Northern California) 
10 Microsoft OneDrive Unknown 
4.6 Conclusions 
This thesis has been able to present using this chapter the nature of FSSS’s design by 
providing details on the components that make up the system. It includes steps used in 
designing the system through coding, execution of codes, result collections and 
computations to determine cloud behaviours during process executions. With the 
design principles explored, information has been laid in a nutshell what this thesis 
tends to achieve and how it goes about it. Furthermore, the System design and 
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components presented all the subsystems that make up the system such as - user 
management, file fragmentation, recreation, cloud behavioural computations and 
agent which forms our future works. While the user management deals with user 
information collection, storage and retrievals, file fragmentation concentrates on how 
fragments are created, key generation, encryption of fragments and share creation. 
Finally, the methodology laid out two important issues bothering on experimental 
setup and evaluation framework that will guide the evaluation works in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7, which provide details on how the objectives of the thesis were achieved and all 
questions answered. It ended with system specifications. 
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5 Data Fragmentation 
Evaluation  
5.1 Introduction 
Several methods exist in data fragmentation and have become popular with the advent 
of multi-cloud architecture in data storage as a way of improving data availability 
through redundancy technique. Popular among them is secret sharing scheme and of 
utmost importance of this method, aside from data availability, is the keyless 
encryption technique that comes with it, which gives data adequate protection as data 
exist in meaningless format. Nevertheless, of all these advantages, the issue of 
scalability remains a challenge facing its applications in large-scale data infrastructure 
making room for more research inputs in this direction. This thesis therefore uses this 
chapter to evaluate a method of fragmentation in Fragmented Secret Share System 
(FSSS) alongside similar schemes that are built on secret sharing scheme to measure 
their levels of scalability in a multi-cloud environment.  
FSSS within the limit of data sizes in use in these experiments takes 15% of file size 
as an optimum fragment size and uses same to break file into fragments, encrypts each 
fragment with AES 256-bit key length, and using secret sharing scheme provide key 
management for each of the encryption keys. The evaluation of this method against 
some existing ones that apply secret sharing scheme in data sharing and recovering 
will not only concentrate on their scalability, but on fitness for use in large-scale data 
infrastructure with regards to their accrued storage overheads and these will be done 
using the defined evaluation framework on scalability in Section 4.4.2. 
5.2 Data fragmentation schemes 
In storage technology, data sharing is used to break data into shares and subsequently 
dispersed to multiple storage locations and original data is recovered when needed 
sometimes with a fewer number of dispersed data known as a threshold. There are 
many types of data sharing techniques, the foremost being the works of Adi Shamir 
[2] and George Blakeley [3] later to be known as Secret sharing scheme, while the 
scheme provides the method of securing data without encryption keys in a dispersed 
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storage, it has proved to be insufficient for use with large-scale data infrastructure as 
they are not very scalable according to Buchanan [39], hence the use in securing 
encryption keys mainly as it will be too processor intense to use in securing data 
[122], [39]. Shamir and Blakely’s works came to be known as perfect secret sharing 
scheme as they provide perfect secrecy to data because the size of each share is 
equivalent to that of the secret implying that their entropy is 1. Other variants of data 
fragmentation of interest to us are Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) by Michael 
Rabin [40], which tends to reduce the storage complexity experienced in Adi Shamir’s 
Perfect secret sharing scheme (PSS). Our interest is in its wider application for data 
dispersals since it has high-performance throughput when used to disperse data 
whether in-memory or in the cloud, as it does not encourage redundancy with a trade-
off on the perfect security of data. 
Hugo Krawczyk [11] proposed the Computational Secret Sharing (CSS) technique 
(a.k.a. secret sharing made short), which combines Rabin’s IDA with Shamir’s PSS. 
Data is first encrypted with a randomly generated key, using a symmetric encryption 
algorithm. Next, this data is split into n fragments using Rabin’s IDA with a threshold 
t configured. In this case, the scheme is t times more efficient than Shamir’s PSS. The 
final step is to use Shamir’s PSS to produce shares of the randomly generated 
symmetric key (which is typically of the order of 64 to 256 bits) and then give one 
share and one fragment to each shareholder. 
A related approach, known as AONT-RS [52] as supported by [18], applies an All-Or-
Nothing Transform (AONT) to the data as a pre-processing step to the IDA. AONT 
guarantees that any number of shares less than the threshold is insufficient to decrypt 
the data. It combines AONT with Reed Solomon (RS) in order to achieve high 
security in a reduced computational and storage overheads. Kapusta et al. [18], and 
Kapusta & Memmi [123],  developed a method that situates between Hugo 
Krawczyk’s CSS and Rabin’s IDA methods in developing a scheme that they claimed 
provides a lightweight data fragmentation scheme with good space efficiency and 
computational level of data confidentiality for data protection with application in 
multi-cloud environment. 
5.2.1 Application Scenarios 
Some fine-grained research projects implement the use of data fragmentation in their 
design include, but not limited to, Loruenser et al. [25] presented an architecture for 
secure cloud-based data sharing known as ARCHISTAR based on secret sharing 
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scheme. The focus of the system is on providing adequate confidentiality to data; 
make it available against any active attacks as well as robust even in the face of 
failures. 
Ermakova and Fabian [13] defined a secret sharing for health data in multi-provider 
clouds. Their work was based on the need to provide a scheme that will make data 
readily available, provide confidentiality and integrity to medical records stored in 
clouds. They used a secret sharing scheme to distribute data as fragments to several 
clouds in order to provide the needs as stated above. 
There are other research solutions based on secret sharing schemes in multi-cloud 
environment such as, Ukwandu et al. [46], presented RESCUE: Resilient Secret 
Sharing Cloud-based Architecture that defined an architecture that applied the resilient 
nature of secret sharing scheme in building a robust data sharing in multi-cloud 
environment. Alsolami and Boult [17], worked on CloudStash: Using Secret-Sharing 
Scheme to Secure Data, Not Keys, in Multi-Clouds. The works used secret sharing for 
data sharing in multi-cloud environment and Fabian et al. [12]  on collaborative and 
secure sharing of healthcare data in multi-clouds that applied the use of secret sharing 
in sharing and recovery of the file in conjunction with cryptographic primitives.  
5.3 FSSS Evaluations 
The method presented in this thesis is known as fragmented secret share system. It 
creates fragments from a file, encrypts each fragment with different encryption key 
and applies secret sharing methods as used in cryptography to create robust and secure 
cloud-based keyless key management system using multi-clouds architecture for 
storage management. 
5.3.1 Method of Data Fragmentation 
The experiments focused on providing information on choices that will ensure quick, 
efficient, and scalable operations through a proper combination of fragments, file 
sizes, and share policies. It provides information on a relationship between file and 
fragment size and the appropriate policy combinations at different users’ choice of file 
size and share policy. 
Experiments performed are of two variants, A and B as presented earlier in Section 
4.4.1. All files are byte streams generated and stored as that provides an opportunity 
of testing in a neutral environment suitable for all file types. In all, experimental 
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evaluations will be based on results obtained from file fragmentations and key shares. 
The plots will be on varied file sizes in kilobytes (KB) against time taken in 
milliseconds (sec) using varied key sharing and recovering policies. 
The total overhead cost of each file processed is calculated by summing all times 
taken to break the file into fragments; encrypt all accrued fragments; decrypt all 
fragments and combination of the file. 
5.3.1.1 Fragments Storage 
FSSS data mappings techniques as shown in Figure 13 has to do with how encrypted 
fragments of file are mapped into storage buckets in the cloudlets with the fileIDs (file 
and fragments identification details) containing all the details of the fragments, 
including the cloud API tokens, fragments locations, names and serial numbers 
returned to a metadata server from where each is retrieved and used to reconstruct the 
original file when needed.  
The mappings are used for both fragments in three separate storage buckets made up 
of premised and external storages in Google Cloud (premised), AWS S3 (external 
public cloud) and Dropbox (external private cloud). The value n represents the last 
fragment. The mixture of public and private clouds premised and external were 
intended to provide the needed resilience and ease of access hence improve 
performance by reducing overhead costs to file reconstruction. The Google cloud 
storage (premised) is the cloud in use daily, while access to others are mainly when 
there is an outage in Google cloud or an evidence of a corrupt fragment(s) during file 
reconstruction. This method uses redundancy technique to improve data availability 
but fails to implement a threshold scheme thereby making it impossible to recover the 
original file if one of the fragments is lost, corrupted or fails during retrieval from 
different storage buckets. This drawback results to a retrieval of fragments using an 
alternative storage bucket and hence increases the recovery overheads at this point. 
5.3.2 Method of Key Sharing and Recovering 
The base algorithms – Sharing and Recovering are the concept as presented originally 
by Adi Shamir [2] and hence a perfect secret sharing scheme. In experiment A, the 
overhead cost is the sum of time taken to create key shares; write key shares to storage 
devices; recover key shares from storage devices based on defined threshold for key 
recovery. The time taken are quite infinitesimal but a reference to them are necessary 
for comparison with that of experiment B, which was done using different cloud 
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service providers presenting a real-life situation to share creation; share writing; share 
recovery based on a prevailing threshold and key recovery. In experiment B the 
overhead cost for key sharing and recovery are based on time taken in key sharing, 
share writing to cloudlets which is made up of upload and download times, share 
recovering from downloads and secret key recovering. 
 
Dropbox
Google 
Cloud
AWS S3
AWS S3
Google Cloud
Dropbox
Data store
Fragments 
Mapping 
Table
 
Figure 13: FSSS Encrypted Fragments Mappings to Cloudlets 
 
5.3.2.1 Key Shares Mapping 
FSSS key shares mapping as shown in Figure 14 below has to do with how key shares 
of encryption key used in safeguarding fragments of file are mapped into storage 
buckets in the cloudlets with the shareIDs (share identification details) containing all 
the details of the shares, including the cloud API tokens, share locations, names and 
serial numbers returned to a metadata server from where each is retrieved and used to 
reconstruct the decryption keys when needed. The mappings are done using a 
maximum of ten different Cloud storages mainly AWS S3 in conjunction with 
Dropbox and Microsoft OneDrive. The mixture of public and private clouds was 
intended to provide the needed resilience and ease of access hence improve 
performance by reducing overhead costs to key recovery. Just like every other Shamir 
PSS method implementation, this method suffers from storage complexity as each 
share size is equivalent to secret key size and hence the larger the key size, the more 
complex the storage and system overheads. But suffice it to say that the choice of 
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threshold (m) in relation to the total number of participating clouds (n) impacts on the 
overall system overheads, this thesis therefore sees the choice of m within the context 
and limit of computer resources, file sizes and share policies used in the experiments 
as best around 60% of n for an optimum performance. This may vary depending on 
the computing resource in use. 
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Figure 14: Key Shares Mappings to Cloudlets 
 
5.4 Tests Results and Evaluations 
5.4.1.1 Test One 
In the first evaluation (see Table 5), the best combination of the system that provides a 
high level of data scalability is evaluated. This assumes that data fragmentation 
irrespective of fragment size and share policy is scalable. 
This test showed that file fragmentation using varied fragment size is scalable but has 
higher overhead when fragment size is smaller in relation to file size as seen in Table 
5 and graphically in Figure 15. The evidence here is such that the smaller the fragment 
size in relation to file size, the higher the number of fragments generated thus an 
increase in overhead as seen in 1KB, 2 from 5 below, where the system failed to 
combine a file of 1GB size using 1KB fragment size due to large system overheads. In 
1KB, 3 from 5 and 1KB, 4 from 5 provided evidence that increasing the threshold 
with smaller fragment size, will lead to high system overhead, implying the effects of 
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threshold and fragment size on system performance, thus dismissing the above 
assumption. 
5.4.1.2 Test Two 
In the second test, we evaluated the best combination of the system that provides data 
scalability with less overhead. This assumes that data fragmentation using an equal 
number of fragments irrespective of share policy is highly scalable. 
The above assumption is supported by the evidence from Table 6 and Figure 16 in 
comparison with Table 5, thus providing a proof that file fragmentation is highly 
scalable when fragment size is defined as 15% percentage of file size. Though 
cautions should be applied in giving all file sizes same percentage of fragment size as 
evidence showed that the larger the file size, the more fragment percentage will be. 
5.4.1.3 Test Three 
This test assumes that share policy has no effect in file sharing and recovery. Using 
Table 7, this thesis validates the earlier claim by Abdallah and Salleh [19] that 
increasing the threshold and that of participants increases system overhead during 
share creation and secret recovery. But Table 8 states otherwise and proves that FSSS 
as a method improves on these bottlenecks by combining data fragmentation with 
secret sharing using optimum fragment size.  
5.4.1.4 Test Four 
This test assumes that FSSS will be adversely affected and fails to produce results 
when file size increases as well as change in share policy while keeping the computing 
resources constant. 
Table 8 above shows that FSSS continued producing results as share policy changed. 
Both the increase in threshold and that of number of participants did not show 
significant effects indicating that it will not fail to provide result at different 
application scenarios. It also did not show any significant effects as file sizes 
increased exponentially. 
Units of measurements 
Units of measurements are (B) for bytes used in measuring file sizes, and (S), for 
seconds used in measuring time taken to perform a task using a certain share policy. 
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Figure 15: Measuring scalability using varied fragment sizes, share policies and file sizes. 
 
 
Figure 16: Plot of varied file sizes, share policies and equal number of fragments. 
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Table 5 : Measuring scalability using varied fragments sizes, share policies and file sizes 
S/N FileSize 
(B) 
1KB, 2 
from 5 (S) 
1GB, 2 
from 5 (S) 
1KB, 3 
from 5 (S) 
1GB, 3 
from 5 (S) 
1KB, 4 
from 5 (S) 
1GB, 4 
from 5 (S) 
1 1KB 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.20 
2 10KB 0.79 0.02 0.29 0.08 0.40 0.08 
3 100KB 1.41 0.0.6 1.38 0.07 2.36 0.16 
4 1MB 13.06 0.09 10.58 0.10 NC 0.23 
5 10MB 403.75 0.59 143.50 0.48 NC 0.51 
6 100MB 5716.87 8.11 NC 9.26 NC 10.41 
7 1GB NC 572.66 NC 2168.81 NC 2316.12 
 
Table 6: Measuring scalability with varied file sizes, share policies and equal number of 
fragments 
S/N 
FileSize 
(B) 
15%, 2 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 10 
(S) 
15%, 8 from 10 
(S) 
1 1KB 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 
2 10KB 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.12 
3 100KB 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 
4 1MB 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 
5 10MB 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.26 
6 100MB 1.87 1.74 1.76 1.78 
7 1GB 78.10 78.01 88.33 96.10 
 
Table 7: Measuring the effects of policies, number of fragments generated on key recovery. 
S/N FileSize 
(B) 
1KB, 2from5 
(S) 
1KB, 3from5 
(S) 
1KB, 4from5 
(S) 
15%, 2from5 
(S) 
15%, 4from5 
(S) 
15%, 4frm10 
(S) 
15%, 8frm10 
(S) 
1 1KB 0.017 0.0184 0.039 7.094 8.160 18.675 1536.350 
2 10KB 0.122 0.130 0.379 7.254 7.397 16.971 1629.540 
3 100KB 1.050 1.566 99.376 7.385 6.918 17.866 1484.630 
4 1MB 12.606 53.050 NC 7.670 6.793 18.672 1444.335 
5 10MB 331.684 4221.852 NC 8.456 8.236 16.395 1515.853 
6 100MB 3839.531 NC NC 7.290 6.655 15.920 1472.754 
7 1GB  NC NC NC 6.768 7.518 16.156 1599.017 
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Table 8: Overhead Cost of File Combination using equal number of fragments with varied 
share policies 
S/N 
FileSize 
(B) 
15%, 2 from 
5 (S) 
15%, 3 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 10 
(S) 
15%, 6 from 10 
(S) 
15%, 8 from 10 
(S) 
1 1KB 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 
2 10KB 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12 
3 100KB 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 
4 1MB 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.11 
5 10MB 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.26 
6 100MB 1.87 1.59 1.74 1.76 1.50 1.78 
7 1GB 78.10 81.38 78.01 88.34 79.98 96.10 
Legend: 
NC = Not Computable within the limit of computing resources used in these 
experiments. 
 
5.5 Overall Evaluation of Data Fragmentation 
Methods 
Secret sharing scheme has been identified as primarily for secure key management as 
posited by Narani in [122] and this position is supported by Buchanan [39], Buchanan 
et al. [31], Kapusta et al [18], Abdallah and Salleh [19], Koikara et al [20], and Pal et 
al. [21]. But Alsolami and Boult in [17] opposed this by saying that Secret Sharing is 
for Data Security, not Keys. Works of Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Fabian et al 
[12] are in conformity with theirs as they used combination of secret sharing scheme 
with other cryptographic primitives in securing healthcare data through shares 
creation, dispersal and recovery in multi-clouds. 
This thesis evaluation at this point will focus on FSSS in comparison with that of 
Fabian et al. and Alsolami & Boult using the developed evaluation framework on 
scalability in Section 4.4.2. The reason for our choice is that these two experiments 
were conducted using cloud resources and showed some levels of scalability as 
against others that were conducted using internal hard disk storage for share storage 
and retrievals. In the same vein, the work of Shor et al. [4], will not be evaluated here 
as its use of data fragmentation technique is in key management, which is secret share 
system that already being discussed.  
FSSS was conducted on Standard Intel N1 1 vCPU 2.30GHz Intel Zeon (R), 3.840GB 
memory, 50.00GB NTFS HDD (Boot disk), Windows Server 2012 R2 DataCenter 
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edition, Stand-alone, Terminal Server, Ethernet, Red Hat VirtIO Ethernet Adapter on 
Google Cloud Console running on Network Internet Egress from Americas to 
Americas with 13 different cloud storage buckets, 3 for data while 10 for keys 
storages, majorly AWS S3 storage buckets in conjunction with Microsoft OneDrive, 
Google Cloud and Dropbox, while that of Fabian et al conducted theirs using 
Windows 7 Professional 64-bit machine within Oracle JRE 1.6.0_39 and Java 
HotSpot 64-bit Server VM. Intel Core i5 2500 K, on 4x4841 MHz, 8 GBytes DDR3 
RAM, Dual Channel on 686,9 MHz with AWS S3 as storage buckets and all 
operations were executed using multithreading, while Alsolami & Boult used 
machines that run on Intel core i5 CPU 2.40 GHz, 4GB RAM and 64 bit Linux 
Operating System with AWS S3 as storage buckets. 
The scalability of these methods will be evaluated based on the ability to continue 
production as file size increases. It will also take a look at the effects of share policy 
on system overheads. Table 8 shows that FSSS was not affected significantly by an 
exponential increase in file sizes, an indication that it will not fail to share and recover 
file at any change of file size and share policy. These are indications that FSSS is 
scalable. Table 9 is an overall summary of the behaviours of the works of Fabian et al 
and CloudStash at different file sizes and share policies. 
In Table 9, file increase implies the method is affected by file size increase, while 
policy change implying that increasing the number of participants and that of 
threshold significantly affect share creation and file recovery. As earlier stated this 
thesis sees scalability from the perspective of continuous production as file size 
increases. It also based on the ability of a method to overcome the effect of increase in 
the number of participants and that of threshold in share creation and secret recovery. 
In all FSSS showed evidence of improving the process of data fragmentation in 
conjunction with secret sharing scheme by reducing the adverse effects of file size 
increase and that of share policy change in file recovery as shown in Table 8. Table 8 
also shows that it can continue production as file size increases and share policy 
changes. These therefore, prove that FSSS is more scalable than the two methods as 
evaluated as shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Evaluation table for FSSS and other similar methods to measure scalability 
S/N Project 
Name 
Method 
Used 
Storage 
Device  
Maximum 
File Size  
File 
Increase 
Policy 
Change 
Processor Scalability 
1 CloudStash SSS Cloud 10MB Yes Yes Single 
Thread 
Poor 
2 Fabian et al SSS Cloud 500MB Yes Yes Multi-
Thread 
Average 
3 FSSS FSSS Cloud 1GB No No Single 
Thread 
Good 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In current data sharing and recovery scenarios, several methods exist and many of the 
methods applied the use of Secret sharing scheme alongside other cryptographic 
primitives such as symmetric encryption like AES with the opinion that secret sharing 
scheme is only good for securing cryptographic keys [123], [18], [19] and others, 
while [124], [17], [12] and [13]  are of the opinion that secret sharing scheme should 
be directly applied in data sharing and recovering as it is resilience and self-preserving 
in application. FSSS was borne after our previous works in [31] and [46] and as was 
initially evaluated in [5]. It shares the view of the former and hence limited itself in 
evaluating the method against those that shared the second view so as to add its voice 
on the need for high level scalability in current data sharing and recovery mechanisms 
that are fit for use in large-scale data infrastructure while maintaining the resilient, 
secure and self-preserving nature of data fragmentation schemes. The method is not 
devoid of the secured nature of data fragmentation schemes, it rather improved on it 
by providing a four-layered protection to data using data fragmentation, symmetric 
encryption, secret sharing scheme and redundancies. Above all it is scalable and fits 
into use for sharing and recovering of large-scale data irrespective of size and types 
despite the shortcomings as identified in the above evaluations. Finally, this chapter 
concludes application scenarios of data fragmentation in a multi-cloud environment to 
show how previous methods have been applied in multi-cloud environment.  
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6 Key Management 
Evaluation  
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter was used to provide FSSS’s data fragmentation scheme as well 
as evaluate same with current practise that believes that secret sharing scheme is 
scalable. In this chapter, FSSS key management is presented with a view of evaluating 
same with similar methods that uses secret sharing scheme in key management in the 
cloud as FSSS combines data fragmentation with encryption and manages the keys 
using secret sharing scheme. Three things are obvious in this chapter, one is that FSSS 
disagrees with Nojoumian et al. that the use of rate of availability and response time is 
enough to judge participant’s (cloud) level of cooperation during each operation, two 
is that it validates the facts that data recovery is possible in as much as cloud failure 
(n), is greater than or equal to the defined threshold (m) and finally is to provide 
information on the effects of different rates of cloud failure (n) on file recovery. 
6.2 Cloud-based Key Management 
Security of stored data in cloud has been opined to be very crucial in cloud computing, 
Wang et al. [94] posits that such necessitates the need for the design of a key 
management scheme that is reliable for safe computing in the cloud. Rao [95] agrees 
that key management is not standardised optimally in the cloud. Rao and Selvamani 
[96] are of the view that having only authorised users to have access to decryption key 
is the best management. While Zissis and Lekkas [97] suggest that having a trusted 
third party is the way to go. In order to achieve this objective as posited, two major 
methods suffice – keyless and In-house key storage management system. In keyless 
system [18], [123], [25], [125] and [78] used secret sharing scheme, but Resch and 
Plank [52] dispersed encryption key with the encrypted data in cloudlets, while [87], 
[98] proposed key aggregate key management system in managing In-house key 
storage. Shor et al. [4] gave credence that use of an efficient secret sharing scheme to 
secure encryption key in multi-cloud environments is an optimal method of 
safeguarding encrypted data. In all it shows how important key management is in 
cloud-based data storage. From the methods presented, keyless system seems to 
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provide a system that prevents key loss, theft and leakages and as such is resilient, 
reliable and as well provide confidentiality and availability needed in key 
management system for a robust cloud-based storage.  
6.3 FSSS Key Management 
FSSS key management is a distributed multi-cloud keyless system that is patterned 
after the works of Nojoumian et al. [32], [33] and [34]  known as Social secret sharing 
scheme with a redefinition of what constitutes good ‘behaviour’ amongst participating 
cloudlets. While Nojoumian et al defines a three-fold construction denoted by (Sha, 
Tun, Rec) implying secret sharing, social tuning and secret recovery, where social 
tuning is carried out based on a value derived through a calculated trust function using 
participants’ response time and rate of availability over a cumulative period. This 
thesis believes that such value derived is insufficient to judge participants’ ‘behaviour’ 
by proving that cloud behaviours such as response time is subjective as multi-tenant 
nature of cloud resources make it fluctuate and hence alter values based on the amount 
of threads available to be processed within each period. Thus argues the sufficiency of 
using availability rate and response time to determine cloud level of cooperation as 
against literature like [120], [121], [126], [127], [128], [129], and [130] and the 
fairness of using capacities that show current behaviours to disenroll participants as 
well as adjust shares of ‘cooperative’ clouds without taking a look at future predictive 
behaviours that will help generate large volume of data thereby take cautious 
measures before such actions are carried out.   
6.3.1 Tests Results and Evaluations 
6.3.1.1 Test One 
These tests the sufficiency of using availability rate and response time to determine 
cloud level of cooperation. It assumes that using cloud capacities like availability rate 
and response time are sufficient to measure cloud participant’s level of cooperation or 
behaviour during data sharing and recovery operations. 
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Table 10: Cloud capacities measure using different CSPs (Shares Download from 4 from 10 share policy) 
 
AWS California AWS Canada Dropbox AWS Frankfurt AWS London AWS Mumbai OneDrive AWS Ohio AWS Sao Paulo  AWS Tokyo 
Download Time (s) 0.41 0.37 0.72 0.78 0.80 1.54 0.90 0.70 0.10 1.24 
Latency (ms) 49.04 48.97 49.18 49.29 49.08 49.03 49.13 49.04 49.29 49.15 
Throughput (bps) 3981.17 4369.51 2301.20 2101.72 2101.67 1070.80 1952.58 3191.37 1646.11 1318.31 
Speed (mps) 1673169.79 2208192.69 1563442.77 2406985.33 1967461.57 2023129.47 13909024.69 2012561.41 1778988.55 1872583.77 
RTT_Avg (ms) 27 27 10 27 27 28 10 27 27 27.5 
Availability (bps) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Upload Bandwidth (mbps) 124.19 132.60 130.06 124.78 108.15 120.16 129.09 112.29 127.81 133.87 
Download Bandwidth (mbps) 174.40 81.39 91.46 274.11 59.13 198.02 171.84 316.41 212.08 121.80 
File Size (B) 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 1GB 
Share Size (B) 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 1638B 
Period of experiment 19:14:18 – 
19:46:05 
19:15:15 - 
19:47:01 
19:12:23 – 
19:44:12 
19:16:37 –  
19:48:28 
19:15:43 –  
19:47:28 
19:14:48 –  
19:46:33  
19:12:50 –  
19:44:40 
19:13:50 –  
19:45:35 
19:16:11 –  
19:47:59 
19:13:24 –  
19:47:07 
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Table 10 provides some measures taken when recovering a 1GB file. First step is to 
retrieve all encrypted fragments made from the file, decrypt and then recombined to 
recover the original file. To do this, as each encrypted fragment is retrieved, 
appropriate key shares are retrieved from 10 participating CSPs but uses the defined 
threshold to recover the original symmetric key. This recoverd key is used to decrypt 
the encrypted fragment. This process is carried out for each encrypted fragment. All 
decrypted fragments are combined to recover the original file. The share size is 1638 
bytes on a 4 from 10 share policy. While this process is going on, measurement tools 
such as Pingparser are used to collect values, which are plugged into the formula to 
determine the capacity of each participating CSP, through this, such metrics as volume 
of processed data, IP transfer delays, packet loss frequency and so on are derived and 
these are regarded as CSPs behaviour. There are other metrics used in determining the 
behaviours of different CSPs in a larger table, but selected these as they relate more to 
the test under review. The DL Time is time taken to download a share of 1638 bytes 
from each CSP. It includes time taken for each CSP to receive an API call, 
authentication of user, access, through to the time taken for the algorithm to receive 
the share for symmetric key recovery. 
This time varies for all the CSPs with AWS Canada being the fastest and AWS 
Mumbai taking longer time than others. A closer look provides the understanding that 
some metrics affect the arrival time such as the Throughput, Download bandwidth and 
Speed as latency are virtually same across bar with minor difference between them 
while Availability is 99.9% as none of them failed during the operations. The 
explanation to this differences is in the period of the experiment from 19:12hours 
through to 19:48 hours. Due to different time zones of the CSPs, the time varied from 
peak to off-peak periods depending on the time zone. Thus underscoring the 
importance of using more metrics to calculate cloud’s level of cooperation as such are 
subjective to other metrics. 
 
6.3.1.2 Test Two 
This experiment tests the fairness of using the two capacities mentioned in test one to 
disenroll participant. It tends to provide evidence that supports an argument that using 
the two variables above to judge cloud behaviour is fair. Implying that using such 
without looking for future likely results are sufficient to determine level of 
cooperation of each CSP. 
                         77    
 
 
Figure 17: Plot of CSPs against Download Time in seconds. 
 
 
Figure 18: Measuring the Throughputs of different CSPs 
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Figure 19: Upload & Download Bandwidths of different CSPs 
 
The results in Figures 17, 18, and 19 show the fluctuating nature of download time 
(arrival time) alongside that of throughput. This is as a result of different time zones 
and the multi-tenant nature of CSPs and hence portends that values are unstable and 
the need for cumulative results both present and future in determining cloud 
behaviours.  Take for instance, in Figure 18, Throughput of Canada is higher than that 
of London, which is closer to Edinburgh – the location of the experiment because of 
different time zones with regards to the period of the experiment. Therefore, 
concludes that using such attributes without looking into future results is not fair in 
application. 
6.3.1.3 Test Three 
This test also assumes that cloud outage will increase key recovery overheads and an 
increase in cloud outage leads to higher overheads. 
Table 11: Cloud Outages and Normal Situations 
FragSizKeyShaPol Key Recovery (S) % Difference (S) 
15B, 3 from 5 7.80 16.41% Faster 
20% failure 15B, 3 from 5, 1 down 6.52 
1.5KB, 3 from 5 7.76 51.80% Faster 
40% failure 1.5KB, 3 from 5, 2 down 3.74 
15B, 6 from 10 25.67 37.90% Faster 
30% failure 15B, 6 from 10, 3 down 15.94 
1.5KB, 6 from 10 25.33 42.99% Faster 
40% failure 1.5KB, 6 from 10, 4 down 14.44 
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The results in Table 11 above show that cloud outage has no negative effect on key 
recovery, rather reduces the overhead in comparison with normal situations. It shows 
the relationship between cloud outage and normal operational conditions. From 
available results at twenty percent (20%) failure rate using 3 from 5 share policy, the 
system becomes faster by sixteen percent (16.41%), but at forty percent (40%) failure 
rate using same share policy, the download speed is faster by close to fifty two percent 
(51.80%). Looking at a higher share policy of 6 from 10, at thirty percent (30%) 
failure rate, the system download speed is higher by a little above thirty-seven percent 
(37.90%), while at forty percent (40%) failure rate, the system performed better by 
about forty-three percent (42.99%). The implications therefore are that in as much as 
failure rate is not equivalent or above the threshold, system performance improves as 
there was no result obtained when the cloud outage exceeds the defined threshold.  
These therefore do not support the assumption as above that cloud outage has negative 
effect in key recovery. There is no significant evidence to show that the size of the 
share has effect on the key recovery during cloud outages because at forty percent 
(40%) failure rate using share of 10KB in 3 from 5 shows performance rate of above 
fifty-one percent while in 6 from 10 share policy approximately forty-three (42.99%) 
percent performance rate. 
6.4 Overall Evaluation 
Managing encryption keys is a very complex system [28], [131], and this complexity 
comes from the methods of generation, exchange, storage, retrieval, and replacement 
of cryptographic keys [131]. Hu et al. [132] believes that such complexity is more on 
retrieval process as the more complex the retrieval interface is, the greater the 
challenge of deploying key retrieval in applications such as decrypting encrypted file. 
FSSS key management is a keyless system built on secret sharing scheme using multi-
cloud architecture. There have been other similar methods such as that of that of Shor 
et al. [4], Kapusta et al. [18], [123], Li et al. [125], Hu et al. [78] and Loruenser et al. 
[25]. This evaluation will be based on developed evaluation framework on Section 
4.4.2 and on how these methods validate or disagree with the works of Abdallah and 
Salleh [8, 134] on key share retrieval when 𝑛 < 𝑚, their available information on the 
application on this concept in cloud-based key management. Finally, on how each of 
these methods, proposed to handle the adverse effects of cloud failures on key share 
retrievals so as to ensure consistent key retrieval. 
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Hu et al. [78] used secret sharing scheme in key management but performed multiple 
heterogeneous-storage system. Their use of secret sharing is only based on share 
policy of 2-from-3, and the 3 shares were stored in local hard disk drive, cloud storage 
bucket and a trusted third party. Of the 3 shares normally dispersed, that of the trusted 
third party is hardly used, and they believed that loss of share in secret sharing scheme 
is a rare scenario. This view perhaps limited their scope of experiments and hence 
never conducted experiments to understand the behaviour of share retrieval during 
adverse situation such as storage loss or outage. 
Shor et al. [4] believes that the only way to secure sensitive data before storing it in 
the cloud is to encrypt before storage. With an evaluation of the inherent trade-offs of 
securing data in remote storage as well as an end-to-end analysis of the current 
methods of securing data using secret sharing scheme and encryption-based schemes 
on a local cluster storage device and multi-cloud environments. Their results suggest 
that the bottlenecks in securing data has moved from that of computational overheads 
of encoding and random data generation to network, storage and availability as a 
result of hardware accelerated encryption methods and hence concluded that data 
encryption and management of keys with an efficient secret sharing scheme is optimal 
for multi-cloud environments.  In all, their concentration is on efficiency, using 
throughput and not on the resilience nature of such methods. This, therefore, limited 
their scope of research and hence not on adverse effects of using secret sharing 
scheme during excessive cloud outages. 
Loruenser et al. [25] developed a system known as ARCHISTAR that applies multiple 
secret sharing schemes on data before dispersal. By using computational secret 
sharing scheme as proposed by Krawczyk [11], it applies symmetric encryption on 
data to be shared, then shares encryption key using Shamir’s PSS [2] and with Rabin’s 
IDA [40] disperses data to multiple storages. Unlike Hu et al. in [78], the performance 
of Shamir’s PSS when used to share ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption key using 3-
from-4 and 3-from-7 share policies were shown but failed to further explore 
experimentally the behaviours during adverse condition such as when cloud failures 
exceeds the defined threshold. 
Li et al. [125] uses Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme (RSSS) to manage convergent keys 
known as Dekey, the work of Loruenser et al. [25] is a bit similar to that of Kapusta et 
al [18], [123] in using secret sharing to secure non-convergent encryption keys. While 
Li et al. [125] posit that Dekey uses RSSS to provide a tunable key management to 
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balance issues of confidentiality, reliability, storage overhead and performance, 
Kapusta et al. deployed a system that situates between Rabin’s IDA [40] and 
Krawczyk CSSS [11]. Curiously there is no known information on the resilient nature 
of the key shares retrieval and the accrued overhead for each sharing policy 
combinations during different rates of cloud failure. Secondly, there is also no known 
proposal on how to improve the resilience nature of secret sharing when failure rate of 
n exceeds that of threshold m. These knowledge gaps are what FSSS key management 
provide. Through extensive experiments, it validated the works of Abdallah and 
Salleh in [8, 134]. The experiments also provided needed information on the 
behaviours of CSPs during each rate of cloud failure and with the future work based 
on an Agent proposes the feasible way of preventing adverse cloud failures from 
inhibiting key shares recovery using self-organisation protocol.  
All the same, FSSS key management looks impracticable in managing large-scale data 
infrastructure as key shares are stored on different cloudlets scattered all over the 
world as this has the potential of adding more overheads to overall system 
performance as seen in the available results. These were only intended to help inform 
on possible overheads in doing so. In the same vein, from available results the use of 
same CSPs at different geographical locations can also add to performance overheads 
as distance can be a factor of performance lag on network bandwidth. So, a balance 
should be implemented in choosing CSPs for an optimum performance in key storage 
management.  
6.5 Conclusions 
Evaluations of FSSS key management system with other similar methods such as that 
of Kapusta et al. [18], [123], Li et al. [125], Hu et al. [78] and Loruenser et al. [25] 
showed that though they used secret sharing in key management at different levels, 
there is no other known information on performance overheads of using any secret 
sharing policy beside the work of Loruenser et al. [25], which showed the 
performance of Shamir’s PSS when used to share ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption key 
using 3-from-4 and 3-from-7 share policies. But it failed to explore further 
experimentally the behaviours during adverse condition such as when cloud failure 
exceeds the defined threshold, and these are insufficient to guide users in choosing 
best file size-share policy combination. Above that, no one proved the resilient nature 
of their key retrieval system and how they intend to improve on the inherent problem 
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of impossible key retrieval with secret sharing schemes when defined threshold is 
exceeded by cloud outages. The above knowledge gaps were what FSSS key 
management system provided using this chapter. 
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7 Disaster Management 
Methods Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
There are many risks in moving data into public cloud environments along with an 
increasing threat around large-scale data and key leakages during cloud outages as 
encryption keys are stored alongside data in many cloud storage resources. This 
chapter aims to present some features of FSSS in comparison with similar methods 
that make it reliable, readily available and resilient, and how it tends to use these 
qualities to redefine disaster management using cloud-based resources from that of 
recovery from losses to mitigation against losses. The previous chapter has been used 
to prove how FSSS key management is resilient against cloud outages, this thesis will 
through this chapter show how this resilience improves on the system overall resilient 
nature and what we are doing to maintain consistent data availability as future works 
as well as possible application scenario of FSSS design methodology. 
7.2 Cloud-based Disaster Recovery (DR) 
System 
The cloud disaster recovery system is entirely different in approach to traditional 
disaster recovery system according to Klein [6]. Cloud-based system takes an 
integrated approach in which the virtual server gets bundled with the operating 
system, applications, software patches and data. Furthermore, the backing up and 
copying of the entire server to an off-site data centres through virtualisation take as 
little as minutes.  
The virtual server does not depend on a particular hardware, which makes it easier to 
transfer safely and accurately from one data centre to another the operating system, 
applications, patches and data without reloading each component of the server. The 
advantages of Cloud-based DR over the traditional type range from reduced recovery 
time and complete data accuracy during data restoration and recovery. These are made 
possible because of its ability to implement full network replication, the 
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synchronisation or mirroring of Virtual Machines (VM) at a remote site to ensure 
failover in the event of failure of the original site. 
Cloud-based DR as in all cloud-based systems provides low-cost DR solutions 
because of the pay-as-you-use model. Cloud-based DR provides its subscribers both 
shared and dedicated DR services. Based on customers’ choice, the benefits can 
accrue but in all, cloud-based DR offers low-cost services compared to traditional 
systems. It is this “resource-on-demand” and high degree of automation that made 
cloud-based DR very attractive. Despite these attractive economics, Wood et al, [99] 
argue that increased latency is a major barrier in using cloud data centres for DR, as 
other servers could have a large geographical separation from the primary site, which 
in no small measure could affect communication between them adversely. The 
limitation of data owners from having control over their data placement worsens this 
scenario, they argued. 
In the same vein, Ji et al. [100] and [79] opined that the use of synchronous replication 
by Cloud-based DR does not in any way help every data write as the wide-area 
latency has negative impacts on its performance, forcing system administrators to 
consider asynchronous replication. This often trades-off loss of data for performance 
by replicating a consistent “snapshot” to the backup site. Asynchronous replication 
positively impacts performance as the primary site can come up even before the 
replication completes. However, this can lead to loss of disk writes at the primary site 
subsequent to the last replicated snapshot in case of a disaster. Current designs and 
implementations of cloud-based disaster management systems are focused on 
recovery after outages leading to some losses, leakages and shut downs depending on 
the level and length of outages. Hence, the concentration is on reducing the Recovery 
Time Objectives (RTO) of cloud-based disasters, which is the time it takes to recover 
from disaster after it has happened, ranging from microseconds, seconds, minutes, 
hours and sometimes days and weeks. 
7.3 FSSS Resilience Method 
FSSS is a method of multi-cloud storage system; the resilience nature will be 
evaluated based on data fragmentations, storage, retrieval and key management 
methods as well as the reliability. Available literature from these works, Loruenser et 
al. [25], Gu et al. [9], Joshi et al. [133], Bessani et al. [23] and Bowers et al. [85] all 
give credence that the use of redundancy technique improves reliability, availability 
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and resilience of cloud-based storage. In the other hands, the use of secret sharing 
improves resilience of cloud-based storage in as much as the defined threshold is not 
exceeded by cloud outages, there are proves from these works, Abdallah and Salleh 
[19], [27], Ukwandu et al. [46], Buchanan et al. [31], Fabian et al. [12], Ermakova 
and Fabian [13] to buttress these points. FSSS combines both methods in data sharing 
and key management. In data sharing using Figures 9 and 13 showed how 3 different 
cloud storages (premised and external) store encrypted fragments, and as well used 
Figures 9 and 14 to show its key share storages, for which the number of cloud 
storages deployed are dependent on key sharing policy in use. This thesis will 
therefore use the following experiments to prove further the level or reliability, 
availability and resilience that FSSS provides. 
7.3.1 Test Results and Evaluations 
7.3.1.1 Test One 
This test is carried out using varied share policies, varied file sizes, with equal number 
of fragments. This is to test the implications of varied share policies on system 
overhead. It assumes that increase in threshold and change in policy has negative 
effect on file combination. 
There is no significant evidence to show that increasing number of participants in a 
share policy impacts negatively on file combination. Taking a look at the Table 12 and 
Figure 20, it is obvious that though they all had equal number of fragments, system 
overheads increased slightly though not consistent and significant with increasing 
number of participants from 5 to 10 participants across board and 1KB through 1GB 
file sizes. 
 
Table 12: Overhead Cost of File Combination using equal number of fragments with varied share policies 
S/N 
FileSize 
(B) 
15%, 2 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 3 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 5 
(S) 
15%, 4 from 10 
(S) 
15%, 6 from 10 
(S) 
15%, 8 from 10 
(S) 
1 1KB 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 
2 10KB 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12 
3 100KB 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 
4 1MB 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.11 
5 10MB 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.26 
6 100MB 1.87 1.59 1.74 1.76 1.50 1.78 
7 1GB 78.10 81.38 78.01 88.34 79.98 96.10 
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Figure 20: Plot of Overhead Cost of File combination, equal number of fragments with varied share policies. 
 
In the same vein, an investigation to test the impact of varied thresholds, varied file 
sizes, equal number of fragments by seeking to know the relationship between 
thresholds and number of fragments generated keeping file sizes the same alongside 
number of participants. It is assumed here that the number of fragments generated has 
the capacity to cause large overheads in file combination. But a look at the above 
Table 12 and Figure 20 show that there is no significant evidence to show that 
increase in thresholds, increases the system overheads in an equal number of 
fragments using same file sizes and number of participants. 
In order to make FSSS model more reliable and predictable, an equation was 
generated to help in this regard as shown below. This statistical model is designed to 
help users understand the time needed to process a given file in conjunction with the 
share policy. The essence of the model is to guide users in making an informed 
decision regarding the implication of choosing a share policy for a given file size. 
7.3.1.2 FSSS Model Equation 
FSSS has two main inputs – file and share policy, while the system produces two 
categories of results that has to do with cost, that is the time in seconds it takes to 
process the file, which includes file split time using the File-splitter, fragment 
encryption time with AES 256-bit key length, fragment decryption time and file 
combination time using the File-combiner. The second category is the results in 
relation to key management using secret sharing policy, which accounts for key shares 
creation time using the sharing algorithm, key shares writing time, shares retrieval 
time, and secret recovery time using the share recovery algorithm. 
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Since the above experiments were performed using a finite blocks of file sizes (1KB, 
10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB and 1GB), it is therefore necessary that a model 
that will help users understand the cost in seconds of what it will take to process their 
file given the file size as provided in Table 13. It is also worthy to note that the model 
is only limited to the share policies used in the experiments – 2 from 5, 3 from 5, 4 
from 5, 4 from 10, 6 from 10 and 8 from 10.  
 
Table 13: File Processing Linear Regression table 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients (S) 
Standardized 
Coefficients (S) 
t (S) Sig. (S) Collinearity 
Statistics (S) 
B  Std. Error  Beta    Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.859 1.347  -1.381 .176   
File Size 7.843E-8 .000 .993 53.801 .000 1.000 1.000 
P2 (3 from 5) .420 1.872 .005 .224 .824 .600 1.667 
P3 (4 from 5) -.046 1.872 -.001 -.025 .980 .600 1.667 
P4 (4 from 10) 1.455 1.872 .019 .777 .442 .600 1.667 
P5 (6 from 10) .203 1.872 .003 .109 .914 .600 1.667 
P6 (8 from 10) 2.587 1.872 .033 1.382 .176 .600 1.667 
a. Dependent Variable: OverHeadCost 
 
Equation modelling gives: 
OverHeadCost = -1.859 + 0.00000007843 × FS + 0.420 × P2 - 0.046 × P3 + 1.455 ×
 P4 + 0.203 × P5 + 2.587 × P6 
FS is file size, P1 (reference variable) is share policy 2 from5, P2 is share policy 3 
from 5, P3 is share policy 4 from 5, P4 is share policy 4 from 10, P5 is share policy 6 
from 10, while P6 is share policy 8 from 10. 
This equation model is derived from Table 13. The intrepretion is that P1 is the 
reference variable here, so it has been excluded from the equation. The interpretation 
has to be done in relation to P1.  
For instance, given a file size, using share policy 3 from 5 in sharing and recovering a 
file within the limit of the system specification used in this experiment will take 0.42 
seconds higher that when used P1 to share such a file, in the same vein, using share 
policy 4 from 5 to process same file size will be 0.046 seconds faster than when done 
with P1, while that of share policy 4 from 10 will take about 1.455 seconds higher 
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than that of P1, 6 from 10 share policy will take about 0.203 seconds higher than that 
of P1 and 8 from 10 will take 2.587 seconds higher than that of P1. This implies in 
relation to our experimental frameworks (hardware and software specifications) that 
share policy 4 from 5 is more effective using any file of size and 15% of file size as 
fragment size, followed by 2 from 5, then 3 from 5, 6 from 10 and least effective is 8 
from 10. When the overhead cost - that is the total time taken to process a file given a 
share policy is predicted, the other components such as file split time, fragment 
encryption time, fragment decryption time and file combination time predictions that 
made up the overhead cost will be generated as well. The linear regression models 
from which these are derived including that of share creation and secret recovery are 
added to this thesis as Appendixes. 
7.3.1.3 Test Two 
This test assumes that an increase in the number of participants (cloudlets) increases 
file combination overhead and hence decreases the level of file availability. Table 12 
shows these range of values: 1GB file size using share policy 2 from 5 took a total of 
78.10 seconds to process, 3 from 5 took 81.38 seconds, while 4 from 5 took 78.01 
seconds. A file of 1GB file size using share policy of 4 from 10 was processed at 
88.34 seconds, 6 from 10 at 79.98 seconds while that of 8 from 10 took 96.10 seconds 
to process. This indicates that such assumption is false rather an increase in threshold 
increases system overhead. This implies that FSSS method has good level of 
availability as CSPs in use are scattered all over the world and are expected to have 
some impacts on share retrievals than when they are closely located.  
7.3.1.4 Test Three 
This test the implication of cloud outages on file combination and hence assumes that 
cloud failure inhibits file combination and as such impossible to recombine file during 
cloud outage. 
Table 11 in Test Three, Section 6.3.1.3 proved resilience of keys and in effect the data 
as also shown in Table 12. Evidence from Test Two, section 7.3.1 show that in as 
much as the threshold does not exceed 60% of total number of cloud storages in use, 
file reconstruction is always feasible, while evidence from Figure 11 gave credence to 
the use of redundancy approach, which improves data availability. Hence, it is 
pertinent to assert that the use of both methods in cloud storages of both encrypted 
fragments and key shares ensure consistent data availability, reliability and resilience. 
                         89    
 
7.4 Overall Evaluations 
The evaluation on this chapter will be based on the potential application area of cloud-
based disaster management. This thesis therefore will take a look at what is currently 
being done and evaluate them with the characteristics of FSSS. 
Current cloud-based disaster management are based on recovery after cloud outages. 
Current works and proposal in cloud-based disaster management are based on 
minimising the time it takes to recover from disaster known as Recovery Time 
Objective (RTO), but the point of recovery known as Recovery Point Objective (RPO) 
has remained a management decision issue [79]. Issues of concern for evaluation are 
limited to, what are being done to automate the RPO decision point, mitigate losses 
rather than recovering after losses occasioned by disaster.  
Gu et al. [9] relied on data backup and restore technology to build a system proposed 
to provide high data reliability, low backup cost and short recovery time by utilising 
co-operative resources of various cloud service providers with various parameters 
using multiple optimisation scheduling as strategies in balancing the objectives of 
disaster recovery. Lenk et al. [111] states that there is a way of being at alert against 
disasters by describing the architecture for a novel approach in establishing standby 
sites, known as warm sites in disaster recovery that replicates a distributed system in 
the cloud to another cloud they argued is a missing link in current literature.  No 
doubt, their system is intended to provide a backup system in case of disaster.  
Even with their deployment method, the certainties of downtime cannot be 
overemphasised. Cully et al. [67]  described a system that provides software resilience 
in the face of hardware failure (VMs for Virtual Machines) in such a manner that an 
active system at such a time can continue execution on an alternative physical host 
while preserving the host configurations by using speculative execution in replicating 
either processor-intensive applications or communication-intensive applications at a 
fixed time interval. The strength lies on the preservation of system’s software 
independently during hardware failure but lags in the area of performing Replication 
by adding fault tolerance into the VM at fixed intervals.  
Dong et al. [114] described an architecture known as Multi-cloud-based Evacuation 
Services for Emergency Management (MCES) that is based on instantiating multiple 
instances at different states as a way of mitigating the cloud-based disaster. Their 
work is similar to that of Chu and Wu [115], Chu and Wu [116] and Chen et al. [117]. 
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Chu and Wu provided a hybrid system that combines cloud resources with mobile 
phones. The cloud serves for routine task computing while sensor information that 
provides the best evacuation routes for data are collected using mobile phones and 
these are done irrespective of an emergency situation or not. Chen et al. concentrated 
on mobile cloud computing using smart-phones. Thus, proving a point that MCES is 
designed for disaster recovery with its attendant downtimes depending on the time it 
takes to re-instantiate a new VM after the disaster. 
By using the evaluation frameworks on resilience, it becomes obvious that when 𝑆𝑝 =
1, the system breaking point has been reached and hence the needed information to 
begin recovery thereby achieving an automated RPO if self-organisation is not 
incorporated. In the same vein, using the proposed solution on how best to implement 
the concept of self-organisation as contained in future work, FSSS wishes to use same 
to bridge the gap on the RTO thereby achieving no downtime and as well prevent 
losses occasioned by outages. This, to the best of our knowledge is the first known 
attempt to shift the focus from disaster recovery to disaster mitigation. First, FSSS 
argues the sufficiency of using rate of availability and response time to determine 
cloud level of cooperation, as metrics like throughput, download bandwidth and speed 
affect the arrival time.  
While availability is virtually 99.9% in modern cloud storage designs, the need to 
anticipate otherwise may not be needed as it has been covered in Service Level 
Agrement(SLAs) thus underscoring the importance of using more metrics to calculate 
cloud behaviours as such are subjective to other metrics. Secondly, its test on fairness 
of using the two capacities mentioned earlier to disenroll participant through Trust 
calculations. Using section 6.3.1 showed the fluctuating nature of download time 
(Arrival time) alongside that of throughput as a result of the multi-tenancy nature of 
CSPs and hence portends that values are unstable and the need for cumulative results 
both present and future in determining cloud behaviours. Therefore, concludes that 
using such attributes without looking into future results is not fair in application. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter provides information on the tests conducted to present some features of 
FSSS in comparison with similar current methods like that of Gu et al. [9], Lenk et al. 
[111], Cully et al. [67], and Dong et al. [114]. While these methods aimed at reducing 
the impact of cloud outage by minimising the RTO and leaving RPO as management 
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decision issue, FSSS we conclude is the first attempt known to us that provided a 
framework that has the capacity of automating RPO, it also focuses on redefining 
disaster management by introducing the concept of mitigation of losses rather than 
recovery from losses after outage. It proves to do these through qualities like high end 
reliability, availability, and proposed redefined resilience through self-organisation 
using an agent as contained in future work section.  
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8 Conclusions and 
Future Work 
8.1 Thesis Summary 
This thesis is an evaluation of a fragmented secret share architecture known as FSSS, 
which aims to provide an alternative that is capable of closing knowledge gap inherent 
in secret sharing schemes, such as the inability to continue production as file size 
increases. Fabian and Fabian [12], Ermakova and Fabian [13] and Alsolami and Boult 
in [17] all posit that secret sharing scheme is suitable for use in data sharing but failed 
to show that it is capable of continuing production when file sizes increased 
exponentially thus limiting its use in large-scale data infrastructure. By using this 
thesis’ evaluation framework on scalability as defined above, the overall evaluation 
with other similar methods showed that FSSS was able to provide a more scalable 
alternative by combining data fragmentation using optimum fragment size with secret 
sharing scheme in key management.  
Managing encryption keys is a very complex system [28], [131], and this complexity 
comes from the methods of generation, exchange, storage, retrieval, and replacement 
of cryptographic keys [131]. Hu et al. [132] believes that such complexity is more on 
retrieval process as the more complex the retrieval interface is, the greater the 
challenge of deploying key retrieval in applications such as decrypting encrypted file. 
But by using secret sharing scheme in key management, high level resilience is 
feasible and has the capacity of providing non-complex key management system. 
FSSS defined resilience in using secret sharing scheme in key management as the 
ability to overcome the facts that when 𝑛 < 𝑚, key recovery become impossible. It 
developed an evaluation framework based on this and used same to evaluate the 
potentials of different methods in compliance with this and found out that though 
there have been other similar methods such as that of Kapusta et al. [18], [123], Li et 
al. [125], Hu et al. [78] and Loruenser et al. [25] only FSSS validated this 
experimentally in accordance with the works of Abdallah and Salleh in [8, 134] on 
key share retrieval when 𝑛 < 𝑚. It also went further to show behaviours of system at 
different rates of cloud outages and proposes possible solution to this mentioned 
challenge using self-organising protocol as proposed by Nojoumian et al. in [34].  
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With these above features, FSSS when compared with the works of Gu et al. [9], Lenk 
et al. [111], Cully et al [67], and Dong et al. [114] showed that while these methods 
aimed at reducing the impact of cloud outage by minimising the recovery time 
objective (RTO) in cloud-based disaster management, FSSS has shown potential in  
redefining disaster management by introducing the concept of mitigation of losses 
rather than recovery from losses after outage. It proves to do these through its qualities 
like high end reliability, availability, and proposed redefined resilience through self-
organisation using an Agent. 
8.2 Main Findings 
This thesis has the following as the primary findings: 
• The inherent challenge in secret sharing scheme by its inability to continue 
production when file size increases exponentially can only be solved through 
alternative means such as combining secret sharing with other data fragmentation 
method. 
• Using an optimum fragment size in data fragmentation gives an almost even 
overhead cost irrespective of the share policy in use as difference between each of 
the overheads at different file sizes are less than three seconds but with an 
understanding that using an optimum fragment size for all file sizes may increase 
overhead as file sizes increase hence the need for some reviews and future 
experiments in that direction. 
• Redefining the concept of resilience in secret sharing scheme using self-organising 
protocol has the ability to provide service irrespective of a number of cloud 
outages, thus closing the knowledge gap that secret sharing cannot be used to 
provide services when cloud outages exceed defined threshold in cloud-based 
storage.   
• Disaster management using cloud resources has been focused on recovery after 
cloud outages, and so resilience has been defined not on mitigating against the 
occasioned losses but on a quick recovery. This has been a source of worry for 
cloud users as such outages could lead to losses, leakages and sometimes complete 
closure of businesses, FSSS fills in that gap as it provides consistent data 
availability in the face of outages while maintaining high-level security, 
confidentiality, and integrity of stored data.  
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8.3 Limitations 
FSSS is deficient in the area of fragments management as it does not implement a 
threshold scheme in encrypted fragments recovery nor does it have an inbuilt privacy 
protection and error correction mechanisms. This makes it difficult to detect as well as 
provide information on unauthorised access, correct corrupt encrypted fragment(s), 
provide details of stolen fragment(s), or lost one in transit. So, when there is a 
malicious intent on encrypted fragment(s) by way of corruption or stealing, fragment 
correction becomes impossible and file recombination fails integrity test using SHA-
512 file checksum. The only possible way out is a rerun of the process using different 
fragment store. This impacts the system negatively by impeding the speed of the 
process. 
Using secret sharing scheme has an inherent deficiency in such a manner that when 
𝑛 < 𝑚, secret recovery is impossible. This thesis could not implement the desired 
self-organisation protocol as proposed by Nojoumian et al. in [34] in key management 
that we believed is capable of ensuring that cloud failure rate does not exceed defined 
threshold.  
FSSS models only predict expected time to process file given a policy and these 
policies are not dynamically chosen like files rather users have to choose from a select 
Share Policies, which makes users options in terms of Share Policies limited. 
8.4 Future Work 
Two main issues form this thesis future works: one is to apply erasure coding 
technique on encrypted file using optimum fragment size, which this thesis found 
more scalable than using block fragment size in use in erasure coding and two is to 
implement self-organising protocol on key management so as to provide consistent 
key retrieval that will ensure steady data availability. Below is current work done to 
help define the future work in the area of self-organisation as mechanism for applying 
erasure coding technique are already defined in several literature. 
8.4.1 The Social Concept in Secret Sharing 
The social concept in secret sharing as proposed by Nojoumian et al. [4, 5, 6] suggests 
that the resilient nature of secret sharing scheme can be strengthened by using it to 
develop a self-organising system as it concerns the use of cloud storage resources. Our 
proposed future woks will be presented here, which we intend to use to redefine the 
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concept of socialisation in secret sharing as presented in Section 2.4.4. It is built 
around using an agent that computes cloud behaviours after every phase of secret 
sharing and recovery operations. Uses same to predict future behaviours of cloudlets 
and hence invoke the social tuning functions of taking away shares from non-
cooperative to cooperative cloudlets.  
8.4.2 Cloud Behavioural Computation 
After every operation, the user is presented with two different computational options – 
capacity measures of each participating cloudlet or overall cloudlets performance 
during each operation. The essence is to give the user options of perusing behaviours 
of each cloudlet during the operation such as its Latency (ms), Speed (bps), 
Throughput (bps) and Availability. While in the other hand, the overall performance 
of all cloudlets in the areas of Elapsed Time (sec), Packet Loss, Average Round Trip 
Time (ms), Speed (bps), Download Bandwidth (bps), Upload Bandwidth (bps), 
Latency (ms), and Throughput (bps) for comparative analysis. We will therefore treat 
this section by looking at these measures in details as designed. 
8.4.3 Capacity Measures of clouds 
At every operation of FSSS, measures are taken to ascertain several behaviours of 
participating cloudlets so as to help set up benchmarks of capacities of participating 
cloudlets for every file size against share policy in relation to accrued performance 
overheads such as latency, rate of packet loss, transaction speed and throughput as 
optimum fragment size has been established through previous publication and 
unpublished experiments. With this one can say using a certain file size in conjunction 
with a fragment size and share policy, the system is capable of having certain 
overheads accrued. With these prediction of future behaviours as well as potential 
dangers can be done. With the proposed future works, self-organisation can be 
activated to avert any impending danger so as to keep the system consistently 
available. These behaviours are calculated through capacity measures as provided in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
8.4.4 Proposed Architectural Design of the Self-Organising 
System 
In Figure 21, shares are mapped into cloudlets and details of ShareIDs returned to 
metadata store. Hence, the system is configured and initialised. Figure 22 shows cloud 
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performance measurements, analysis and possible system adjustments, while Figure 
23 shows actions taken when results are interpreted to avert danger thereby creating a 
resilient and self-organising system capable of mitigating disaster. 
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Figure 21: Share Mapping, Distribution and System Initialisation 
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Figure 22: Performance Measurements and System Adjustments. 
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Figure 23: Disenrollment and Self-Reconfiguration System. 
 
8.1.1 Agent 
The activities of the proposed Agent is to receive data from the calculated cloudlets 
capacities from several storage files and use same based on the metrics to (1) 
Calculate cloud performance from measurements taken during each operations, 
analyse and possible issue pre-system adjustments notifications as shown in Figures 
21 and 22. As shown in Figure 23, use values gathered to predict possible behaviours 
of cloudlets and where necessary actions are taken when results are interpreted as 
showing adverse behaviours by cloudlet. The actions are not limited to removing 
shares from such poorly behaved cloudlet and transferring same to better behaved 
cloudlet but not exceedingly pre-defined threshold. These adjustments thereby provide 
self-organisation that helps to prevent system failure due to adverse outages. 
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10 Appendix A 
10.1 Performance Evaluation of a Fragmented 
Secret System 
This work was done as an evaluation of the performance of RESCUE using desktop 
computers with folders as storage resources for the purpose of storing and recovering 
of shares. It serves as a way of testing the overall performance overhead so as to 
ascertain the implications of using RESCUE in data sharing in multi-cloud 
architecture. After these tests, RESCUE was scaled to full cloud implementation using 
Google Cloud VM alongside other cloud storage resources. 
10.2 Overview of RESCUE 
RESCUE is a secured threshold Cloud-based storage infrastructure using the 
Fragmented Secret Sharing System design philosophy, and is based on multi-cloud 
architecture for data storage. Replication for backup and restore of data from a 
primary site to other sites separated geographically shows little-known potential in 
eliminating system downtime because of the: 
• Effects of latency on performance: the effect of latency on performance is a 
source of performance lag in using replication for backup and restore of data or 
virtualised infrastructure from a primary site to backup sites. Using synchronized 
replication in a multi-cloud storage system has an increasingly large overhead, 
and, on the other hand, asynchronous replication reduces the integrity of the 
replicated data.  
• Data integrity on recovery: quality assurance of recovered data is an issue not 
readily discussed in data storage and retrieval, but a very strong necessity. So, 
checking the integrity of data after recovery is necessary to eliminate possible data 
corruption.  
• Consistent data availability: data availability is key to the knowledge economy 
and therefore needful to mitigate factors that add large overheads to systems and 
thus using a robust, and all-encompassing, system is a necessity. 
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RESCUE is designed to handle: the latency effect on performance by defining the 
usage of key share mechanism rather than data sharing, when the file size is large. 
It also addresses the issue of data integrity on recovery, as it is highly minimal or non-
existent depending on the combination used in terms of file size, fragment size and 
key share policy. With regards to key share method; files are broken into chunks and 
the chunks in turn encrypted with AES and safely decrypted using recovered key 
before decrypting the chunks and combining file. In terms of shared data, data is 
treated as a sequence of bytes so data encoding does not matter and recovered file are 
cross-checked with the original file using SHA-512 hash function for data checksum. 
Additionally, using secret sharing scheme to split data and recover it assures data 
security in a keyless manner devoid of corruption as appropriate measure is put in 
place in the algorithm to detect wrong shares during data recovery. 
10.3 Architecture 
The architecture of RESCUE involves data/key splitting, storage, and retrievals. The 
two different methods involve data splitting or key splitting with data encryption and 
decryption using recovered key. The method implemented starts by defining the 
policy, which is the number of shares to be generated from each file, (N) and the least 
required number of shares (M) needed to come together to recover the file. The Policy 
of M-out-of-N, here the policy is 2-out-of-5, 3-out-of-5 and 4-out-of-5 shares, 
implying that for example 2 shares out-of-5 generated shares from a file are needed to 
recreate the file. The unique identifier is similar a magic number, unique to each 
session that is appended to the share when created.  
10.3.1 File share 
Files are scanned as in Figure 24 from a designated folder and encoded to byte 
streams. Using a pre-defined share policy, the encoded data is broken into shares. The 
shares generated are stored in separate containers and from where they are read-in and 
files recovered during file recovery on request.  
10.3.2 Key share 
Files are scanned as in Figure 24 from a designated folder as above, then using a 
predefined chunk size say 1024 Bytes, files are broken into the defined chunk size, 
encrypted and the encryption key shared as above. When the files are required, the 
shares generated from the key are brought together and the key recovered from where 
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encrypted chunks are decrypted and the chunks brought together and the files are 
recreated.  
10.3.2.1 Share generation 
Using the equation below we generate shares: 
iM
i
XiASUMGFAXf ][ _),(
1
0
−
=
=     Equation 21 
To create N shares from a secret, with a threshold of M, we will take a look on how 
each octet of the secret is generated. An array A of M octets is created at first in which 
the array element A[0] contains a portion of the secret, while A[1], A[2],..., A[M-1] 
are selected independently and uniformly at random. Each share is generated by 
computing the value of f(X,A), where X is the share index and the resulting octet is 
appended to the share. A, B, C,... are arrays of M octets and each zero element of the 
array contains a portion of the share. A[0], B[0], C[0], .... are equal to first, second and 
third octets of the secret and so on. The power of X is the coefficient and M-1 is the 
threshold. GF_SUM is Galois field summation, which takes place over GF(256), 
different from integer addition as each addition uses the exclusive-or operation. 
10.3.2.2 Secret Recovery 
Just as in Shamir [12] authorised participants following earlier stated rules are able to 
recover the secret using Lagrangian interpolation once the conditions: 
1. All zero elements of the array of M octets are retrieved. 
2. Number of retrieved elements greater or equal to the threshold. 
3. All contributed shares from participants are certified as genuine and satisfies 2 
above. 
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Figure 24: Key/File share creation 
 
10.3.2.3 Recovery: Files 
When files are to be recovered as in Figure 25, the user types in the destination folder 
for recovered files; the program picks up each filename, the associated values that 
identify the owner of the files – the UUID all in the metadata database and used the 
values gathered to confirm ownership  and thereafter scans and retrieves all shares 
associated with the filename. With these, file recovery is made using the Recovery 
algorithm. 
10.4 Recovery: Key 
Following the initial method use above in ownership identification, the system 
retrieves the encrypted file, recover key and use the key so recovered to decrypt the 
file. See Figure 26 for details.  
The number of shares recovered can be less than N but equals or greater than M 
(Threshold). The shares must be of equal length, else they are inconsistent. In file 
recovering, the output string is initialised to zero and the initial octet (share indexes 
are grouped in octets) of the share is stripped from each share and none of these octets 
are same else error will be reported, which halts the process. For each of these shares 
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an array V of M octets is created, in which an array element V[i] contains the octet 
from ith share. These stripped octets are appended to the octets array U, formed by 
setting U[i] equals to the first octet of the ith share. The value of I(U, V) is computed, 
and appended to the output string, which is returned as the secret. This contains one 
fewer octet than the shares. 
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Figure 25: File Recovery 
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Figure 26: Key recovery and File decryption 
10.5 Results and Evaluations  
Two different sets of experiments were performed: file/data share; and key share 
methods. In file share, files of different sizes are created into share and stored in 
folders. When the files are needed, the several shares are recovered from the folders 
and the file recreated. Each file involved in the process is created into shares using M-
out-of-N threshold secret sharing scheme and the shares stored in folders, while in key 
share, files of different sizes are broken into chunks; each chunk is encrypted using 
AES of 256-bits key length then stored in folder, the encryption key is thereafter 
shared, stored in folders as well.  
When the files are needed, the shares are recovered from the folders for each key 
based on policy and the key recreated, using each key to decrypt a chunk as retrieved 
from the folder and the file recombined. The secret sharing scheme used is modified 
Social Secret sharing scheme. The issue of confidentiality and integrity in the use of 
secret sharing scheme has been validated by many works in secret sharing schemes 
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such as Abdallah and Salleh [27], Buchanan et al. [135]. Since RESCUE is 
concentrated on Data Availability at Zero Downtime [136], the essence of the 
experiment is to understand all performance overheads that will impact negatively on 
the objective of the system so as to eliminate them or validating already known facts. 
Evaluation of the results: Secret sharing schemes have been used successfully in 
data splitting and reconstruction, thereby providing data security in a keyless manner. 
This section outlines an experiment involving two main methods of secret sharing 
application – data sharing and key sharing. In Experiment One, figures 27 and 30 
show normal curve with an increasing size of Threshold (M) and file size but Figure 
28 and 29 showed otherwise, a varying curve indicating the effects of Share Writing 
and Recovery from folders on systems performance. In Experiment Two, Figures 31, 
32 and 33 showed the validation of [13, 14] on the effect of increasing Threshold and 
file size on the system performance as in Figure 31, the threshold is 2, so the overhead 
is with the Process not on Recovery as in figures 32 and 33. But a look at Figure 34, 
35 and 36 indicate entirely different results from the previous ones thus giving an 
understanding that there are resultant effects of file size, fragment size on share 
policy. The fragment size was varied in all as well as share policy using file sizes from 
1KB to 1GB. In all the results shown, it is evident that using fragmented secret share 
system is the best option while dealing with big data infrastructure than using 
threshold secret sharing scheme alone, which has proved impossible to be used to 
scale large data infrastructure due to inherent characteristics of finite field arithmetic. 
The evaluator, in this case, is the performance overhead at an increasing thresholds 
and data sizes. The experiments showed that Share Writing and Recovery adds more 
performance overhead in Experiments One, while in Experiment Two, the 
performance overheads of File and Fragment Sizes on Share Policy were obvious. 
These depict their strengths and weaknesses at different application scenarios.  
The aim of the experiment is to discover all factors capable of adding performance 
overhead thereby derailing total system performance both in File and Key Sharing 
methods. Because we aim to apply the methods further in both network and cloud 
scenarios, we will work in eliminating the discovered factors that add to performance 
overhead to the system as this method has proved scalable with big data infrastructure. 
The test machine is a Duo Core Intel Pentium N3530 2.16GHz, 2.16 GHz, 64bit x64-
based processor, Windows 8 operating system on 4GB of RAM. 
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Two primary sets of results are presented which use the parameters of M=2, N=5; 
M=3, N=5 and M=4, N=5. The variable N relates to the number of shares to create 
while the variable M relates to the number of shares required for recreation of the 
original arbitrary data (using each SSS algorithm). Results are presented in seconds 
for Time, while in KB, MB and GBs for variables file sizes. From the figures and 
tables presented, it can be clearly demonstrated that key share is the fastest method 
regardless of file sizes as well the method capable of scaling over large volumes of 
varying file sizes. 
The key share experiment involves more stages than the previous and we therefore use 
the terms, Process and Recover. Process time involves time taken to split the file into 
chunks using a pre-defined chunk size, fragment encryption time, key share creation 
and writing times while Recover time involves time taken to recover key shares from 
folders, key recreation time, fragment decryption and file recombination times. 
10.6 Conclusions 
Experiments performed using secret sharing scheme has proved resilience in the face 
of failures as not all hosts are required to reconstruct data after splitting, but a major 
drawback remains the effect of latency on performance. This is worsened as data size 
increase as well as the distance between each of the hosts thus giving rise to our work. 
Lessons learnt are that using Key Share rather than Data Share method in combination 
with an appropriate fragment and share policy is the only way to scale large data 
infrastructure and with this lessons and validations we intend to eliminate all factors 
revealed as capable of adding large overhead to the system. This will provide a 
platform capable of achieving data availability at zero downtime.  
10.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 14: Share creation against policy 
  Policy: 2 from 5 3 from 5 4 from 5 
S/N 
File Size 
(KB) 
Creation 
Time (Sec) 
Creation 
Time (Sec) 
Creation 
Time (Sec) 
1 1 0.106119 0.10933 0.143713 
2 10 0.913352 1.075088 1.427096 
3 100 1.833184 2.115918 2.461108 
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Figure 27: Time taken to Create share against Policy 
 
Table 15: Share Writing to folders against Policy 
 
Policy: 2 from 5 3 from 5 4 from 5 
S/N File Size (KB) 
Writing Shares 
(Sec) 
Writing 
Shares(Sec) 
Writing 
Shares(Sec) 
1 1 0.020532 0.03125 0.164257 
2 10 0.066987 0.100468 0.03355 
3 100 0.090945 0.085788 0.068099 
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Figure 28: Share Writing to folders against Policy 
  
 
Table 16:: Share Recovery against Policy 
 Policy: 2 from 5 3 from 5 4 from 5 
S/N File Size (KB) 
Share Recovery 
(Sec) 
Share Recovery 
(Sec) 
Share Recovery 
(Sec) 
1 1 0.008113 0.004693 0.015012 
2 10 0.083933 0.009362 0.005608 
3 100 0.025136 0.010948 0.008912 
 
 
Figure 29: Share Recovery from folders against Policy  
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Table 17:: File Recreation against Policy 
 
Policy: 2 from 5 3 from 5 4 from 5 
S/N File Size (KB) File Recreation (sec) File Recreation (sec) File Recreation (sec) 
1 1 0.03405 0.054628 0.10265 
2 10 0.434176 0.558682 0.92636 
3 100 0.674842 1.091936 1.704002 
 
 
 
Figure 30: File Recreation against Policy 
 
 
Figure 31: Process and Recover of file using 10KB fragment size on 2 from 5 Policy. 
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Figure 32: Process and Recover of file using 10KB fragment size on 3 from 5 Policy. 
 
 
Figure 33: Process and Recover of file using 10KB fragment size on 4 from 5 Policy. 
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Figure 34: Process and Recover of file using 100MB fragment size on 2 from 5 Policy. 
 
 
Figure 35: Process and Recover of a file using 100MB fragment size on 3 from 5 Policy. 
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Figure 36: Process and Recover of a file using 100MB fragment size on 4 from 5 Policy.  
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11 Appendix B 
11.1 Basic Data Striping and RAID Systems 
RAID stands for Redundant Array of Independent Disks. It is a well-known method of 
combining several hard disk drives into one logical unit, so as to address the fault-
tolerance and performance limitations of an individual hard disk drive. The key 
notions behind a RAID storage system are Data Striping and various levels of 
Redundancy. The striping process takes large data blocks and splits them into blocks 
of a defined size, such as 4 KB, which are then spread across each of the disks in the 
array. This can increase the performance of a storage system as a n-disk array (i.e., n-
way striping) provides n times the read and write speed improvement of a single disk 
(although in practice the actual performance achieved tends to be less than n times due 
to control overheads). However, the trade-off is reliability, as the failure of any 
individual disk would result in the failure of the entire array. Formally, assume that 
each independent hard disk drive has an identical rate of failure r, then the overall 
failure rate of an array of n disks is: 
1 − (1 − r)n       Equation 22 
Basic data striping over an array of n-disks without redundancy is referred to as 
RAID0, which is only suitable to situations where the highest I/O performance is 
desired, whilst the resulting increased probability of data loss can be tolerated. In 
other situations, reliability of data may outweigh system performance, and thus 
instead of striping the data over n disks, the same data is duplicated (or mirrored) to n 
disks. This strategy is referred to as RAID1, which is suitable to ensure the reliability 
of critical data. In comparison to RAID0, the overall failure rate of a RAID1 array of n 
disks becomes: 
 
rn        Equation 23 
However, when the same set of data is duplicated over n disks, it would result in a 
storage overhead of n − 1 disks. 
 
RAID0 and RAID1 can be combined into a RAID01 or a RAID10 configuration. The 
former means a mirrored configuration of multiple striped sets (i.e., mirror of stripes); 
and the latter means a stripe across a number of mirrored sets (i.e., stripe of mirrors). 
Both strategies are able to provide very good performance and reliability, whereas 
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both are expensive solutions as considerable amount of hard disk storage is committed 
to maintaining redundancy information. 
 
Another RAID level, namely RAID5, attempts to mitigate the high costs of 
RAID01/10. RAID5 utilizes striping and parity techniques to achieve simultaneously 
a similar I/O performance to RAID0 with a significantly lower failure rate of: 
 
1 − (1 − r)n − nr(1 − r)n−1     Equation 24 
A parity bit (or check bit) is a bit added to the end of a string of binary code that 
indicates whether the number of bits in the string with the value 1 is even or odd. In 
computing and telecommunications, a parity bit is calculated via an XOR sum of all 
the previous bits, yielding 0 for even parity and 1 for odd parity. Let A and B being 
two binary sequences. If: 
X = A XOR B 
then the following will be true: 
A = X XOR B 
B = X XOR A 
Using this property, we can say that the following expressions are also true (and this 
can be repeated for an infinite amount of terms): 
A XOR B XOR C XOR D = X 
X XOR B XOR C XOR D = A 
A XOR X XOR C XOR D = B 
A XOR B XOR X XOR D = C 
A XOR B XOR C XOR X = D 
Put simply, if we calculate a XOR of a number sequence, we can substitute X for any 
number in this sequence, recalculate the XOR, and recover the original number. This 
is the principle for building a RAID5 array, of which an example is shown in Figure 
37. Each of the four drives in Figure 37 are divided into four blocks, each belonging to 
a stripe on the same level across each drive. Each drive and each stripe have a parity 
block (stored in disk 4) which is the XOR of the other three blocks.  
So, say Disk 2 failed, then the XOR of A1 with A2 and A4 would get the remaining 
A3 for the A stripe; B1 with B2 and B3 to get the B4 parity block; etc. Generally 
speaking, by introducing a single parity bit, RAID5 is able to survive the failure of 
any single hard disk drive in any array which contains a minimum of three drives. 
 
The RAID5 data striping mechanism can be applied to secret sharing of data in the 
Cloud, where each cloud storage provider represents a disk storing one share of the 
secret data, but the limitation of this lies in that it always requires n − 1 shares to 
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reconstruct the original data, rather than a more desirable and flexible arbitrary k-out-
of-n shares. 
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Figure 37: A 4-disk Array in RAID5 format 
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12 Appendix C 
12.1 Detailed Experimental Results 
12.2 Variant One 
12.2.1 Fragments 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Secret Sharing Policy: 2 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and combine 
file  using a particular key share policy. 
 
Table 18: Varied file sizes using 1KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/
N 
FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007814 0.019532 0.015503 0.011718 0.05456668 
2 10KB 0.046878 0.035514 0.467881 0.23438 0.78465236 
3 100KB 0.2394 0.32927 0.634978 0.209857 1.41350527 
4 1MB 2.128525 3.598536 5.165434 2.159326 13.0518216 
5 10MB 83.9537 129.7083 131.0154 59.06891 403.746322 
6 100MB 258.7115 3143.999 656.6972 1657.46 5716.86737 
 
 
Figure 38: Varied file sizes using 1KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
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Table 19: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.015459 0.062503 0.007737 0.00761 0.09331036 
2 10KB 0.015662 0.027291 0 0.01556 0.05851249 
3 100KB 0.054534 0.07285 0.093732 0.054647 0.27576305 
4 1MB 0.383249 0.281557 0.564448 0.234383 1.46363745 
5 10MB 2.140715 2.6705 3.520125 2.093841 10.4251813 
6 100MB 22.28913 31.55624 38.52662 23.57686 115.948858 
7 1GB 385.7138 2098.181 905.8744 422.0202 3811.78945 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
 
Table 20: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0 0.031374 0.00774 0 0.039114 
2 10KB 0.015586 0.046881 0 0 0.06246698 
3 100KB 0.015625 0.011734 0.015587 0 0.04294586 
4 1MB 0.077863 0.120823 0.062505 0.031251 0.29244148 
5 10MB 0.468773 0.509873 0.695343 0.265636 1.93962426 
6 100MB 2.306734 4.857761 5.507886 4.238577 16.9109581 
7 1GB 65.50594 135.7359 136.9692 122.2016 460.412576 
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Figure 40: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 21: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.01542 0.046879 0 0 0.06229949 
2 10KB 0.015629 0.039606 0.015504 0.007814 0.0785534 
3 100KB 0.007813 0.015626 0.015588 0 0.0390268 
4 1MB 0.026114 0.023432 0.039002 0.015626 0.10417414 
5 10MB 0.124867 0.364098 0.24216 0.054688 0.78581219 
6 100MB 0.715984 2.259576 2.371971 0.466472 5.81400332 
7 1GB 58.32339 100.316 133.5535 123.2983 415.491188 
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Figure 41: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 22: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.023438 0.101659 0.109469 0.023346 0.2579124 
2 10KB 0.015488 0.406416 0.031252 0.015626 0.46878195 
3 100KB 0.01557 0.023438 0.015626 0.062598 0.11723244 
4 1MB 0.015625 0.03125 0.031253 0.007811 0.08593885 
5 10MB 0.804761 0.234951 1.023605 0.085927 2.14924483 
6 100MB 0.461024 1.729554 2.14624 0.321052 4.65786879 
7 1GB 43.87095 47.18494 64.00888 40.07847 195.143231 
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Figure 42: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 23: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007704 0.023322 0.031273 0 0.06229913 
2 10KB 0 0.03125 0.007814 0 0.03906357 
3 100KB 0.015669 0.031253 0.015565 0 0.06248677 
4 1MB 0.031139 0.086004 0.031161 0.007814 0.15611708 
5 10MB 0.046877 0.195385 0.195246 0.015627 0.45313442 
6 100MB 1.337963 1.310698 2.81248 1.437562 6.89870221 
7 1GB 55.83863 27.30553 34.04062 21.6859 138.870675 
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Figure 43: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 24: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007794 0.039104 0.015493 0 0.06239057 
2 10KB 0 0 0.023367 0 0.02336657 
3 100KB 0.009818 0.021634 0.023639 0.005499 0.06059051 
4 1MB 0.00801 0.038056 0.036052 0.005508 0.08762646 
5 10MB 0.102186 0.234294 0.218722 0.039147 0.59434903 
6 100MB 1.18749 2.782697 2.881051 1.257869 8.10910678 
7 1GB 39.4435 62.98048 434.7571 35.47601 572.657097 
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Figure 44: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Secret Sharing Policy: 3 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and combine 
file  using a particular key share policy. 
 
 
Table 25: Varied file sizes using 1 KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007814 0.024441 0.015626 0 0.04788077 
2 10KB 0.039009 0.028408 0.17977 0.038987 0.286173698 
3 100KB 0.355546 0.290273 0.507835 0.226573 1.380226719 
4 1MB 2.460981 2.749018 3.411468 1.961024 10.58249097 
5 10MB 20.73167 31.34608 71.71715 19.70122 143.496118 
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Figure 45: Varied file sizes using 1KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
 
 
Table 26: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007815 0.054611 0.007871 0 0.070297003 
2 10KB 0.015624 0.023468 0.031187 0.007814 0.078092813 
3 100KB 0.070212 0.05682 0.062431 0.023438 0.21290154 
4 1MB 0.523388 0.386838 0.507764 0.250011 1.668001673 
5 10MB 3.164124 2.763088 7.033319 4.414262 17.37479342 
6 100MB 96.407 93.02779 212.402 148.634 550.4707818 
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Figure 46: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 27: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.032046 0.055771 0.008948 0.008453 0.10521841 
2 10KB 0.035926 0.02375 0.030348 0.074121 0.164145291 
3 100KB 0.085691 0.007237 0.096141 0.450164 0.639233004 
4 1MB 0.386582 0.059073 0.739658 2.010074 3.195386351 
5 10MB 5.276726 0.590746 7.817365 3.073143 16.75798046 
6 100MB 51.49968 5.967706 211.5395 30.44199 299.448869 
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Figure 47: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
Table 28: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.008512 0.065378 0.008515 0.035585 0.117990375 
2 10KB 0.01302 0.02103 0.010015 0.014521 0.058585167 
3 100KB 0.021531 0.023533 0.011017 0.025536 0.081617594 
4 1MB 0.017026 0.065158 0.030042 0.031525 0.143750549 
5 10MB 0.108657 0.236346 0.303846 0.056082 0.704930187 
6 100MB 1.344405 3.045307 3.22482 0.691046 8.305577577 
7 1GB 104.6643 49.06252 62.80052 37.64411 254.171503 
 
 
Figure 48: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
 
Table 29: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.020112 0.023535 0.009015 0.007514 0.060176014 
2 10KB 0.026537 0.036577 0.009023 0.007011 0.079147697 
3 100KB 0.01502 0.033179 0.011017 0.022862 0.082077845 
4 1MB 0.023534 0.034552 0.036846 0.025393 0.120325445 
5 10MB 0.058586 0.191281 0.199291 0.030044 0.479201556 
6 100MB 0.499753 1.877582 1.954264 0.262493 4.594092017 
7 1GB 96.12252 43.16561 53.37338 37.46342 230.1249373 
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Figure 49: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 30: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.019525 0.034548 0.009015 0.032547 0.095635414 
2 10KB 0.031044 0.047069 0.009012 0.007512 0.094637393 
3 100KB 0.028545 0.046119 0.030143 0.007513 0.112320304 
4 1MB 0.028566 0.061591 0.030044 0.009013 0.129214049 
5 10MB 0.078111 0.204799 0.194784 0.051771 0.529465198 
6 100MB 1.864599 7.377933 3.008147 1.185042 13.43572044 
7 1GB 194.9306 39.19965 42.25581 28.53763 304.9236548 
 
 
Figure 50: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
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Table 31: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.012519 0.02003 0.021626 0.007512 0.06168723 
2 10KB 0.014022 0.025037 0.028429 0.008012 0.075499296 
3 100KB 0.024529 0.026193 0.01197 0.00751 0.070202584 
4 1MB 0.010514 0.042563 0.031548 0.010013 0.094639063 
5 10MB 0.055076 0.187779 0.195324 0.038056 0.476234913 
6 100MB 1.785259 2.842892 3.164258 1.471594 9.264002561 
7 1GB 223.3865 572.8175 1050.397 322.2105 2168.811955 
 
 
Figure 51: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Secret Sharing Policy: 4 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and combine 
file  using a particular key share policy. 
 
Table 32: Varied file sizes using 1KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.045069 0.017524 0.04006 0.022031 0.124684453 
2 10KB 0.089797 0.063733 0.205464 0.040059 0.399052507 
3 100KB 0.441522 0.552298 1.030704 0.331485 2.356008299 
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Figure 52: Varied file sizes using 1KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 33: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.054735 0.029455 0.010021 0.00801 0.102221012 
2 10KB 0.052071 0.023409 0.018026 0.011017 0.104522109 
3 100KB 0.06436 0.06374 0.124244 0.041061 0.293404951 
4 1MB 0.497475 0.561048 0.923853 0.394741 2.377116688 
 
 
 
Figure 53: Varied file sizes using 10KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
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Table 34: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTim
e 
OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.011017 0.016023 0.010015 0.008013 0.045068264 
2 10KB 0.016021 0.020027 0.011017 0.080083 0.12714839 
3 100KB 0.033045 0.017527 0.019031 0.011016 0.0806185 
4 1MB 0.076108 0.076481 0.151044 0.042059 0.345691375 
5 10MB 0.489383 1.046031 0.995171 0.389736 2.920321628 
 
 
Figure 54: Varied file sizes using 100KB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 35: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.015165 0.019025 0.009014 0.007011 0.050215244 
2 10KB 0.016024 0.019028 0.010012 0.00801 0.05307436 
3 100KB 0.009013 0.01903 0.012019 0.008011 0.048072815 
4 1MB 0.032046 0.070643 0.039058 0.036055 0.177802086 
5 10MB 0.242368 0.28314 0.288423 0.082094 0.896025287 
6 100MB 1.427057 3.188541 3.232013 0.870321 8.71793245 
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Figure 55: Varied file sizes using 1MB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
 
Table 36: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.021032 0.079934 0.011017 0.007009 0.118992329 
2 10KB 0.027039 0.016024 0.009015 0.00701 0.059087992 
3 100KB 0.033048 0.076109 0.012018 0.039436 0.160611153 
4 1MB 0.03004 0.076736 0.032045 0.010015 0.148836136 
5 10MB 0.098146 0.179262 0.279647 0.071104 0.628159046 
6 100MB 0.818294 2.268259 2.388486 0.403592 5.878630726 
7 1GB 87.14479 49.09185 49.53975 41.1374 226.9137902 
 
 
 
Figure 56: Varied file sizes using 10MB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
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Table 37: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.054091 0.078141 0.010017 0.008011 0.150259972 
2 10KB 0.024037 0.017024 0.008889 0.008013 0.057962894 
3 100KB 0.022032 0.067101 0.032055 0.022034 0.143222332 
4 1MB 0.044828 0.080118 0.031864 0.026553 0.183362961 
5 10MB 0.088123 0.224328 0.231341 0.028037 0.571829319 
6 100MB 1.746907 1.490762 3.070401 1.048018 7.356088161 
7 1GB 73.1758 31.97497 37.34199 28.54653 171.0392945 
 
 
 
Figure 57: Varied file sizes using 100MB fragment size in share policy 
 
Table 38: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.021034 0.166063 0.010013 0.007008 0.204117775 
2 10KB 0.021028 0.038056 0.011017 0.008012 0.078113079 
3 100KB 0.045064 0.058084 0.047072 0.007009 0.157228947 
4 1MB 0.052076 0.121175 0.051073 0.010013 0.23433733 
5 10MB 0.081123 0.203299 0.194283 0.030045 0.508749962 
6 100MB 1.876107 3.978742 3.320234 1.230602 10.40568471 
7 1GB 87.97622 562.5093 1627.002 38.63254 2316.119604 
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Figure 58: Varied file sizes using 1GB fragment size in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
12.2.2 Key Share Creation and Recovering 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Secret Sharing Policy: 2 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and recover 
secret key using a particular key share policy. 
 
Table 39: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0 0.007813275 0.001562595 0.007751107 0.017126977 
2 10KB 0.04972036 0.05682285 0.01562595 0 0.12216916 
3 100KB 0.3956114 0.6448381 0.008513689 0 1.048963189 
4 1MB 4.817735 7.716554 0.067607008 0.004066491 12.6059625 
5 10MB 106.03329 224.536643 0.748716545 0.365789056 331.6844386 
6 100MB 1538.0304 2280.3814 17.59926614 3.519875407 3839.530942 
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Figure 59: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 40: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.015624046 0.023435116 0.004688001 0.007812977 0.05156014 
2 10KB 0.019611657 0.015583277 0.003124714 0.00781095 0.046130598 
3 100KB 0.07102507 0.05682039 0.001562595 0 0.129408055 
4 1MB 0.3954959 0.6173189 0.010937715 0.0078125 1.031565015 
5 10MB 3.7395 5.776235 0.075003028 0.039065003 9.629803031 
6 100MB 38.96319 67.60683 0.702415705 0.343688607 107.6161243 
7 1GB 400.1159 779.7861 21.66762698 3.590544581 1205.160172 
 
 
Figure 60: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
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Table 41: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007838011 0.023381114 0.006269598 0 0.037488723 
2 10KB 0.007813931 0.015626431 0 0 0.023440362 
3 100KB 0.007812977 0.011719525 0.003098392 0.007735014 0.030365908 
4 1MB 0.09242752 0.12073322 0.003100586 0 0.216261326 
5 10MB 0.394453 0.6486295 0.006310487 0.015625954 1.065018941 
6 100MB 4.339445 6.764127 0.071877098 0.031312108 11.20676121 
7 1GB 42.49972 74.2406 0.722071505 0.453271508 117.915663 
 
 
Figure 61: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 2 from 5 share 
policy 
 
Table 42: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.01562345 0.015625 0.001549006 0 0.032797456 
2 10KB 0 0.02343452 0.001101365 0.001501918 0.026037803 
3 100KB 0.011718452 0.050782264 0 0.003906727 0.066407443 
4 1MB 0.003876984 0.019532502 0 0 0.023409486 
5 10MB 0.08513852 0.09226236 0 0 0.17740088 
6 100MB 0.3869049 0.6269624 0.007811785 0 1.021679085 
7 1GB 4.906314 6.379165 0.084378815 0.078129053 11.44798687 
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Figure 62: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 43: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.015615106 0.054621458 0.007812691 0 0.078049255 
2 10KB 0.015594959 0.031126022 0 0 0.046720982 
3 100KB 0.007812977 0.007812023 0.001579499 0 0.017204499 
4 1MB 0.007812977 0.015625596 0.00469821 0 0.028136783 
5 10MB 0 0.97619534 0.003150225 0 0.979345565 
6 100MB 0.04982027 0.07785375 0.003112006 0.007812977 0.138599003 
7 1GB 0.88994782 1.7235888 0.024221396 0.007811546 2.645569562 
 
 
Figure 63: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
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Table 44: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 2 from 5 share 
policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.0079 0.007726431 0.00156281 0 0.017189241 
2 10KB 0 0.0078125 0.001549411 0 0.009361911 
3 100KB 0.007815003 0.007812977 0.00156419 0 0.01719217 
4 1MB 0.015667081 0.015568376 0 0 0.031235457 
5 10MB 0 0.007812977 0 0.007813096 0.015626073 
6 100MB 0.003906787 0.015624762 0.001571512 0 0.021103061 
7 1GB 0.19159794 0.16335043 0.00794549 0 0.36289386 
 
 
Figure 64: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 2 from 5 share 
policy 
 
Table 45: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007737517 0.055197954 0 0 0.062935471 
2 10KB 0 0.015625 0.001582384 0 0.017207384 
3 100KB 0.009815454 0.011816621 0.002163911 0.000500083 0.024296069 
4 1MB 0.003503442 0.013517618 0.00800322 0.001502514 0.026526794 
5 10MB 0.007814407 0.00781405 0.001578999 0 0.017207456 
6 100MB 0.007820487 0.046877384 0.001562715 0.007751465 0.064012051 
7 1GB 1.119861722 0.605621219 0.012093687 0.007828951 1.745405579 
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Figure 65: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB  
Secret Sharing Policy: 3 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and recover secret 
key using a particular key share policy. 
 
Table 46: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.001999975 0.014819742 0.001568794 0 0.018388511 
2 10KB 0.04971905 0.07812608 0.002437305 0 0.130282435 
3 100KB 0.5164762 0.6092557 0.015612602 0.424601555 1.565946057 
4 1MB 5.293963 6.223017 0.069243789 41.463992 53.05021579 
5 10MB 47.87565 71.48502 0.693807769 4101.797584 4221.852062 
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Figure 66: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 47: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.007918477 0.001565707 0.034364295 0 0.043848479 
 2 10KB 0.011720224 0.01171881 0.002063322 0 0.025502356 
 3 100KB 0.07813096 0.0781237 0.001562691 0.0078125 0.165629851 
 4 1MB 0.6922069 0.6770385 0.007134318 0.424463511 1.800843229 
 5 10MB 5.820417 6.456415 0.1079391 41.2689935 53.6537646 
 6 100MB 49.52936 280.75698 0.698485422 4101.788009 4432.772834 
 
 
Figure 67: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
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Table 48: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.014020085 0.038558364 0.006610155 0.005006909 0.064195513 
2 10KB 0.010513544 0.031795979 0.0038059 0.003003597 0.04911902 
3 100KB 0.004733075 0.018936558 0.005607772 0.00801003 0.037287435 
4 1MB 0.04486291 0.17686271 0.011015558 0.424120426 0.656861604 
5 10MB 0.4684845 1.8965906 0.075609422 41.84533298 44.2860175 
6 100MB 4.66078 19.933848 0.90046041 4531.828259 4557.323347 
 
 
Figure 68: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 3 from 5 share 
policy 
 
Table 49: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.00750792 0.024041891 0.003505302 0.003004074 0.038059187 
2 10KB 0.005506635 0.024134517 0.003405094 0.002502441 0.035548687 
3 100KB 0.005005479 0.024034381 0.003807426 0.00250411 0.035351396 
4 1MB 0.005508065 0.019026518 0.003905606 0.003003359 0.031443548 
5 10MB 0.04505467 0.18677616 0.004206061 0.018526435 0.254563326 
6 100MB 0.4826415 1.946952 0.011116862 0.432633519 2.873343881 
7 1GB 4.989744 21.453339 0.187532067 41.61609554 68.24671061 
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Figure 69: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 50: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.006509542 0.030044436 0.004006076 0.003504992 0.044065046 
2 10KB 0.005507469 0.019529939 0.003304434 0.002000451 0.030342293 
3 100KB 0.004006028 0.020030022 0.00320487 0.002504587 0.029745507 
4 1MB 0.005007386 0.023534417 0.00390588 0.002505541 0.034953224 
5 10MB 0.004507065 0.03955853 0.003304601 0.002004027 0.049374223 
6 100MB 0.05157232 0.18577373 0.004005647 0.006009936 0.247361633 
7 1GB 1.6381979 5.3205009 0.17423861 0.533988953 7.666926363 
 
 
Figure 70: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
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Table 51: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 3 from 5 share 
policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.009513378 0.028017998 0.00420537 0.003503919 0.045240665 
 2 10KB 0.013522625 0.046231985 0.00730865 0.00600493 0.07306819 
 3 100KB 0.01452148 0.029041052 0.005407834 0.004507065 0.053477431 
 4 1MB 0.005006552 0.018527627 0.00300386 0.002505064 0.029043103 
 5 10MB 0.005009532 0.025157452 0.004906583 0.003504038 0.038577605 
 6 100MB 0.019026995 0.035051942 0.003906035 0.002503037 0.060488009 
 7 1GB 0.58460409 0.70191026 0.036320114 0.013153458 1.335987922 
 
 
Figure 71: Key Share and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 52: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.004504561 0.022533417 0.003804874 0.002502918 0.03334577 
2 10KB 0.004504919 0.02116394 0.003404713 0.0028162 0.031889772 
3 100KB 0.004005432 0.020029902 0.003505039 0.002503037 0.03004341 
4 1MB 0.009513497 0.034051538 0.005709576 0.002499104 0.051773715 
5 10MB 0.005006075 0.031042457 0.00410662 0.002002001 0.042157153 
6 100MB 0.01941359 0.02503264 0.004306817 0.003006458 0.051759505 
7 1GB 3.183449984 1.58512044 0.382245779 0.337004185 5.487820388 
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Figure 72: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB  
Secret Sharing Policy: 4 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and recover 
secret key using a particular key share policy. 
 
Table 53: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.005007386 0.025519967 0.00380497 0.005005836 0.039338159 
2 10KB 0.05279541 0.19847545 0.00460763 0.123180866 0.379059356 
3 100KB 0.5393359 2.00651 0.011215639 96.81914401 99.37620555 
 
 
Figure 73: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1KB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
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Table 54: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.007010937 0.022032022 0.003404284 0.004004002 0.036451245 
2 10KB 0.00500536 0.020031929 0.003805208 0.005007982 0.033850479 
3 100KB 0.05189267 0.20212195 0.004207563 0.116168022 0.374390205 
4 1MB 0.5541734 1.9436804 0.011416817 101.3007209 103.8099915 
 
 
Figure 74: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10KB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 55: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.00600791 0.028062105 0.003203535 0.004007101 0.041280651 
2 10KB 0.005008936 0.025034904 0.004005957 0.004005909 0.038055706 
3 100KB 0.006007075 0.020029426 0.003605556 0.005007029 0.034649086 
4 1MB 0.05279888 0.2021174 0.004406166 0.115168095 0.374490541 
5 10MB 0.5434386 2.2062003 0.011215019 102.727818 105.4886719 
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Figure 75: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100KB fragment in 4 from 5 share 
policy 
 
Table 56: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.005009174 0.019028902 0.003806543 0.004006147 0.031850767 
2 10KB 0.005007982 0.023032904 0.004005384 0.004005909 0.036052179 
3 100KB 0.006009102 0.039059877 0.004007149 0.003004074 0.052080202 
4 1MB 0.020028472 0.041079044 0.012418222 0.009011984 0.082537722 
5 10MB 0.06737124 0.21885027 0.004606152 0.116168976 0.406996638 
6 100MB 0.6781625 2.3552517 0.011617374 97.11757994 100.1626115 
 
 
Figure 76: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1MB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
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Table 57: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.017022848 0.036051989 0.00580821 0.007007122 0.065890169 
2 10KB 0.00600791 0.022032976 0.003603983 0.004000902 0.035645771 
3 100KB 0.010014057 0.041062117 0.0038064 0.004008055 0.058890629 
4 1MB 0.007007122 0.028040886 0.004407072 0.005008936 0.044464016 
5 10MB 0.005006433 0.018527508 0.003606033 0.004004955 0.031144929 
6 100MB 0.06571531 0.25674928 0.004205561 0.114168167 0.440838318 
7 1GB 2.4023419 6.7281839 0.22472744 104.130311 113.4855643 
 
 
Figure 77: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 10MB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 58: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 4 from 5 share 
policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.029040098 0.052077055 0.015822411 0.010015965 0.106955529 
2 10KB 0.005007029 0.022032976 0.003605461 0.004004955 0.034650421 
3 100KB 0.016027927 0.034050941 0.006007957 0.007007122 0.063093948 
4 1MB 0.011016846 0.034053087 0.00600996 0.007009983 0.058089876 
5 10MB 0.006008148 0.021037102 0.003604174 0.004004002 0.034653426 
6 100MB 0.010514975 0.028539062 0.015069962 0.02402997 0.078153969 
7 1GB 0.35621665 0.50816536 0.023654175 0.209298849 1.097335034 
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Figure 78: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 100MB fragment in 4 from 5 share 
policy 
 
Table 59: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.026038885 0.095140934 0.013951063 0.08305788 0.218188763 
2 10KB 0.010014057 0.030047894 0.005007219 0.006008863 0.051078033 
3 100KB 0.021031857 0.063093185 0.006408787 0.00801301 0.098546839 
4 1MB 0.011013985 0.033047199 0.006009436 0.007011175 0.057081795 
5 10MB 0.005006075 0.020029068 0.003403807 0.003004074 0.031443024 
6 100MB 0.027036905 0.036056995 0.003605795 0.004007101 0.070706797 
7 1GB 1.863462448 1.334843516 0.088929844 0.956404209 4.243640017 
 
 
Figure 79: Key Share Creation and Recovering using 1GB fragment in 4 from 5 share policy 
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12.3 Variant Two 
12.3.1 Fragments 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 15% of each file Size 
Secret Sharing Policy: 2 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and recombine 
file using varied key share policies. 
 
Table 60: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.002925038 0.005387 0.013149977 0.001445055 0.02290707 
 2 10KB 0.038562179 0.0073225 0.03125155 0.002905488 0.080041716 
 3 100KB 0.003394961 0.0068255 0.035158157 0.002437949 0.047816568 
 4 1MB 0.004876733 0.009764 0.020504594 0.002928138 0.038073464 
 5 10MB 0.022940755 0.0542355 0.08544898 0.01366663 0.176291865 
 6 100MB 0.263669968 0.7352945 0.684566617 0.190426588 1.873957673 
 7 1GB 26.31982481 18.0551 19.57863176 14.14794874 78.10150532 
 
 
Figure 80: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 2 from 5 share policy 
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Table 61: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.01074183 0.007808 0.0117203 0.001464128 0.031734258 
 2 10KB 0.003417015 0.005401 0.014142394 0.001951933 0.024912342 
 3 100KB 0.003919721 0.0097795 0.013170838 0.001954079 0.028824138 
 4 1MB 0.006330132 0.0097585 0.016113043 0.003416777 0.035618452 
 5 10MB 0.024902463 0.066904 0.079588175 0.016105175 0.187499813 
 6 100MB 0.249003887 0.499052 0.668944597 0.171869397 1.588869882 
 7 1GB 29.3764677 18.272035 19.59326553 14.14258373 81.38435197 
 
 
 
Figure 81: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 3 from 5 share policy 
 
 
Table 62: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.002427101 0.0053805 0.00732398 0.00145793 0.016589511 
 2 10KB 0.00292635 0.005372 0.008307219 0.001480222 0.01808579 
 3 100KB 0.003412962 0.004893 0.012213349 0.001952171 0.022471483 
 4 1MB 0.004395008 0.01222 0.014651418 0.002941012 0.034207438 
 5 10MB 0.028311729 0.063499 0.06786871 0.013174653 0.172854092 
 6 100MB 0.220714808 0.5121775 0.73241353 0.276359558 1.741665396 
 7 1GB 26.46483827 18.09913 19.42675602 14.02051485 78.01123914 
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Figure 82: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 63: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.026849508 0.00783 0.03028059 0.00194037 0.066900468 
 2 10KB 0.004398942 0.0068895 0.024399281 0.002448678 0.038136401 
 3 100KB 0.019526243 0.007301 0.030745983 0.001979351 0.059552577 
 4 1MB 0.004876614 0.006857 0.041999578 0.003415108 0.0571483 
 5 10MB 0.030759573 0.0800605 0.073757172 0.028308153 0.212885398 
 6 100MB 0.262196779 0.581529 0.638176203 0.275382519 1.757284501 
 7 1GB 35.07715082 18.72004 20.2573272 14.28020155 88.33471957 
 
 
 
Figure 83: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 10 share policy 
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Table 64: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 6 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.002924442 0.005363 0.014597535 0.001461148 0.024346126 
2 10KB 0.002439857 0.003923 0.012702703 0.001458526 0.020524086 
3 100KB 0.00341785 0.0092475 0.012699008 0.001951814 0.027316171 
4 1MB 0.005369663 0.009251 0.01805234 0.008789301 0.041462304 
5 10MB 0.028310537 0.0502505 0.080553055 0.013691425 0.172805517 
6 100MB 0.231923342 0.479033 0.621574283 0.16698122 1.499511845 
7 1GB 27.49071908 18.178235 20.24266446 14.06738889 79.97900743 
 
 
 
 
Figure 84: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 6 from 10 share policy 
 
Table 65: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 8 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.019048691 0.0073495 0.024884462 0.001938701 0.053221354 
2 10KB 0.003939748 0.0083285 0.102038383 0.002929687 0.117236319 
3 100KB 0.002926469 0.005854 0.02783668 0.001965404 0.038582553 
4 1MB 0.004895687 0.009758 0.044403076 0.045897126 0.104953889 
5 10MB 0.035639167 0.0532065 0.154280305 0.018523335 0.261649307 
6 100MB 0.216794372 0.4418855 0.792963624 0.328602195 1.78024569 
7 1GB 37.22312522 19.845195 24.66403377 14.36472654 96.09708053 
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Figure 85: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 8 from 10 share policy 
 
12.3.2 Key Share creation and Recovering 
File Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB, 1GB 
Fragment Sizes: 15% of each file Size 
Secret Sharing Policy: 2 from 5 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and recover 
secret key using varied key share policies. 
 
Table 66: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 2 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
 1 1KB 0.0063395 7.08288 0.00391 0.001009345 7.094138845 
 2 10KB 0.0063515 7.24591 0.0014255 0.000486374 7.254173374 
 3 100KB 0.007299 7.3756 0.00196 0.000485539 7.385344539 
 4 1MB 0.006354 7.66259 0.00098548 0.000488043 7.670417523 
 5 10MB 0.007364 8.44544 0.001933122 0.00096786 8.455704982 
 6 100MB 0.0073195 7.2813 0.00098455 0.00097096 7.290575009 
 7 1GB 0.0083555 6.7577 0.001965 0 6.7680205 
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Figure 86: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 2 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 67: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 3 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.0126305 7.78316 0.001954635 0.000973582 7.798718718 
2 10KB 0.0083265 7.75075 0.002922924 0.000968575 7.762967999 
3 100KB 0.0097285 7.73132 0.0009935 0.000983834 7.743025834 
4 1MB 0.009259 7.92991 0.000970244 0.000974536 7.94111378 
5 10MB 0.0130765 7.26687 0.001469758 0.001462817 7.282879075 
6 100MB 0.031743 7.18971 0.001950973 0.000982046 7.224386019 
7 1GB 0.008793 7.71865 0.0009675 0.000972033 7.729382533 
 
 
Figure 87: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 3 from 5 share policy 
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Table 68: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 5 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.0097145 8.14136 0.002932 0.005845308 8.159851808 
2 10KB 0.0097625 7.37872 0.0024415 0.006352425 7.397276425 
3 100KB 0.0102365 6.89898 0.002934 0.006337404 6.918487904 
4 1MB 0.01023 6.77493 0.00097394 0.007277608 6.793411548 
5 10MB 0.0097235 8.21718 0.00244192 0.00633204 8.23567746 
6 100MB 0.0117145 6.63638 0.000980616 0.005851626 6.654926742 
7 1GB 0.010253 7.50053 0.000982 0.005854607 7.517619607 
 
 
 
Figure 88: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 5 share policy 
 
Table 69: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.018493 18.631 0.001472185 0.024397969 18.67536315 
2 10KB 0.0233775 16.9215 0.002914 0.02342999 16.97122149 
3 100KB 0.0214355 17.8164 0.005371 0.02293098 17.86613748 
4 1MB 0.023038 18.6172 0.00243494 0.029303908 18.67197685 
5 10MB 0.0180025 16.3501 0.0024365 0.024405718 16.39494472 
6 100MB 0.020926 15.8723 0.0034195 0.023820877 15.92046638 
7 1GB 0.0248405 16.101 0.004886 0.024891376 16.15561788 
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Figure 89: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 4 from 10 share policy 
 
Table 70: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 6 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.0233445 16.2525 0.0024405 9.392581463 25.67086646 
2 10KB 0.0238365 15.9982 0.001952566 9.305171847 25.32916091 
3 100KB 0.0287805 15.26517272 0.0029445 9.76513195 25.06202967 
4 1MB 0.0287635 15.6713 0.002930973 9.67675817 25.37975264 
5 10MB 0.026309 16.1595 0.001954331 9.628413081 25.81617641 
6 100MB 0.0287345 15.956 0.004394 9.275384188 25.26451269 
7 1GB 0.026781 15.7265 0.0033945 9.627430558 25.38410606 
 
 
Figure 90: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 6 from 10 share policy 
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Table 71: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 8 from 10 share policy 
S/N FileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB 0.0555445 17.0244 0.0019635 1519.267616 1536.349524 
2 10KB 0.035603 15.6087 0.002954 1613.893052 1629.540309 
3 100KB 0.035248 16.7949 0.00243842 1467.797424 1484.63001 
4 1MB 0.031649 15.9978 0.002927824 1428.302855 1444.335232 
5 10MB 0.0355935 15.448 0.002912 1500.366265 1515.85277 
6 100MB 0.0332835 16.9651 0.004884 1455.750583 1472.75385 
7 1GB 0.031208 21.5647 0.013211 1577.407721 1599.01684 
 
 
Figure 91: Varied file sizes using equal number of fragments in 8 from 10 share policy  
 
12.4 Variant Three 
12.4.1 Fragments 
File Sizes: Varied 
Fragment Sizes: Varied 
Secret Sharing Policy: Varied 
Cloud Outage: Varied 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and combine 
file  using varied key share policies with cloud outages. 
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Table 72: Cloud outages at varied file sizes and share policies 
S/
N 
KeyShaFileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCos
t 
1 1KB, 3 from 5, 1down 0.003419161 0.019013 0.020502925 0.001953244 0.04488833 
2 10KB, 3 from 5, 2 
down 
0.002927661 0.0063275 0.043943286 0.001934886 0.055133333 
3 1KB, 6 from 10, 
3down 
0.003908277 0.006839 0.012194753 0.001466274 0.024408304 
4 10KB, 6 from 10, 
4down 
0.003423333 0.0068415 0.015063882 0.002443552 0.027772267 
 
 
Table 73: Varied file sizes and share policies 
S/
N 
KeyShaFileSize FileSplitTime FragEncTime FragDecTime FileComTime OverHeadCos
t 
1 1KB, 3 from 5, 1 
down 
0.01074183 0.007808 0.0117203 0.001464128 0.031734258 
2 10KB, 3 from 5, 
2down 
0.003417015 0.005401 0.014142394 0.001951933 0.024912342 
3 1KB, 6 from 10, 
3down 
0.002924442 0.005363 0.014597535 0.001461148 0.024346126 
4 10KB, 6 from 10, 
4down 
0.002439857 0.003923 0.012702703 0.001458526 0.020524086 
 
 
 
Figure 92: Comparing file processing overheads during normal situations and cloud outages 
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12.4.2 Key Share Creation and Recovery 
File Sizes: Varied 
Fragment Sizes: Varied 
Secret Sharing Policy: Varied 
Plot:  File Sizes in KB against Time Taken in Seconds to process and combine 
file  using varied key share policies. 
Table 74: Cloud outages at varied file sizes and share policies 
S/N KeyShaFileSize KeyShaCreTime KeyShaWriTime ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCost 
1 1KB, 3 from 5, 
1down 
0.0111955 6.5083 0.00098145 0.000971913 6.521448863 
2 10KB, 3 from 5, 
2down 
0.0074035 3.7339 0.000978708 0.000979543 3.743261751 
3 1KB, 6 from 10, 
3 down 
0.026288 13.8595 0.000978 2.049305081 15.93607108 
4 10KB, 6 from 10, 
4down 
0.036072 13.3141 0.001961 1.091316342 14.44344934 
 
Table 75: Varied file sizes and share policies 
S/
N 
KeyShaFileSize KeyShaCreTim
e 
KeyShaWriTim
e 
ShaRecTime SecRecTime OverHeadCos
t 
1 1KB, 3 from 5 0.0126305 7.78316 0.00195463
5 
0.00097358
2 
7.798718718 
2 10KB, 3 from 5 0.0083265 7.75075 0.00292292
4 
0.00096857
5 
7.762967999 
3 1KB, 6 from 10 0.0233445 16.2525 0.0024405 9.39258146
3 
25.67086646 
4 10KB, 6 from 10 0.0238365 15.9982 0.00195256
6 
9.30517184
7 
25.32916091 
 
 
Figure 93: Comparing cloud outages at varied share policies against normal situations 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1KB, 3 from 5 10KB, 3 from 5 1KB, 6 from 10 10KB, 6 from 10
Ti
m
e
 T
ak
en
 (
S)
File Sizes (KB)
Cloud outages at variable file
sizes and share policies
Variable file sizes and share
policies
                         165    
 
13 Appendix D 
13.1 Details of the experimental procedures 
used 
Table 76: User Management Data Store 
Datetime ID UUID FileName FileSize FileRef Cloudlet0 Cloudlet1 ... Cloudletn 
Datetime1 ID1 UUID1 Filename1 Filesize1 FileRef1 FileID0 FileID1 ... FileIDn 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Datetimen IDn UUIDn Filenamen Filesizen FileRefn FileIDn0 FileIDn1 ... FileIDn 
 
Legends: 
DateTime  = specifies Date and Time user details were stored. 
ID  = contains hashed value of all user personal details    
UUID   = Universally Unique Identifier automatically created for each user. It  
  differentiates users and used to name file fragments when created in order of 
  creation (UUID.1, UUID.2,..,UUID.n). 
FileName  = specified name of file from which fragments were created 
FileSize  = provides size of user’s file 
FileRef  = Reference number of user’s file, serves as a Primary key. 
Cloudlet0-Cloudletn = provides FileID that reveals share storage details (cloud API, token, 
   name of share and location in storage bucket of the cloud).  
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Figure 94: File Fragmentation and Encryption 
 
A. Processes of Share Creation 
To create shares out of a secret key, we define the Threshold, M and Share size N, 
determine a unique Identifier, (an identifier that distinguishes each Share creation 
session containing values (0-9, a-z)). The essence is to establish the number of 
participating cloudlets and the minimum number of cloudlets that are required to 
reconstruct the secret key in case of share corruption or failure of retrieval from one or 
more cloudlets during the reconstruction phase. That is to say: 
Define policy: M-out-of-N  
Determine unique identifier: combination of alphanumeric characters 
Key path = (‘path/to/keygen’) 
Hash value: if the hash value chosen is 1, the secret will be hashed with SHA128, if 2, 
SHA256. 
B. Key extraction: 
Keys are automatically generated by a random number generator using,  
Secret = os.urandom (BS), where BS represents block size and Secret is the 
encryption key. 
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C. Share generation: 
Using the chosen share policy’s threshold, the degree of the polynomial is determined, 
which is the value of (M-1) and the number of values generated for (X, A) pair is based 
on N, and hence the values are generated using this equation [137]:  
 
𝑓(𝑋, 𝐴) =   ∑ 𝐴[𝑖]. 𝑋𝑖𝑀−1𝑖=0       Equation 25 
X is the number of participants from 1 to N; A represents the values taken at random 
for each participant (X). Using this, shares are generated for each participant and the 
number of shares generated is based on the value of N as stated earlier. The secret is 
set at an index, where X = 0, as the value of A where X = 0, known as the intercept 
lies the secret. Hence the secret lies at A[0] = 0, choosing A[1], A[2],...A[M-1] at 
random corresponding shares are computed and distributed to all participants. 
RESCUE uses the diagram in Figure 95 to explain how each share is represented at 
the storage locations after computation. 
Append Hash
Generate Shares
ECC Encoding
Add Unique Identifier
Append Metadata
Metadata ID ECC Share
Hash 
Value
Processes of share 
creation
Share Storage Format
Share A1
Share B1
...
Share N1
Share A2
Share B2
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Share A3
Share B3
...
Share N3
Share A...
Share B...
...
Share N...
Share An
Share Bn
...
Share Nn
Key Generator
Encryption Key
Creates Shares from Key using 
Secret Sharing Algorithm
 
Figure 95: Key Share and Storage 
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D. File Recreation 
File recreation in RESCUE as shown in Figure 96 are of several stages – the user 
types in personal details as well as file reference number at login stage, RESCUE 
produces their equivalent hash values and matches them with stored values in user’s 
metadata store. When matched values are found, the user’s access is granted and a 
Pointer is placed on the record. First, the UUID of the user is retrieved and this is used 
call up all correspondent encrypted fragments in memory. Secondly, FileIDs of each 
participating cloudlets are retrieved and used to locate shares created out of the key for 
each encrypted fragment. Thirdly, each key is recovered from the participating 
cloudlets using Secret Share Recovering Algorithm based on a pre-determined 
threshold. Fourthly, each recovered key is used to decrypt correspondent encrypted 
fragments in sequence until all encrypted fragments are decrypted. The decrypted 
fragment each is written in sequence (serial numbered) until all fragments are written 
on top of each order and hence original file is reconstructed. Finally, the original file 
name with the corresponding file extension name are retrieved and used to name the 
reconstructed file. The file so reconstructed is checked for integrity using SHA 512 
checksum, and when valid, it is moved to a designated file container. We hereby 
present the mathematical expression of the secret share recovery algorithm as follows: 
 
Mathematically, M numbers of participants collaborate to recover the secret f(0) using 
Lagrange interpolation such as [137]:  
 
𝑓(0) = ∑ 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) ∏
𝑥𝑘
𝑥𝑘−𝑥𝑖
𝑀−1
𝑘=0,𝑘≠𝑖
𝑀−1
𝑖=0      Equation 
26 
Ith values are the minimum number of participants that can collaborate to recover the 
secret, while kth values are the maximum number of participants and they are not the 
same. Just as in Shamir [2] authorised participants following earlier stated rules are 
able to recover the secret using Lagrangian interpolation once the conditions: 
1. All zero elements of the array of M octets are retrieved. 
2. Number of retrieved elements greater or equal to the threshold. 
3. All contributed shares from participants are certified as genuine and satisfies 2 
above. 
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Figure 96: Key recoveries and file reconstruction 
 
E. Cloud Behavioural Computation 
After every operation, the user is presented with two different computational options – 
Capacity Measures of each participating cloudlet or Overall Cloudlets Performance 
during each operation. The essence is to give the user options of perusing behaviours 
of each cloudlet during the operation such as its Latency (ms), Speed (bps), 
Throughput (bps) and Availability. While in the other hand, the overall performance 
of all cloudlets in the areas of Elapsed Time (sec), Packet Loss, Average Round Trip 
Time (ms), Speed (bps), Download Bandwidth (bps), Upload Bandwidth (bps), 
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Latency (ms), and Throughput (bps) for comparative analysis. We will therefore treat 
this section by looking at these measures in details as designed. 
III. Capacity Measures of clouds 
Below is a table showing the Capacities, Evaluation Metrics, Formulae, Units and 
Tools for measurement. 
Table 77: Evaluation Metrics 
Capacity Metrics Formulae Unit Tool 
Availability Packet Loss 
Frequency 
Packet Loss Per Unit Time Bits per second 
(bps) 
Pingparser 
Latency IP Transfer Delays Propagation Delay + 
Serialisation delay 
Milliseconds (ms) SpeedNet 
Transaction 
Speed 
Max. No. of Transfer 
Session 
Length of File Over Time Meters per Second 
(mps) 
SpeedNet 
Throughput Volume of processed 
data 
File Size Over Time Ops/Sec (bps) SpeedNet 
 
IV. Overall Performance Measures 
Overall performance extends some measures by including more metrics that shows 
comparatively cloudlets performance at a glance by considering their different 
capacities such as: Elapsed Time (s), Packet Loss, Average Round Trip Time (ms), 
Speed (s), Download and Upload Bandwidths (bps), Latency (bps) and Throughput 
(bps). 
Table 78: Overall Performance Evaluation Metrics 
Capacity Metrics Formulae Unit Tool 
Elapsed Time Time Taken for action End Time - Start Time seconds Clock Time 
Packet Loss Packet differentials Received – Transmitted 
packets 
bps SpeedNet 
Average Round 
Trip Time 
Mean Round Trip Time Total RTT/Number of Round 
Trips 
ms Pingparser 
Speed Max. No. of Transfer 
Session 
Length/Time taken mps Pingparser 
Download 
Bandwidth 
Total download traffic 
carrying capacity 
Volume of data transmitted 
between two points per second 
bps SpeedNet 
Upload 
Bandwidth 
Total upload traffic 
carrying capacity 
Volume of data transmitted 
between two points per second 
bps SpeedNet 
Latency IP Transfer Delays Propagation Delay + 
Serialisation delay 
ms SpeedNet 
Throughput Volume of Processed 
Data 
File Size Over Time bps SpeedNet 
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At every operation of RESCUE, measures are taken to ascertain several behaviours of 
participating cloudlets so as to help set up benchmarks of capacities of participating 
cloudlets for every file size against share policy in relation to accrued performance 
overheads such as latency, rate of packet loss, transaction speed and throughput. With 
this one can say using a certain file size in conjunction with a fragment size and share 
policy, the system is capable of having certain overheads accrued and hence 
prediction of future behaviours, as well as potential dangers, can be made using 
available results. With regards to this thesis’ proposed future works, self-organisation 
can be activated to avert any impending danger so as to keep the system consistently 
available. These behaviours are calculated through capacity measures as provided in 
the above tables. 
F. Agent 
The activities to be performed by the proposed Agent using Linear Regression model 
in Machine Learning as well as our Mathematical model to help predict the expected 
outcome of each cloudlet’s behaviour given a certain condition and inputs from the 
user are elaborated in section 8.4 of Chapter 8. The works of the Agent is to receive 
data from the calculated cloudlets capacities from several Microsoft Excel files and 
use same based on the metrics to 1. Establish a relationship between capacity’s 
variables and 2. Use the same to predict future results. When such results so predicted 
portends potential danger, the Agent retrieves shares posted to such cloudlet(s) and 
send same to better behaved cloudlets without giving any cloudlet shares exceeding or 
equals to the minimum thresholds used in such operation. 
 
